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ABSTRACT 
This project adopts an international relations perspective to examine how the 
Chickasaws conceptualized their position within the unraveling system of western 
imperial involvement in North America from the American Revolution until the end of 
the nineteenth century.  In their attempts to assert their right to sovereignty during the 
Early American Republic, the Chickasaws transformed from a coalescent society into a 
consolidated nation-state.  As a result, the Chickasaws established a strong political 
organization that prolonged their ability to thwart American attempts to subjugate them 
to the status of domestic dependent nations further than conventional historiography 
admits.  Whereas most scholars credit removal with establishing an understanding 
among Native Americans that they must accept United States hegemony, I argue that 
the federal-state power struggle offered opportunities for the Chickasaw to negotiate for 
autonomous sovereignty through the end of the Civil War.  In settling the debate over 
authority within the United States, the process of reconstruction—not removal—
demonstrated to the Chickasaws that the United States was able to impose a permanent 
semi-sovereign status on Native Americans.  By developing a native understanding of 
the debates concerning the nature of authority during the first century of the United 
States’ existence, therefore, I reexamine the process through which Native Americans 
understood that a semi-sovereign status under the United States became permanent. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No culture . . . retains its identity in isolation; identity is attained in 
contact, in contrast, in breakthrough. 
– Carlos Fuentes1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
True identity is found, oddly enough, when we lose ourselves.  Like 
happiness in living and good style in writing, a strong identity generally 
comes, if it comes at all, only when we are preoccupied with something 
or someone else:  if we deliberately go after it, we will probably not get 
it. 
– James Axtell2 
  
                                                 
1 Carlos Fuentes, Myself with Others: Selected Essays, reprinted (New York: 
Macmillan, 1990), p. 12. 
2 James Axtell, The Pleasures of Academe: A Celebration and Defense of 
Higher Education (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1998; Bison Books, 1999), 
p. 71. 
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From September 8 to 21, 1865, Native American representatives from Indian 
Territory met with U. S. commissioners at Fort Smith, Arkansas.  Their purpose was to 
negotiate the terms for former Indian Confederates to resume political relations with the 
United States government.  In their first appearance before the federal officials, the 
Chickasaw delegates proclaimed that they  
were not induced by the emissaries of the Confederate States to sever our treaty 
stipulations with the government of the United States, but that we made treaties 
with the Confederate States, from what appeared to us as our interest seemed to 
dictate, and as the means of preserving our independence and national identity, 
considering ourselves a separate political organization, and our country 
composing an integral part of the territory of the United States. 
 
Unlike the other native delegations, the Chickasaw representatives steadfastly refused to 
place the blame their alliance with the Confederate States of America solely on southern 
transgressions.  Although admitting that the close proximity of Confederate entities 
factored into tribal deliberations, the Chickasaw delegates repeatedly referenced 
concepts of sovereignty in their negotiations.  They boldly proclaimed that “to establish 
. . . the right of self-government” was the Nation’s underlying intent from the beginning 
of the Americans’ civil war.3   
I have always been fascinated with trying to understand why societies commit to 
war.  My initial focus for this dissertation was the Chickasaws’ decision to align with 
the Confederate States of America during the United States Civil War.  However, this is 
not a dissertation about Chickasaw participation in the Civil War in and of itself.  It is 
the choice of the Confederacy as an ally that fascinates me; the individual experiences 
                                                 
3 “Official Report of the proceedings of the council with the Indians of the west 
and southwest, held at Fort Smith, Arkansas, in September, 1865,” Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for the year 1865 (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1865), pp. 345-346. Hereinafter referred to as ARCIA, 1865. 
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of fighting in specific battles, although important, are somewhat anecdotal.  The 
motivations that commit societies to war are not influenced by the experiences endured 
during the subsequent conflict.   
The reasons that American Indian groups fought alongside the Confederacy 
vary.  The Chickasaws’ decision to ally with the Confederacy did not come lightly, nor 
was it something forced on them due to external pressures.  Most historians have 
attributed the driving motivation behind the Chickasaws’ choice of action to external 
influences rather than internal desires.4  Although recent interpretations highlight 
                                                 
4 In Between Two Fires: American Indians in the Civil War, Laurence M. 
Hauptman claimed that “many [Indians] fought because they believed it was their last 
best hope to halt a genocide that had begun in the East in the early seventeenth century, 
one that continued throughout the Trail of Tears westward in the 1830s, and exploded 
again after the California Gold Rush of 1849.”  Other historians related the decision to 
the Indians’ ownership of black slaves.  Within Chickasaw historiography, Kenny A. 
Franks determined that the decision resulted from cultural and economic ties to the 
South resulting from the Chickasaws’ ownership of slaves.  Ohland Morton carried this 
concept further.  Morton implied greater cultural ties since the majority of slaveowners 
among the Indians were mixed-bloods and the white ancestry involved was 
predominately Southern.  Arrell Gibson revealed another economic tie to the 
Confederacy through the holding of tribal trust funds by the southern states.  As for ties 
to the Union, there do not appear to be many.  Franks, among others, claimed that the 
abandonment of federal forts within Indian Territory left the tribes isolated and almost 
completely surrounded by southerner interests; self-preservation, therefore, became the 
underlying motivation.  Marion Ray McCullar claimed that federal troop withdrawal 
and the suspension of tribal fund disbursement allowed Southern sympathizers to play 
on the idea that the federal government would continue to ignore the Indians’ rights and 
to dupe the tribes into the believing that the federal government no longer existed.  This 
led the Indians to believe that the Confederacy would at least deal with them on an 
equal basis.  See Laurence M. Hauptman, Between Two Fires:  American Indians in the 
Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), pp. ix-x; Kenny A. Franks, “An 
Analysis of Confederate Treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes,” Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 50 (Winter 1972): 458; Ohland Morton, “The Confederate States 
Government and the Five Civilized Tribes, Part I,” Chronicles of Oklahoma 31 
(Summer 1953): 199; Arrell M. Gibson, The Chickasaws (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1971), p. 228; Marion Ray McCullar, “The Choctaw-Chickasaw 
Reconstruction Treaty of 1866” in The Civil War Era in Indian Territory, ed. LeRoy H. 
Fischer (Los Angeles: Lorrin L. Morrison, 1974), pp. 131-132.  See also Alvin M. 
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concepts of sovereignty and self-government as fundamental linchpins to choosing a 
side—Union or Confederacy—no one has demonstrated how a native group could 
conceive of an alliance with the Confederacy as an effective means through which to 
achieve their own internal goals beyond that of immediate self-preservation.5  It is my 
contention that Chickasaw leaders made a calculated choice in determining how and on 
which side their nation would become involved in the war.  These men believed they 
had the right to commit their society to war against the United States, an act that was 
not challenged by any Chickasaws who claimed the authority to represent their society 
to the outside world.  Not only did this act reveal that they represented the sovereign 
power of the Chickasaw government, it also demonstrated the Chickasaws had the right 
to act as any autonomous sovereign nation according to rules of international relations. 
*************** 
Although such high-minded ideals appeal to a segment of our contemporary 
society, we cannot simply expect the remainder of the historical profession to accept 
that internal desires such as the demand for recognition of native independence and 
sovereignty outweighed the external pressures inherent with the dissolution of the 
American union.  Rather, we must illustrate a process through which such reasons make 
sense within the context of the international system in which our subjects operated.  In 
seeking to reveal this process, my research has brought me into several other realms of 
investigation that were altogether unexpected when I first embarked on this project. 
                                                                                                                                               
Josephy, The Civil War in the American West (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 
pp. 324-330. 
5 A primary example is Clarissa Confer, The Cherokee Nation in the Civil War 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2007), Ch. 2.  Confer even states that “self-
governance” drove the Chickasaws’ decision, only to tie this to the desire to have 
Chickasaw-only military units protecting their territory; see p. 165n19.   
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The topic of sovereignty is a malleable concept that has changed over time, 
especially as Native Americans have come to use western rhetoric effectively against 
the descendents of those who first employed the idea to colonize their ancestors.  At its 
most basic, the term implies supreme authority over a specified territory, unencumbered 
by the ability of another power to assert its influence over the decisions of the 
recognized political authority.  Implicit in this ability to wield authority from an 
international perspective is the recognition by other sovereign entities of rightful claim 
to a territorial domain even if the exact boundaries are in dispute.  Within the context of 
nineteenth century international relations, sovereign actors were fully autonomous, 
recognized, and visible on the international stage.  Not only did they have supreme 
authority within their own polity, they had the ability to enter into contracts with other 
sovereign entities in all matters including their own subjugation should the power 
dynamics within the international system dictate.  Only the inability to repel another 
polity’s exertions of authority over oneself or willful acceptance of a protected status 
could restrict that autonomy.  In fact, many sovereign powers placed themselves into 
subservient relationships through the acts of their own free will.  As such, the restriction 
or loss of autonomy was only a temporary state of existence as the subservient polity 
had every right to sever the relationship should the opportunity arise.6 
                                                 
6 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations, edited and with an introduction by Béla 
Kapossy and Richard Whatmore, Natural Law and Enlightenment Classics, Knud 
Haakonssen, gen. ed. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, Inc., 2008), pp. 83-85; Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr., Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History 
(New York: HarperCollins College Publishers, 1993), p. 133-135; Geoffrey Stern, The 
Structure of International Society: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Relations (New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995), Ch. 6. 
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The term, sovereignty, was born in the western intellectual movement known as 
the Enlightenment.  It did not exist in the lexicon of pre-Columbian Native American 
cultures.  However, this does not mean that the Chickasaws’ ancestors would not have 
recognized the basic tenets westerners ascribed to the word for the socio-political 
interaction between societies.  Native American systems of diplomatic interaction were 
remarkably similar to those practiced by Europeans.  This made it somewhat easy for 
mid-nineteenth century Chickasaw leaders to incorporate western terminology and 
concepts into their diplomatic intercourse with the United States in ways that combined 
those ideas with their peoples’ traditional native definitions.  Just as their western 
counterparts did, Native American cultures recognized the concept of independent 
governmental authority as it applied to specific political units that did not necessarily 
have to answer to a higher power.  Both recognized that a sovereign actor—be it a 
monarch or a council of respected individuals who guided a community of ethnically- 
or politically-related villages—was the sole source of legal authority within its society; 
no outside political organization could impose laws on the individual citizens.  Further, 
a sovereign actor had the right to form alliances with other sovereign actors, and no 
higher authority could restrict that right.  Even in those cases where one sovereign actor 
took a subservient role within the alliance, the more powerful actor could not impose 
legal authority over the individual citizens of the weaker party.  The right to wield legal 
authority among the citizenry, as opposed to over the entire polity, remained solely 
within the power of the weaker actor’s chosen political system.  Therefore, as this 
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subservient role was one of choice, the weaker actor had every right to sever the 
relationship should the opportunity present itself.7 
In our own time, the ability of a sovereign power to demonstrate true autonomy 
is rare.  Over the past two centuries, both western and Native American scholars have 
disassociated the concept of autonomy from their assertions of sovereignty.  Despite 
western notions that the state’s authority is supreme and that no other power can 
constrain or dictate its actions, the realities of coexistence within an international realm 
of equally sovereign actors has forced most modern nations to accept that the larger 
community can restrain one state’s ability to act unilaterally without the others’ consent.  
Further, economic relationships forged by individuals in one state with those in other 
states that operate under different governing philosophies have restricted the autonomy 
of even the most powerful modern states.  For American Indians, the separation of 
autonomy from sovereignty came as the result of a prolonged colonial process and their 
incorporation into the American body politic in an ambiguous manner that continues to 
exist today.  Even though Native Americans have successfully incorporated sovereignty 
into their own arsenal of rhetorical weapons, the term carries certain cultural baggage 
that, historically, colonizing societies employed both to recognize or to deny indigenous 
peoples’ sovereignty in order to best obtain their objective in a given situation.  This 
                                                 
7 Vine Deloria, Jr. and Clifford M. Lytle, The Nations Within: The Past and 
Future of American Indian Sovereignty (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984; reprinted 
with a new preface, University of Texas Press, 1998), pp. 1-36; Neta C. Crawford, “A 
Security Regime among Democracies: Cooperation among Iroquois Nations,” 
International Organization 48:3 (Summer 1994): 345-385; Taiaiake Alfred, 
“Sovereignty” in Phillip Deloria and Neal Salisbury, eds., A Companion to American 
Indian History, Blackwell Companions to American History, paperback ed. (Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), pp. 460-474; and Nancy Shoemaker, A Strange 
Likeness: Becoming Red and White in Eighteenth-Century North America (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), Ch. 4. 
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was most notably accomplished by Americans’ desire to justify their own imperial 
accomplishments through the negotiation of treaties but then denying that Native 
Americans had the intellectual capacity to those basic rights the treaties purported to 
uphold for their polities. 
When looked at from a nineteenth-century, western-oriented perspective of 
international relations, modern American Indian nations exist in a permanent semi-
sovereign status within the confines of American federal hegemony.  Modern Native 
American nations have the ability to form economic relationships with foreign 
governments.  However, they do not enjoy full autonomy.  Although some modern 
Native American activists continue to seek recognition as independent players within 
the international system, they know that recognition must be agreed upon by 
independent players on the world stage.8  They cannot simply demand that they be 
recognized as fully autonomous polities as their ancestors did until the end of the 
nineteenth century.  The odds are stacked against them.  Relations between Americans 
and Native Americans throughout the twentieth century certainly indicate that the 
United States has no inclination to dissolve the relationship Americans have defined 
between themselves and the indigenous populations within their territorial domain.  Due 
to the power the United States holds in the twenty-first century international system, 
American Indians certainly could not expect an offer of alliance from a sovereign state 
in their effort to throw off the yoke of American dominance.  If they were to commit to 
war against the United States as the Chickasaws and other Confederate-allied groups 
                                                 
8 Bill Donahue, “Ways and Means: The Last Stand of Russell Means,” The 
Washington Post Magazine (June 29, 2008): W08. 
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did during the Civil War, most international polities would consider such an action a 
rebellion by a segment among the citizenry of the United States. 
Although modern definitions of sovereignty help us to explain how this story 
ends, they do not help us to understand how each side came to understand that the same 
definitions applied to their own situation.  Using our own contemporary constructs to 
define our subjects’ world obscures the systemic changes Native Americans had to 
accept as the balance of power shifted after the American Revolution from one in which 
native polities dictated the manner of diplomacy to one in which the United States 
controlled the terms of negotiation.  Therefore, this dissertation studies the nineteenth-
century Chickasaws as they conceived of their own ability to maneuver within an 
evolving system of international political actors. 
The Chickasaws practiced diplomacy according to both native and western 
nineteenth century concepts depending on the time in which negotiations took place.  
Consequently, it should not surprise us that Chickasaws began to demand recognition of 
their independence and sovereignty using western rhetoric once they determined the 
need to adapt their political system to confront the expansive nature of the United 
States.  Americans may have denied that Native American groups could demand such a 
status based on notions of racial and social difference prior to Removal, but their 
actions on the eve of the Civil War belied this belief.  That the Confederate States 
formed alliances with Native American polities at the same time that they sought 
recognition within the international community themselves only reaffirmed the 
Chickasaws’ belief that they held the same rights afforded to states in western 
diplomacy. 
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The Chickasaws viewed their position as a distinct and separate political entity 
within the world system beyond the parameters that have been previously defined 
within the historiography of United States-Indian relations.  When we look for 
watershed events within the fight for native sovereignty in the Early American Republic 
from an American perspective, two moments dominate the historiography.  Many 
historians argue that the United States emerged as the sole Euro-American imperial 
power east of the Mississippi River following the War of 1812.  This ended the tribes’ 
ability to “play”—or check the ambitions of—Euro-American powers against each 
other.  Historians have suggested a rapid progression from this to the second moment:  
the removal of the eastern tribes to territories west of the Mississippi.  Through the 
process of removal, many argue, the United States secured Native American acceptance 
of the semi-sovereign status defined by Chief Justice John Marshall in the 1831 
Supreme Court case, Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.9  However, both of these 
interpretations fail to offer a native understanding of when their ability to “play” Euro-
American powers ended and, thus, when it became necessary to separate the concepts of 
autonomy and sovereignty. 
                                                 
9 Historians have spent a great deal of time illustrating the end of the play-off 
system and—allowing for regional variations—most place it at the end of the War of 
1812.  For examples among prominent contemporary historians, see Richard White, The 
Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region (1992); 
Daniel Richter, Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001); and Colin G. Calloway, The Scratch of a 
Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2006).  Recently, some scholars have stated that we should the need to extend the 
system a few more years.  They argue that American Indians south of the Great Lakes 
and east of the Mississippi River did not have to deal solely with the United States until 
after 1820 when the Spanish Empire in the Americas collapsed.  See Francois 
Furstenburg, “The Significance of the Trans-Appalachian Frontier in Atlantic History,” 
American Historical Review 113:3 (June 2008): 647-677. 
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The Chickasaws’ decision to align with the Confederacy demonstrates that the 
international system in which the ability to check Euro-American power over native 
polities flourished did not end with Removal.  Both the Chickasaws and southern states 
held deep cultural commitments to the right to self-determination.  Although neither 
was overly committed to preserving that right for the other during the Early Republic, 
by the 1860s, the desire to be free of federal intrusion became a shared goal.  And yet, 
simple incorporation into the Confederate polity threatened a similar subjugated 
position as the Chickasaws suffered under the United States.  The only way for the 
Chickasaws to retain sovereignty, therefore, was to make Indian Territory a Native 
American center, not simply a Euro-American periphery.  The establishment of the 
Confederacy offered such an opportunity. 
Before removal, the Chickasaws tried to check the ambitions of individual 
American states by appealing to the president as the chief executive of the federal 
government.  The states’ rights rhetoric employed by American officials to secure 
Chickasaw removal, however, suggested to the Chickasaws that the states were more 
powerful than the federal government.  By the eve of the Civil War, Chickasaws 
determined that they could exploit the competing interests among the American states 
as they would have when dealing with any large native polity prior to the nineteenth 
century.  If their gamble to support the creation of the Confederate States of America 
had been successful, then the Chickasaws would have helped to introduce a new 
political entity through which Native American peoples could balance imperial-minded 
nations against each other in the effort to preserve their own autonomous sovereignty. 
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Consequently, this dissertation identifies a process through which Native 
Americans came to understood that their ability to demand recognition of their 
autonomous sovereignty had ended.  The focus on the process through which 
Chickasaws recognized the de facto hegemony of the United States—and that they no 
longer had any means through which to combat such a relationship—makes this 
dissertation, in essence, a study of power.  I am certainly not alone in my attempt to 
treat the indigenous peoples of what became the United States as international actors.  
Recognizing my work as a study of power, therefore, places it within an ever-growing 
number of scholarly efforts to demonstrate the places and methods through which native 
socio-political communities asserted their own authority despite European efforts to 
colonize non-western peoples and landscapes.  Other scholars wish to discourage the 
study of international polities as the principal unit of study—most often in the form of 
empires—in frontiers or borderlands areas.  These individuals emphasize the ways in 
which immediate demands of life on the periphery diffused any true notion of 
obedience or belonging to a specific metropole, thus making moot studies structured 
around the power of distant imperial polities.10 
                                                 
10 Recent notable examples include Juliana Barr, Peace Came in the Form of a 
Woman: Indians and Spaniards in the Texas Borderlands (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2007), Kathleen DuVal, The Native Ground: Indians and 
Colonists in the Heart of the Continent (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006), Peeka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2008), Brian DeLay, War of a Thousand Deserts: Indian Raids and the U.S. Mexican 
War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Anne F. Hyde, Empires, Nations, and 
Families: A History of the North American West, 1800-1860 (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 2011); and Michael Witgen, An Infinity of Nations: How the Native 
New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 
Press, 2012). 
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Although I welcome and even try to incorporate the contributions of these 
scholars, I hope that my work provokes a moment of pause, or re-inclusion.  The door 
should not be closed on the efforts of native polities within the American South to 
preserve their own autonomy and sovereignty in the face of United States expansion. 
With few exceptions, these authors have chosen to illustrate their unique and dynamic 
examples in regional systems that preceded the full arrival of American power.  As a 
result, most seem to fall into the all too familiar assumption that once incorporated into 
the territorial claims of the United States—and therefore once the United States held the 
upper hand—it was all over but the crying.  This was simply not the case.   
The United States were not a monolithic nation-state from their creation any 
more than their Native American neighbors were.  The former colonists had just fought 
a war to separate themselves from a government that they had come to believe was too 
far removed physically and mentally.  To surrender their own local identity and 
concerns to a new central government whose legislators were removed from their own 
reality was too risky a concept to accept easily.  The framers of the new American 
union had to ameliorate these fears and provide for a stronger presence within the 
international system.  Therefore, the newly independent Americans settled on a federal 
union as the structure that would tie their independent, sovereign republics together as 
the United States.  Just as past scholars have often been criticized for treating Native 
Americans and Europeans as opposing monolithic units, we should be cautious not to 
do the same to the Americans.  To do so denies the very process of social and political 
consolidation the United States underwent during their first century of existence, one 
that required the Union victory in the Civil War to convince Americans that they were 
 14 
members of a larger nation-state.  Consequently, I have chosen to emphasize a stylistic 
convention the favors the “United States” as a confederation of independent members 
rather than a single political body.   
Studies of the United States’ ability to impose their will on Native Americans 
have led us to believe that Americans demonstrated their permanent hegemony over 
their North American territory by being able to compel native groups to move 
elsewhere when commanded.  As the Chickasaws’ statements at Fort Smith in 1865 
indicate, this was simply not the case.  Chickasaw leaders did not claim that their 
alliance with the Confederacy was an act of rebellion against their political masters, as 
Americans would have believed.  Rather, they claimed that their people had the right to 
dissolve the agreement they held with the United States because they comprised a 
separate and distinct political entity on the world stage.  Despite American assertions of 
their own superiority, mid-nineteenth century Chickasaws did not accepted the status of 
a ward to the federal government.  In fact, they accepted removal in order to avoid that 
very situation.  The Chickasaws also believed that the southern states had the right to 
sever their own ties with the United States and form a new political alliance, a practice 
that had been in existence in native diplomacy for centuries.  Therefore, we must 
examine how the Chickasaws conceptualized the nature of the American nation as the 
states struggled with each other and the central government over the power and 
permanence of their federal union. 
*************** 
Native Americans had experienced the rise and fall of new political coalitions 
before, including their own.  The Chicaza with whom Hernando de Soto and his forces 
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wintered and fought against in 1540 and 1541 survived the cultural, demographic, 
political, and social upheavals of the Columbian Encounter to a greater degree than 
many other southeastern native ethnic group.  Regardless, this era provoked significant 
social and political changes among the Chickasaws.  The descendents of the Chicaza 
weathered the experiences of the Mississippian shatter zone to emerge as a “coalescent 
society” that maintained connections to the social and political institutions of their 
forbearers while incorporating smaller dissolving polities to become the Chickasaws of 
this study.  Many Chickasaws engaged in the colonial-era Indian slave trade, and the 
resulting necessity to defend each other against retribution during the eighteenth century 
helped to spread a nascent national identity among the Chickasaws that would continue 
to unite the actions of factions well into the nineteenth century.11 
The engagement of the Chickasaws with the global economy via the Indian 
slave trade also created a social and political environment in which factions could 
pursue different policies and interests.  As had the other southeastern Indian socio-
political groups for most of the colonial era, the Chickasaws transformed from a unified 
chiefdom into an ethnically related set of autonomous towns by the early eighteenth 
century.  They would remain so into the nineteenth century.  As these towns were 
                                                 
11 Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the 
American South, 1670-1717 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Gibson, The 
Chickasaws, pp. 40-41; James R. Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People: The 
Chickasaw Indians to Removal (Tuscaloosa, AL: The University of Alabama Press, 
2004), p. 24; Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The European Invasion 
and the Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2010), passim; Robbie Ethridge, “Introduction: Mapping the 
Mississippian Shatter Zone,” in Robbie Ethridge and Sheri M. Shuck-Hall, eds., 
Mapping the Mississippi Shatter Zone: The Colonial Indian Slave Trade and Regional 
Instability in the American South (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2009), pp. 1-
18; and Christina Snyder, Slavery in Indian Country: The Changing Face of Captivity in 
Early America (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2010), p. 71. 
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connected through kinship ties, they also took on characteristics of the Chickasaw 
moiety system in which certain responsibilities were divided along activities that 
involved war (red) and peace (white).  Participation in the capitalist Indian slave trade, 
however, led to the emergence of factionalism as the red and white moieties within 
Chickasaw society began to compete with, rather than complement, each other.12  
Despite the persistence of red and white metaphors in the diplomatic record in the post-
American Revolution world, these uses referred only to the relations Chickasaws shared 
with outsiders, not members of their own ethnic community.  Due to the consolidation 
of red and white roles into a single individual or town, Chickasaw socio-political 
organization on the eve of the American Revolution is best understood as a 
confederation of autonomous towns united by a shared ethnicity and kinship ties.  The 
Chickasaws were not a united nation-state, as their contemporary Euro-American 
counterparts wished to define them.  In this system, kinship ties could create equally 
legitimate factional claims to leadership of the Chickasaws as clan affiliation was more 
                                                 
12 The division of Chickasaws into pro-French and pro-British factions seems to 
have been in line with the separation of peacekeeping and warfare functions of the 
Chickasaw moiety system.  As slaving was an aggressive act predicated upon the threat 
of or actual act of engaging in warfare, the red towns of the Large Prairie secured and 
maintained the Chickasaw alliance with the English colony at Charles Town.  The 
white, or peacekeeping towns, on the other hand, offered an alliance to the French.  
Once the French pushed the Choctaws to conduct warfare against the Chickasaw 
following 1720, the Chickasaws consolidated their villages into even tighter clusters for 
greater protection from outside threats.  As the Chickasaws began to live in closer 
proximity to one another, red and white leaders began to assume the responsibilities and 
rights of those who formerly served as their counterweight in Chickasaw politics and 
diplomacy.  In doing so, the system in which different village clusters performed red 
and white duties collapsed. Jay K. Johnson, John W. O’Hear, Robbie Ethridge, Brad R. 
Lieb, Susan L. Scott, and H. Edwin Jackson, “Measuring Chickasaw Adaptation on the 
Western Frontier of the Colonial South:  A Correlation of Documentary and 
Archaeological Data,” Southeastern Archaeology 27:1 (Summer 2008): 23-24; 
Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, pp. 1-119; and Ethridge, From Chicaza to 
Chickasaw, pp. 194-231. 
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likely to influence an individual’s acceptance of an alliance rather than any recognition 
of a de jure national policy.13 
As their own political system exhibited factional divisions during the late 
eighteenth century, the Chickasaws exited the American Revolution with no reason to 
believe that the United States was necessarily a unified polity capable of imposing their 
will on their newly gained territory east of the Mississippi River.  Even individual states 
conducted negotiations with native groups as separate entities, illustrating that the 
fledgling U.S. was a conglomeration of distinct and individual states, not a united entity 
with whom the Chickasaws would have to negotiate.  As they had in their colonial 
form, the newly created states vied with one another and competed—both singularly 
and sometimes in concert with other states—against the central government for control 
                                                 
13 Although a national identity, forged around a common ethnic sense of 
belonging, persisted among Chickasaws during the late-eighteenth century, the use of 
“confederacy” better explains the persistence and nature of factional divisions within 
Chickasaw society.  In choosing to use the term confederacy, I am drawing upon the 
work of Greg O’Brien, who states that the “divisional autonomy” afforded to factions 
within a confederation “made it easier for [southeastern Indians] to ‘play-off’ one 
European country against another in diplomacy, since Europeans could never be sure 
exactly where [native] loyalties lay.”  As we will see in Chapters 1 and 2, this statement 
accurately describes the diplomatic interaction among the Chickasaws, Spain, and the 
United States in the 1780s and 1790s.  Greg O'Brien, “The Conqueror Meets the 
Unconquered: Negotiating Cultural Boundaries on the Post-Revolutionary Frontier,” 
Journal of Southern History 67:1 (Feb., 2001): 42.  In his seminal study of the 
Chickasaws, historian Arrell M. Gibson described what he termed the “particularistic” 
nature of Chickasaw government, noting the independence of towns that were 
connected through kinship ties.  However, Gibson believed the latent national unity, 
which underlay the factional divisions between pro-American and pro-Spanish factions 
after the American Revolution, implies the competition of the late eighteenth century 
was an anomaly that grew out of individual leaders’ self-interest rather than a cultural 
facet of the Chickasaw political structure as I emphasize in this dissertation. Gibson, 
The Chickasaws, pp. 3-105; the “particularistic” description can be found on p. 21. 
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over land and access to the Indian trade.14  Although the competition for trade 
eventually subsided, the competition for land did not. 
Not only did Americans compete with each other to influence and exert control 
over the Native Americans in the American South, they also had to contend with the 
Spanish, who regained their foothold in the Floridas and along the eastern shore of the 
Mississippi River during the American Revolution.  Capitalizing on this reality, the 
Chickasaws continued the practice of playing the various powers against each other, 
just as they had earlier in the eighteenth century with the British and French.  The 
context of this early diplomacy involved both military and economic objectives, with 
economics often winning out.15  During the 1790s, however, Chickasaw factional 
leaders divided over how much influence they should allow the Americans and the 
Spanish to wield within their society.  As these competing strategic visions diverged 
over for how to preserve their nation’s autonomy, factional lines hardened and set the 
stage for the Chickasaws’ fall into dependency upon Americans after the two Euro-
American powers concluded the Treaty of San Lorenzo in 1795. 
Throughout the early 1800s, the Chickasaws attempted to maintain as much of 
their sovereignty as possible while recognizing the power the American union could 
demonstrate over them.  The early negotiations for land by the southern states promoted 
                                                 
14 Francis Paul Prucha, American Indian Treaties: The History of a Political 
Anomaly (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994), pp. 59-65; David C. 
Hendrickson, “The First Union: Nationalism versus Internationalism in the American 
Revolution,” in Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf, eds., Empire and Nation: The 
American Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 2005), pp. 35-53. 
15 Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country: Crisis and 
Diversity in Native American communities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), Ch. 8. 
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an understanding among the Chickasaws that the United States operated according to 
separate interests, through which the tribe could check state ambitions by appealing to 
the federal government.  While the Americans presented a divided front, the 
Chickasaws worked to ensure that all governments recognized their sovereignty, 
particularly concerning activities within their territorial domain.  Despite gradually 
ceding lands over the next 30 years, the Chickasaws steadfastly opposed removal from 
their territory east of the Mississippi River.   
The presidential election of Andrew Jackson effectively signified the end of 
Chickasaw efforts in their tribal homelands.  Even had Jackson opposed removal, his 
commitment to preserving the Union in the face of the emerging Nullification Crisis 
ensured that he would not risk upsetting the southern states on any other issue.16  
Jackson employed a states’ rights interpretation of the U.S. Constitution concerning the 
issue of removal, which essentially revoked tribal sovereignty and gave control to the 
states.  By hiding behind the rhetoric of states’ rights to compel removal, American 
leaders demonstrated the ability for states to pursue individual or sectional ambitions 
that the federal government could not curtail. 
Faced with shrinking autonomy, the Chickasaws chose to emigrate west rather 
than relinquish their right to self-government as required by the Indian Removal Act of 
1830 were they to remain on their homelands in Mississippi.17  Although they agreed to 
remove, they did not have a designated area to move into west of the Mississippi River.  
                                                 
16 Daniel Walker Howe, What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of 
America, 1815-1848 (New York: Oxford UP, 2007), pp. 412-413. 
17 Henry M. Winsor, “Chickasaw-Choctaw Financial Relations with the United 
States, 1830-1880” in The Civil War Era in Indian Territory, ed. LeRoy H. Fischer (Los 
Angeles: Lorrin L. Morrison, 1974), p. 30. 
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Ultimately, they agreed to become a member district within the Choctaw Nation in 
Indian Territory, a diplomatic maneuver that native polities had practiced for quite some 
time.  Although the Chickasaws’ treaty with the Choctaws established a semi-sovereign 
status, they retained their ability to exist as a distinct political entity, which they would 
have been unable to do if they stayed in Mississippi and Alabama.  As such, the 
Chickasaws temporarily surrendered their society’s independent sovereign status rather 
than live among those with whom they did not share common cultural values.  
Chickasaw subjugation to political intrusion from both the United States and the 
Choctaws became a source of contention in internal and external tribal politics for at 
least the next 18 years.  Many Chickasaws refused to assimilate into the Choctaw polity, 
and two different factions emerged to fight for the ability to preserve their nation’s 
identity and authority.  Eventually, the two groups united through a commitment to 
preserve their shared ethnic identity.  The Chickasaws demonstrated their newly forged 
national identity with the formation of a constitutional government in 1856, an action 
that was informed by their experiences during the removal negotiations of the 1820s 
and 1830s.  After achieving independence from the Choctaws in 1855, the Chickasaws 
modeled a new constitutional government that borrowed concepts developed after those 
of the states, not the federal government, which the rhetoric of removal had revealed to 
them as the truly sovereign powers within the United States. 
*************** 
As my exploration of Chickasaw diplomacy illustrates, it is through their 
interaction with other polities that people adapt their culture and society to create new 
identities designed to achieve their goals.  An examination of diplomatic activities can 
 21 
reveal a collective polity’s understanding of their position within a greater system of 
societies.  Scholars of international relations recognize the presence of politically 
related communities and people as individual actors.  Citizens speak of themselves as 
members of “this” and “that” nation.  They accept that the decisions made by their 
political leaders represent them in the world at large.  They may disagree with those 
decisions; however, the American experience aside, their attempts to change them 
rarely result in the creation of a new polity.  They may change their form of 
government.  They may restyle their nom de guerre.  Regardless, efforts to redirect the 
internal and external policies of a political entity generally attempt to keep the social 
community together.  We must stick with a recognizable social and political entity, 
therefore, one that existed by the constituent members’ own free will and is connected 
through disagreements by an intangible sense of belonging.  Among the southeastern 
Indian polities to have survived break up and dissolution of the chiefdom system, the 
Chickasaw emerged from the colonial era as the most ethnically and politically united 
group.  A similar study among the Creek, whose political unity did not clearly emerge 
until later in nineteenth century could prove impossible. 
Unlike their Confederate allies and Union adversaries, the Chickasaws 
approached the United States Civil War as an international, not a domestic, affair, and 
we must understand their participation in it as such.  The Chickasaws entered into the 
war as a united political entity, one that existed without any factions who could 
challenge the authority of the government in setting such a course of action for the 
whole.  The Chickasaws did not exist in such a political state at the beginning of our 
study, however.  Coalescent societies were certainly not the epitome of the emerging 
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nation-states of western Europe that their imperial counterparts wished them to be.  
However, southeastern natives eventually adapted and consolidated their political 
structures into recognizable nation-states in an effort to maintain sovereignty in a world 
that came to be dominated by a single expansive European American culture.18   
*************** 
This dissertation is focused on illustrating two intertwined processes.  One 
examines the Chickasaws as they interacted with the United States across three distinct 
eras of American history:  Revolution, Removal, and Civil War.  The other follows the 
Chickasaws transformation from a coalescent society into a consolidated nation-state.  
Consequently, I have organized the presentation of material into chronological chapters.  
I believe this helps to illustrate how internal political change can be revealed by the 
study of external diplomatic interaction, and vice versa.  In Chapter 1, I examine 
Chickasaw diplomacy during and in the immediate aftermath of the American 
Revolution and how the Chickasaws incorporated the United States into their vision of 
the world system.  Chapter 2 follows the dissolution of the Chickasaws’ political unity 
as factional leaders tied themselves to either the Americans or the Spanish.  The chapter 
culminates with a discussion of the significance of the Treaty of San Lorenzo.  
                                                 
18 The best example illustrating how a Native American group restyled their 
political organization to conform more closely to European notions of governance can 
be found in William G. McLoughlin, Cherokee Renascence in the New Republic 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).  Even United States officials, most 
notably John Marshall, recognized this process as it occurred among some of the 
southeastern tribes; see Maureen Konkle, Writing Indian Nations: Native Intellectuals 
and the Politics of Historiography, 1827-1863 (Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 2004), p. 19.  We should avoid acceptance and direct application of the 
Cherokee experience to other southeastern native groups, however.  McLoughlin’s 
overall interpretation of how this process contributed to the Cherokees’ removal was 
more a circumstance of the timing in which they underwent this transformation. 
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Chapter 3 explores the reunification of the Chickasaw factions as their diplomatic 
activities became increasingly focused on the United States.  Chapter 4 discusses the 
various land cessions, and their associated negotiation processes, that culminated with 
the Chickasaws’ removal to Indian Territory and subsequent incorporation into the 
Choctaw polity following the Treaty of Doaksville in 1837.  In Chapter 5, I examine the 
efforts of the Chickasaws to free themselves of the economic dependency to the United 
States and the political influence of the Choctaws.  Through their efforts to secure these 
goals, the Chickasaws restructured their governmental system into a form that could 
interact with the European American world in terms compliant with western politics.  In 
Chapter 6, I discuss how this new system established the Chickasaws in the form of a 
nation-state that was poised to engage in the United States Civil War.  The chapter 
closes with an examination of the Fort Smith treaty proceedings to re-establish the 
relationship between the Chickasaws and the federal government.  Finally, the Epilogue 
examines the Chickasaw understanding of federal authority during Reconstruction.  
Following the failed attempt to support the Confederate States, the Chickasaws once 
again placed themselves within a semi-sovereign status in the Treaty of 1866—also 
known as the Reconstruction Treaty.  The permanency of this condition, however, 
remained debatable.  Although the Chickasaws recognized the permanency of their 
dependent nation status by the mid- to late-1880s, they continued to reject the domestic 
status that many Americans assumed for them.  As the Chickasaws fought to preserve 
autonomy and recognition of their separate nationhood, federal efforts to secure the 
treaty objectives resulted in the loss of autonomy all Indian nations experienced at the 
turn of the twentieth century. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
“WE KNOW NOT OF THEM WE ARE TO LISTEN TO” 
 
On July 28, 1783, several of the Chickasaw chiefs—Mingo Houma, Piomingo, 
Paya Mataha, Piomingoe, and Kushthaputhasa—sent a message to the United States 
Confederation Congress.  The petition signifies the Chickasaws’ first attempt to 
establish formal diplomatic relations with the United States as a singular entity; 
however, this was not their first diplomatic interlude with constituent members of the 
American confederation.  They were in the middle of planning peace negotiations with 
Virginia, and they had “receive[d] talks from the Governor of Georgia” to establish 
trade relations.  The chiefs expressed confusion about the nature of the union of the new 
American states: 
We are told that the Americans have 13 Councils Compos’d of Chiefs and 
Warriors.  We know not which of them we are to Listen to, or if we are to hear 
some, and Reject others, we are at a loss to Distinguish those we are to hear.  
We are told that you are the head Chief of the Grand Council, which is above 
these 13 Councils:  if so why have we not had Talks from you,—We are head 
men and Chiefs and Warriors also:  and have always been accustomed to speak 
with great Chiefs & warriors—We are Likewise told that you and the Great men 
of your Council are Very Wise—we are glad to hear it, being assured that you 
will not do us any Wrong, and therefore we wish to Speak with you and your 
Council, or if you Do not approve of our so Doing, as you are wise, you will tell 
us who shall speak with us, in behalf of all our Brothers the Americans, and 
from whare and whome we are supplyed with necessarries in the manner our 
great father [Great Britain] supplied us—we hope you will put a stop to any 
encroachments on our lands, without our consent, and silence all those People 
who send us Such Talks as inflame & exasperate our Young Men, as it is our 
earnest desire to remain in peace and friendship with our Br: the Americans for 
ever.1 
 
                                                 
1 “To his Excellency the President of the Honorable Congress of the United 
American States, July 28, 1783,” Calendar of Virginia State Papers and Other 
Manuscripts from January 1, 1782, to December 31, 1784, Preserved in the Capitol at 
Richmond, Vol. III, arranged and edited by Wm. P. Palmer (Richmond: 1883), pp. 515-
517.  Hereinafter referred to as CVSP III.  
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These chiefs represented each Chickasaw village cluster; as such, they were the closest 
thing to a central body of authority the Chickasaws could present to the outside world at 
this time.  That each signor identified with a specific village cluster suggests that the 
Chickasaws approached the task of incorporating the fledgling United States into their 
diplomatic world from a united standpoint.  However, each of these individuals held 
authority in the matter, which indicates that sorting out the seat of central authority for 
Chickasaw diplomacy during the waning years of the American Revolution would 
prove to be just as confusing to the Spanish and American delegates with whom they 
negotiated as the chiefs expressed about the United States. 
In this chapter, I establish a framework to understand how the Chickasaws’ 
methods to maintain sovereignty in the years following the American Revolution 
created the image of the Chickasaws as a consolidated nation-state despite their 
organization according to a political system that recognized the legitimacy of factions to 
act on behalf of the entire society.  Therefore, this chapter should be read with the 
following themes in mind.  First, I examine how the Chickasaws sought to incorporate 
the United States into their existing world of international relations during and 
immediately after the American Revolution.  Second, I attempt to demonstrate 
Chickasaw efforts to understand the nature of power and authority within the union of 
and among the individual states and what they reveal about the solidarity of the new 
American confederation when viewed from a native perspective.  Third, I explore how 
the initial efforts of two former allies—the United States and Spain—to assert their own 
control over the southeast illustrate the appearance of a unified diplomatic strategy 
among the Chickasaws, one that could only succeed due to the factional nature of 
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internal politics within the nation.  Fourth, I discuss the process in which Chickasaw 
leaders worked together to establish economic and political relationships, according to 
the customs of native diplomacy, that balanced the newly independent Americans to the 
east with the Spanish to the south and west.  Once this framework is established, readers 
will be better prepared to understand how the aggressive demands of the two European 
powers led to a situation in which only the unity among Chickasaw leaders—founded 
on their shared ethnic identity—could hold the factions together behind a shared goal of 
maintaining independence. 
*************** 
In the wake of the American colonies’ declarations of independence and their 
subsequent war of rebellion against the British, Native American societies worked to 
understand the place of the thirteen newly independent states and their confederation of 
autonomous, sovereign entities within the existing system of diplomatic relations on the 
North American continent.  Despite popular and scholarly claims to the contrary, the 
Chickasaws were not fervent supporters of either the British or the Whig causes during 
the American Revolution.  Rather, they made alliances and acted on their own terms 
with the purpose of protecting their control over their own territory.  As they had for the 
previous century of engagement in the imperial world, they envisioned themselves as an 
autonomous, sovereign polity, beholden to no other power.2   
The two primary adversaries of the war—Great Britain and the United States—
approached the subject of native involvement in the war differently.  The British, 
having long maintained a presence in southeastern Indian affairs, understood the need to 
                                                 
2 Gibson, The Chickasaws, p. 72; Colin G. Calloway, The American Revolution 
in Indian Country, pp. 219-220. 
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reaffirm the friendly demeanor of Native Americans on a continual basis, especially the 
Chickasaws with whom they had secured a long-standing alliance through trade.  In 
1778, British Superintendent of Indian Affairs John Stuart sent Alexander McGillivray 
“to the Chickasaw Nation . . . to secure them in their Loyalty” to the British cause.3  The 
rebellious Americans, on the other hand, chose a more bellicose stance that compelled 
the Chickasaws to establish diplomatic negotiations with the United States even before 
the latter’s independence was secured.  The first diplomatic milestone in Chickasaw–
United States relations, therefore, came not through interaction with the central 
government but with an individual state:  Virginia.   
By the middle of the American Revolution, Virginians—among others—
ventured west into the territories that had been denied to them in their former status as 
colonial subjects.  These territories included the Chickasaws’ traditional hunting 
grounds in what is now western Kentucky.  Not only were individual citizens seeking 
land on which to settle and secure their liberty, the former colonial governments sought 
to secure their western territories from British and Native American aggression.  In an 
attempt to ameliorate Chickasaw concerns about white intrusion onto their lands, 
Virginia officials sent an offering of white wampum—traditionally a sign of peace and 
friendship.  Unlike the British, however, the Virginians blurred the lines of native 
diplomacy by simultaneously sending a message that threatened annihilation should the 
Chickasaws oppose the Virginians’ efforts.  The presentation of these two diametrically 
                                                 
3 “John Stuart to The Right Honorable Lord George Germain, His Majesty’s 
principal Secretary of State for America, 19th May 1778,” Randolph Boehm, compiler 
and editor, Records of the British Colonial Office, Class 5, Part 1: Westward Expansion 
(Frederick: University Publications of America, 1981), Reel 8. 
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opposed messages did not work and set the Chickasaws and the Virginians on course 
for their own war.   
Chickasaw leaders warned the Virginians to abandon ideas of settling in their 
territory.  In a talk signed by Mingo Houma, Paya Mataha, and Tuskau Patapo, the 
Chickasaws announced that the Virginians’ threat of warfare did not scare their people.  
The Virginians could bring as large a force as they wanted.  It would not matter.  The 
chiefs threatened to beat the Virginians back just as they had done to the French and 
Choctaws in the 1730s.4 
Undeterred, Virginia officials moved forward with their plans to secure their 
western borderlands.  Governor Thomas Jefferson openly invited Chickasaw retaliation 
when he invited hostility against them by their native enemies from the north and west 
in early 1780.  At the same time, George Rogers Clark, Virginia’s military commander 
in the west, established Fort Jefferson along the bank of the Mississippi River, about 
five miles below the mouth of the Ohio River.  Clark believed that his primary objective 
in establishing the fort was to restrain the ability of the Chickasaws and the British to 
penetrate into the Illinois country.5  Such overt measures naturally provoked the 
Chickasaws to protect their own territorial authority by attacking the fort.6 
                                                 
4 “Copy of a Talk from the Chickasaws to the Rebels answering there [sic] 
Talks, May 22, 1779,” in National Archives and Records Administration, Papers of the 
Continental Congress, 1774-89 (microfilm), Item 51, vol. 2, pp. 41-44, microcopy 247, 
reel 65. 
5 James A. James, ed., George Rogers Clark Papers, 1771-1781, in Clarence 
Walworth Alvord, ed., Collections of the Illinois State Historical Library, Virginia 
Series, Vol. III (Springfield: Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1912), 
p. cxxi-cxxii. 
6 Calloway, The American Revolution in Indian Country, pp. 225-227. 
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The establishment of Fort Jefferson was a direct affront to the Chickasaws’ 
territorial sovereignty, which they would not tolerate.  This attitude was not lost on 
Virginia’s frontier leaders, who understood that they could “expect no peace with [the 
Chickasaws] while we maintain the Post.”7  The Chickasaws, for their part, confirmed 
such suspicions.  They did not stop attacking the fort until it was abandoned in June 
1781.8 
Relations between the Chickasaws and Virginians improved over the next year.  
By spring 1782, both sides were ready to lay down the hatchet to negotiate peace.  Jean 
Baptiste de Coigne, a Kaskaskia chief, acted as an intermediary on behalf of the 
Virginians.  Coigne’s mission coincided with a talk Mingo Houma, the self-proclaimed 
Chickasaw high chief, sent to the Virginians.9  In this message, Mingo Houma informed 
                                                 
7 “Col: Wm. Christian to the Governor of Virginia, April 10th 1781,” Calendar 
of Virginia State Papers and Other Manuscripts from April 1, 1781 to December 31, 
1781, Preserved in the Capitol at Richmond, Vol. II, arranged and edited by Wm. P. 
Palmer (Richmond: 1881), p. 24. 
8 Robert S. Cotterill, “The Virginia-Chickasaw Treaty of 1783,” Journal of 
Southern History 8:4 (Nov. 1942): 483-484. 
9 Throughout the eighteenth century, the Chickasaws recognized the presence of 
a high chief, or king as their Euro-American counterparts translated references to the 
position.  Traditionally, this was a hereditary position—handed down through the 
Minko clan of the peace moiety—that emerged during the late-sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries.  The Chickasaws seem to have held the position of high chief 
within their social structure as symbolically important; however, it is important to 
remember that the individual who could lay claim to this position did not hold 
unconditional political power.  Rather, his authority was determined based on his ability 
to gather followers just as it was for the other Chickasaw chiefs.  Competition among 
the chiefs during the second half of the eighteenth century abounded, and Mingo 
Houma claimed the position during the era of the American Revolution.  Although Paya 
Mataha held more authority when dealing with the Spanish, the majority of Chickasaws 
seem to have recognized Mingo Houma as the high chief, as the individuals who held 
this position following his and Paya Mataha’s deaths in 1784 were all descendants 
within his kinship group.  Gibson, The Chickasaws, pp. 18-22; Atkinson, Splendid 
Land, Splendid People, pp. 27-28; Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw, pp. 201-202 
and 224-227. 
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the Virginians of the Chickasaws’ intent to seal a peace treaty with their enemies of the 
past few years.  Additionally, the Chickasaws sent their own emissaries out on the peace 
path the following summer.  On July 9, 1782, the Chickasaws sent Simon Burney, a 
British refugee from the Natchez district living among the Chickasaws, and two chiefs 
to deliver a message “to the Commanders of Every different station Between this nation 
and the falls of the Ohio River.”  In their statement, the Chickasaw leaders indicated 
their desire to establish a peace agreement between the Chickasaws and the Virginians.   
The Chickasaws worked to ensure that the Virginians understood that they did 
not make these overtures from a weakened position.  In both Mingo Houma’s message 
and the two chiefs’ mission, Chickasaw leaders affirmed their peoples’ right to treat 
with whomever they chose.  Mingo Houma referenced his ability to procure goods from 
the Spanish in Mobile as an indication to the Virginians that the Chickasaws did not 
need to seal a peace; they would have continued the war if they so desired.10  Through 
the two chiefs and Burney, the Chickasaws stated their intent to continue their long-
standing relations with the British.  “Our making a Peace with you doth not Entittle Us 
to fall out with Our Fathers the Inglish, for we love them, as they were the first People 
that Ever Supported us to Defend ourselves against our former Enimys, The French & 
Spaniards & all their Indians.”  Further, the Chickasaws referred to the Virginians as 
their “brothers,” thereby asserting their equality with the former colony.11 
The Chickasaws did not refer to Virginians as brothers as a mere convention.  
Throughout the previous two centuries of interaction, Europeans and southeastern 
                                                 
10 “The message of the Chief of the Chikasas, as delivered by the messenger 
from the Cherokees,” CVSP III, pp. 272-273; quote on p. 272. 
11 “John Bowman to Gov’r Harrison of Va, August 30th 1782,” CVSP III, pp. 
277-279. 
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natives alike addressed each other according to familial metaphors.  Native groups 
referred to their counterparts in terms of male siblings, fathers and sons, and even 
nephews and uncles.12  Each one of these types of relationships connoted different 
levels of status and power between the groups in question, all based on the familial 
relationships existent in a particular native society.  In the matrilineal societies of the 
southeast, the most powerful relationship a male had—the one in which he was 
expected to show deference and obedience—was that with his mother’s brother.  In a 
matrilineal system, uncles were responsible for teaching their sisters’ sons the rules of 
society and how to succeed in life.  The father and son relationship called for a degree 
of deference as well; however, fathers did not try to impose their authority upon their 
sons.  Rather, a father’s role was to provide them with the attributes to make life more 
comfortable.  Therefore, when Native Americans referred to Europeans as fathers, their 
intent was not to display obedience, but rather to indicate that their allegiance could be 
won and maintained through gifts that made it easier to live.13  Finally, to call another 
polity a brother meant to put them on an equal plane with oneself.  Within a brother-to-
brother relationship degrees of influence could be admitted, however, as would be the 
case when one group was considered the elder brother.  Regardless, brothers often 
competed with each other, much as they did in European families. 
Referring to the Virginians as brothers did not necessarily mean that the 
Chickasaws intended to incorporate the Virginians as fictive kin, however.  The use of 
                                                 
12 Shoemaker, A Strange Likeness, pp. 115-121. 
13 Patricia K. Galloway, “The Chief Who is Your Father: Choctaw and French 
Views of the Diplomatic Relation,” in Gregory A. Waselkov, Peter H. Wood, and Tom 
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the term brother among matrilineal societies does not carry the designation of kinship as 
it does in patrilineal societies.  As Patricia Galloway has noted, “the only people a man 
might term his brothers were the sons of his father and those of his father’s sister’s 
daughter. . . .In other words, kin and non-kin were separated terminologically, and a 
‘brother’ could fall on the side of the father, as non-kin.”14  Identity in a matrilineal 
society is derived from one’s mother, and the presence of a brother can just as easily 
have been made by the union of the father and another woman.  Therefore, the two 
siblings would not belong to the same kinship group by virtue of their having different 
mothers.  By referring to the Virginians as brothers, it is possible that the Chickasaws 
hoped to establish a formal relationship with the newly independent state in a manner 
that asserted their equality while keeping the Americans at a safe distance from being 
able to influence the internal workings of their own society. 
At the same time that the Chickasaws reached out to the Virginians, George 
Rogers Clark sent overtures on behalf of his state before his own governor, Benjamin 
Harrison, sent official emissaries to do the same.  Clark sent Robert George and John 
Donne to deliver peace talks to the Chickasaws.  In his message, Clark denied that the 
building of Fort Jefferson provoked Chickasaw attacks on Virginian settlers.  He placed 
the blame solely at the feet of the Chickasaws.  Clark intended to compel the 
Chickasaws to sell their hunting grounds in western Kentucky to Virginia.  In exchange, 
Virginia would build a new community in the lands to promote trade between the 
Chickasaws and Americans.  Clark informed Harrison of his action.  The Virginia 
governor was especially interested in obtaining a land cession from the Chickasaws.  
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 359. 
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The Chickasaws, on the other hand, adamantly opposed the idea.  The Chickasaws 
abhorred the idea ceding land so much that George refrained from formally raising the 
subject to their leaders.  Both sides played coy for a while:  George focused on the 
promotion of trade, and three principle Chickasaw leaders—Paya Mataha, Mingo 
Houma, and Piomingo—attempted to divert blame for the conflict from either of the 
two parties involved and onto the British.15 
By late August, Burney had been making the rounds on behalf of the 
Chickasaws.  On August 31, 1782, Benjamin Logan inquired about Governor 
Harrison’s and the Virginia Legislature’s desire “to hold a treaty” with the Chickasaws.  
Logan suggested the services of John Donelson, a leading member of the burgeoning 
settlement on the Cumberland River and future father-in-law of Andrew Jackson, to 
head Virginia’s negotiations.  The concept of negotiating a treaty with one the 
individual states was not new to the southeastern Indians, nor was it anathema to the 
nature of the newly formed United States.  The Chickasaws had made treaties with the 
individual colonies throughout the eighteenth century, and the Cherokees made a treaty 
with both North Carolina and Virginia in 1777.  According to Indian Agent Benjamin 
Hawkins, the states ceded their right to form treaties with the Indians to Congress when 
final ratification of the Articles of Confederation occurred on March 1, 1781.16  The 
states did not always recognize the right of the central government to control Indian 
                                                 
15 “Answer from Piamathihaw [et al.],” CVSP, III: 357-358; Calloway, The 
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16 “Benjamin Hawkins to William Blount, 10th March 1791,” William Blount 
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affairs, however, especially before the adoption of the United States Constitution.17  In 
the American South, specifically, Virginia never ceded its authority over its western 
territory to the central government, North Carolina did not do so until early 1790, and 
Georgia continued to assert its claim over territory extending to the Mississippi River 
until 1803. 
Virginians were interested in concluding a peace with the Chickasaws for 
several reasons.  First, Donelson suggested that a peace treaty would be advantageous 
for Virginia “in view of the terrible losses in the battle with the Shawnees on the 19th of 
August, and the unprotected situation of the frontiers and inhabitants.”18  Second, John 
Bowman recommended the treaty as there was in all likelihood the possibility of 
securing a concurrent treaty with the Creeks, which would be beneficial to not only 
Virginia but “as well as our neighboring Sistren states to the southward.”  Bowman 
believed that  
If a Peace could be concluded with these two nations, the Chicasaws and the 
Creeks, it would Effectively put a stop to the Cherokees and Chuckamogga 
Indians committing depredations on any of our frontears, and compleat the 
Happiness of the Inhabitants who have long suffe’d by them, and we Conceive 
that such an alliance might Greatly Discurrage the Shawnees, and other Western 
Tribes.19   
 
The emphasis these men gave to informing Harrison of the mutual benefit the 
peace treaty would provide to both Virginia and North Carolina deserves special 
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1815 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 123-129. 
18 “Col: John Donelson to Gov: Harrison, Septem. 1st 1782,” CVSP III, p. 284.  
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19 “John Bowman to Gov’r Harrison of Va, August 30th 1782,” CVSP III, pp. 
277-279. 
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attention.  The proposition of the two states working together in this matter was not 
without precedent.  Thomas Jefferson had initiated actions to join with North Carolina 
to obtain a peaceful settlement concerning the ongoing war with the Cherokees as early 
as March 1781.20  Jefferson’s successor as governor, Benjamin Harrison, followed his 
predecessor’s example.  Harrison believed that the lack of coordination among the 
southern states could lead to more violence with their native neighbors.21  Further, in a 
letter from North Carolina Governor Alexander Martin to Harrison, written on 
November 21, 1782, Martin reveals a notion of the states as equals, fully imbued with 
the right to take such action, and that the decisions made by one could not be stopped by 
the other—or even the central government.22  If each state had representatives at the 
negotiating table—or even if only a Virginia representative expressed concern about 
how another state might view the agreement—then it is plausible to assume that the 
Chickasaws internalized a conception of power and authority among the United States 
as being akin to the autonomy of factional interests within their own nation. 
That the southern states referred their fellow partners in the American union as 
“sisters” also bears discussion.  State officials during the late eighteenth century often 
referred to their counterparts as representatives of “sister states,” especially during this 
time of turmoil with the Southern Indians.  In 1788, Andrew Pickens, acting as a 
commissioner to negotiate a peace with the Upper Creeks on behalf of South Carolina 
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referred to “some disputes that had unluckily arisen between [the Creeks] and our Sister 
State of Georgia.”23  The following year, Alexander McGillivray used the term to 
denote his recognition of a kindred relationship between the states of South Carolina 
and Georgia in a letter to South Carolina Governor Thomas Pinckney.24  However, 
Native Americans and Europeans rarely, if ever, referred to each other in a metaphorical 
status associated with the female gender.25  Even if state representatives used the 
metaphor to refer to their counterparts in a manner to illustrate kinship, southeastern 
Native Americans may have understood the use in a deeper manner.  Women within 
matrilineal cultures had the right to counsel men behind closed doors but not in public.26  
Therefore, we can plausibly expect that Chickasaw leaders internalized the concept of 
sister states to mean that neither Virginia nor North Carolina could wield public 
authority over their sibling states.  Further, by referring to each other as sisters, state 
officials could have implied that the relationship between theirs and the other states 
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would never recognize the authority of one over the other as sometimes happened when 
native groups exchange the roles of elder and younger brothers based on each other’s 
contemporary status of power.27 
This is not to say that the use of the term “sistren” would not connote a 
relationship as kin.  In fact, the relationship between brothers and sisters and among 
sisters was strong within both southeastern native and European American families.  
Sisters and brothers in native societies still held a close relationship as members of the 
same clan.  For southeastern matrilineal societies, the relationship between brothers and 
sisters was closer than that of husbands and wives.28  That Native Americans would 
understand the very close relationship among the states as siblings should not surprise 
us today; it is certainly doubtful that the former colonists would have been surprised.  
European American siblings, as well as Native American and even African American 
siblings, shared a special affinity for one another through shared experiences as 
members of the same family.29  It is almost certain that the states felt that way despite 
their differences over how to move forward.  They had just overcome their differences 
and joined arms over the past seven years to overthrow their mutual father:  Great 
Britain. 
                                                 
27 Although I have not found a direct reference to the idea of the states as sisters 
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By October 1782, the Chickasaws and Virginians were willing to sit down to 
negotiate a treaty.  Governor Harrison appointed John Donelson, Isaac Shelby, and 
Joseph Martin as commissioners.  Although Harrison wanted to secure a land cession, 
he instructed the men not to recognize any Chickasaw claims to sovereignty over the 
territory in question.30  George Rogers Clark bolstered Harrison’s hopes shortly after he 
dispatched the three commissioners.  Clark informed the governor that he believed the 
Chickasaws would be willing to cede some land to the Virginians, particularly “land in 
the bounds of Virginia below the Tenesee River.”31  On October 22, 1782, Governor 
Harrison of Virginia wrote to Governor Alexander Martin of North Carolina to inform 
his counterpart of the impending treaty negotiations Virginia was about to enter into 
with the Chickasaws.  Harrison invited Martin to send commissioners on North 
Carolina’s behalf.32 
The question of what right Virginia had to undertake this treaty with the 
Chickasaws in the first place raises more questions for this study.  According to the 
Articles of Confederation, Virginia would have had a right to conduct the treaty if the 
Chickasaws lived in territory claimed by Virginia.  However, that was not the case.  The 
Chickasaw villages clustered around modern-day Tupelo, Mississippi.  Although the 
Chickasaws claimed the territory in western Kentucky as their hunting grounds, the 
Americans did not recognize the legitimacy of claims to lands on which Native 
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Americans did not actually live.  It is highly unlikely that many Chickasaws lived there 
on a long enough basis that would constitute legal residency in United States law.33  
Actually, the Chickasaws lived on lands and the treaty was negotiated in territory 
claimed by North Carolina.  Therefore, it is possible that Virginia and North Carolina 
agreed to the deal in part to promote a southern confederation among the United States 
to deal with the Indians, an assertion that is supported by Governor Harrison’s 
inivitation to Governor Martin on October 22: 
I most earnestly wish that some regular plan was fix’d on by the Southern States 
for the regulation of Indian Affairs, and that Commissioners should be appoint’d 
from this State and those south of it for that purpose if such a Measure was 
adopted I expect those people [Chickasaws] might hereafter be kept quiet, or be 
brought to reason by the joint efforts of the States, for any depredations they 
might commit on either of them at a much less expence than we are now at in 
continually supporting Guards on our frontiers for the protection of each 
individual State.34 
 
To complicate matters even further, groups often contested each other’s claim to 
land in the South, and not just among the Indians.  Although the Treaty of Paris granted 
authority over land east of the Mississippi River to the United States, the Spanish 
claimed certain sections east of the river by right of defeating the British there during 
the final years of the war.  Looking from our lens among the Chickasaws, the quandary 
concerning which American polity had the right to negotiate with the Chickasaws raises 
even more concerns because the Chickasaw domain actually covered territories claimed 
by four states.35  If we accept the Euro-American definition that legal residence is 
established by where one’s home is, the Chickasaw villages in 1782 actually lay in 
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territory claimed by Georgia and South Carolina, both of which had distinct visions for 
where the authority for Indian affairs should reside.36  With such questions of territorial 
authority abounding, it is understandable that the Chickasaws expressed confusion 
about the nature of power and authority among the United States in their July 1783 
letter to Congress. 
*************** 
The Chickasaw chiefs’ letter to the President of the United States Congress 
illustrates the Chickasaws’ efforts not only to understand the nature of allegiance among 
the United States but also the conflicting nature of authority between the individual 
states and the central government.  Despite the fact that they were already in the early 
stages of negotiating peace with Virginia and contemplating an offer for trade with 
Georgia, the Chickasaws recognized that the United States, although willing to take 
action on their own, remained joined for political and economic reasons even though the 
hostilities of the Revolution had concluded.  Therefore, it is plausible to assume that the 
Chickasaws envisioned the American States as akin to any other political confederation 
that existed among Native American societies. 
The Chickasaw leaders stated their desire to establish diplomatic relations with 
the Americans in accordance with native diplomacy.  The chiefs were pleased that 
“[their] Brothers the Americans are inclined to take us by the hand, and Smoke with us 
at the great Fire.”  Further, the chiefs indicated their desire to have an American 
appointed as a fanemingo.  The naming of a fanemingo was a traditional form of 
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kinship diplomacy used by the Chickasaw and other southeastern Indian groups when 
initiating diplomatic relations with another sovereign entity.  The English trader, 
Thomas Nairne, provided the first written description of a fanemingo in his 1708 
journal, written while traveling among the Chickasaws and Tallapoosas.  According to 
Nairne’s account, one family would adopt a member of another family, “generally some 
growing man of Esteem in the Warrs,” who was then required to act as the adoptive 
family’s representative and protector without putting his own family first.  When 
applied to diplomacy, the relationship shifted to some extent.  If two nations joined in 
an alliance, each chose a fanemingo from the ranks of the other, and, in such cases, the 
individual’s responsibility was to  
make up all Breaches between the 2 nations, to keep the pipes of peace by which 
they first contracted the Freindship, to devert the Warriors from any designe 
against the people they protect, and Pacifie them by carrying them the Eagle 
pipe to smoak out of, and if after all, ar unable to oppose the stream, are to send 
the people private intelligence to provide for their own safty.37 
 
The chiefs reminded the Americans that the English had “always left one of [their] 
beloved Men amongst us, to whom we told anything we had to say, and he soon 
obtained an answer—and by him our great Father, his Chiefs & headmen spoke to us.”  
As the Chickasaws were confused as to the nature of the American polity, “Such a man 
living among us particularly at this time, would rescue us from the darkness and 
confusion we are in, By directing us to whom we should speak, and putting us in the 
right Path that we should not go wrong.”   
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In this case, the chiefs’ selection of John Donne “to deliver this talk” speaks 
directly to the native form of selecting a diplomat.  When two native groups established 
peaceful relations, each chose a fanemingo from their counterpart; they did not simply 
accept whomever their new ally chose.38  Despite the attempt of the chiefs to facilitate 
the entry of the United States into the native world of diplomacy, it appears that the 
Americans did not act immediately.  The states and the central government were still 
trying to sort out their respective roles in the American South.  During these early years 
after the Revolution, multiple states and the central government all claimed authority 
over the vast majority of land west of the Appalachian Mountains.  As will be discussed 
later, Piomingo may have assumed the role as fanemingo for the Chickasaws’ American 
brothers when the Americans failed to comply with the chiefs’ desire to have Donne 
appointed in this diplomatic capacity. 
The chiefs closed the letter by indicating that they needed ammunition; however, 
they informed the Americans that the Chickasaws could “supply ourselves from the 
Spaniards” if necessary.  As was often the case when Indians played one European 
culture against another, they said that they did not want to trade with the Spaniards and 
courted American trade with flattery and the idea that they could keep their younger 
warriors from acting hastily.  Three days later, James Logan Colbert, a trader who had 
married into a Chickasaw clan, sent a letter to Governor Harrison that reinforced the 
necessity for some entity among the new American polity to secure an open path with 
the Chickasaws.  Colbert stated that the Chickasaws desired to make peace with all of 
their American “brothers,” but “they know not where to apply or find the American 
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Chiefs.”  Further, he indicated that the Spanish were forging relationships with leaders 
of nation and that it would be in the best interest of the Americans to gain the 
Chickasaws’ favor as well.39   
*************** 
Colbert’s attempt to establish a peaceful, economic relationship between the 
Chickasaws and the Americans offers a window through which we can see how 
factional interests could arise within Chickasaw society that the established leadership 
was somewhat powerless to control.  His connection to specific kinship groups has led 
to popular claims that all of Chickasaw society supported specific Euro-American 
powers during the latter decades of the eighteenth century:  the British during the 
Revolution and the Americans thereafter.  Despite persistent notions that Colbert’s 
actions during and after the American Revolution represented official Chickasaw 
policy, however, he did not have the authority to speak on behalf of the nation.  
Therefore, Colbert’s appeal to the Virginia governor was more likely due to his own, 
personal on-going war with the Spanish.  Regardless, his actions created problems that 
Chickasaw leaders could not ignore in their relations with outside polities such as the 
Spanish and the Americans.  Colbert’s ability to draw supporters from the emerging 
generation of Chickasaw leaders meant that his actions would help harden the lines 
between Chickasaw factions and decrease their willingness to cooperate among 
themselves as they sought to restrict western imperial powers from gaining control over 
the Chickasaws’ world. 
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James Logan Colbert was a Scottish trader who had lived among the 
Chickasaws since about 1740.  He was one of many European traders to settle among 
the Indian societies of the southeast whose presence caused concern for imperial 
officials.  Approximately 500 such individuals lived among the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws by the mid-1780s.40  According to Malcolm McGee, the man who served as 
the Chickasaws interpreter for their dealings with Americans until the turn of the 
nineteenth century, Colbert immersed himself fully in Chickasaw society and culture, 
married several women and fathered multiple children.  Despite his influence among the 
Chickasaws, Colbert never became a chief himself, but several of his sons—William, 
George, and Levi—became influential Chickasaw leaders by the 1790s.  This has led to 
the continued belief that his actions represented official Chickasaw policy during the 
American Revolution. 41  A more accurate interpretation, however, is that due to his 
long-term association with the Chickasaws and ability to procure supporters from his 
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Chickasaw family, James Logan Colbert’s actions often blurred the lines between what 
can be considered official Chickasaw and non-Chickasaw policy. 
Colbert was fiercely proud of his British identity, as evidenced by his continued 
harassment of the Spanish after the fall of Pensacola in the spring of 1782.  As the 
Revolution had not yet officially ended, Colbert resented the Spanish presence on the 
east side of the Mississippi River and continued to attack the Spanish and take prisoners 
in the name of the British monarchy.  Colbert was even so bold as to kidnap Anicamora 
Ramos—wife of the Spanish governor in St. Louis, Don Francisco Cruzat—while she 
accompanied a supply shipment up the Mississippi River to rendezvous with her 
husband.  In a response to the Spanish Governor General in New Orleans, Esteban 
Miró, concerning the incident involving Ramos among others, Colbert chastised the 
governor for accusing him of harboring rebels, whom Colbert considered “Inglish 
Subjects,” and for “go[ing] to war without an Autharity.”  Colbert proclaimed that he 
had “As much Authority to destress my kings Enymys as you have to maintain 
[Natchez] Or Any Other place in behalf of your King.”  Finally, Colbert attempted to 
absolve the Chickasaws from culpability in his efforts.  He stated that he had advised 
“my Indians to make Peace both with you & the Americans & with all The world as it is 
proper that no Indians ought to interfare with what Concerns None but white 
(people).”42 
Cruzat was understandably furious about the incident and did not necessarily 
accept Colbert’s statement concerning the lack of official Chickasaw involvement in the 
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affair.  He took steps to ensure that the Chickasaws did not aid and abet any future rebel 
actions.  The Spanish official “adopted one of the most efficacious means [he had] of 
dealing with all the Indians of this immense continent, in order to have the Chickasaw 
nation on my side.”  In order to convince “a considerable party of Kickapoo and 
Mascouten Indians . . . to make war upon the Chickasaws and the rebels,” Cruzat stated 
that Colbert’s faction had captured “presents for all the Indians of this district” among 
the bounty in Don Silvester Labadie’s—the commander of the supply train Cruzat’s 
wife accompanied—boat.  The governor’s deliberate misdirection convinced the Indians 
that the affront was not directed solely at the Spanish, but at the native population as 
well.   
Cruzat’s trick apparently worked.  A party of Chickasaws came to visit the 
Spaniard to seek his help in forming a peace with the Kickapoos and Mascoutens.  
Cruzat informed Miró that because of his actions, “They [the Chickasaws] wish to 
become our allies.”  The delegation who appealed to Cruzat represented Paya Mataha, 
who Cruzat believed was “complete master among” the Chickasaws.  Cruzat claimed 
that the Chickasaws promised not to assist Colbert’s faction and, more importantly, “to 
expel the bandits from their nation and that they would make efforts to clear the banks 
of [the Mississippi] river of all the evil doers who infest it.”  According to Cruzat, the 
Chickasaws even promised to prove to the Spanish that they no longer supported their 
former British allies.43 
Although Spanish officials tried to persuade the Chickasaw leadership to curtail 
Colbert’s actions, they did not really believe that the rebels represented the nation in 
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any official capacity.  Nor did they think that the Chickasaws would comply with their 
promise to “expel” Colbert and his followers from their territory.  In his deposition, 
taken on July 5, 1782 after the party’s release by Colbert and arrival in St. Louis, 
Labadie indicated that although “the Chickasaw . . . are not much inclined in general 
towards the rebels,” they did hold an affinity for “the chiefs, Tranble, Colbert, Cilly, 
and Malguibry.”  Therefore, Labadie “believe[d] that although it may not be impossible, 
at least it will be very difficult to induce these Indians to deliver [the rebel leaders] or 
allow [them] to be arrested, no matter what efforts may be made.”44  Despite his 
chicanery in setting the Kickapoos and Mascouten against the Chickasaw, even Cruzat 
recognized that Colbert’s faction did not represent the Chickasaws on a national level.  
Actually, he doubted whether the faction represented the Chickasaws at all.   
These acknowledgements did not prevent Spanish officials from using Colbert’s 
connection to the Chickasaws to influence official Chickasaw policy.  In early August, 
Cruzat sent Captain Jacobo De Breuil to investigate the ambush on Labadie’s company.  
Breuil met with a party of Loup Indians at Ste. Genevieve.  The Loups claimed 
knowledge of the attack on Labadie and company.  These Indians insisted, “the 
Chickasaw nation had had absolutely nothing to do with the affair and found itself 
undecided and not knowing what course to take.”  With this information in hand, Breuil 
enlisted the Loup “and some of the Peoria and Kaskaskia nations” to travel to convince 
the Chickasaws, “not to protect the rebels” and to ensure that “everything possible [was 
done] so that the river might be navigated without danger or difficulty.”45  In contrast to 
Cruzat’s stick approach in the north, Miró offered a carrot from the south.  The Spanish 
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governor general employed the Choctaws to bring the Chickasaw leadership over to the 
Spanish side.  Miró took a practical look at the French efforts to subdue the Chickasaws 
earlier in the century.  He determined that any military expedition into Chickasaw 
territory would ultimately end in failure.46  Miró’s assessment of the situation implies an 
understanding among Spanish officials that although the Chickasaw factions may have 
had different visions for how to move forward, they would ultimately back each other 
before anyone else.   
The nature in which the Chickasaws responded to this carrot and stick approach 
reveals several things about the unity among the factions of the Chickasaw nation 
during the last decades of the eighteenth century.  It does not matter why or how 
individual Chickasaws joined Colbert’s efforts; it only matters that they did.  Colbert’s 
raids threatened the trade the Chickasaws had worked to secure with the Spanish in the 
1770s.  As a result, many of the Chickasaw leaders sought to distance themselves, and 
more significantly their polity, from being identified with Colbert.47   
Despite the influence his sons would gain over the next few decades, the desire 
of the Chickasaw leaders to absolve themselves from any association with Colbert and 
his followers immediately after the Revolution reveals that many Chickasaws wished to 
maintain friendly relations with the Spanish in the post-war years.48  However, the fact 
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that none of the recognized leaders of the villages that comprised the central body of the 
Chickasaw confederation could or would force Colbert and his followers to stop their 
raids demonstrates a lack of a central authority among the Chickasaws.  There seems to 
be no recorded instance in which the chiefs made a concerted effort to expel Colbert or 
censure those Chickasaws who fought by his side.49  This reveals that the dissolution of 
the traditional moiety system and the emergence of Chickasaw factionalism meant that 
the chiefs could only attempt to mitigate the damage aggressive factions could cause by 
establishing and maintaining friendly relations with those groups more powerful than 
their own. 
*************** 
James Logan Colbert’s inability to act on behalf of the Chickasaws in an official 
capacity aside, it is probable that his letter to Harrison in late July 1783 pushed the 
Virginia governor to secure a favorable treaty with the nation.  Delegates from both 
groups met at French Lick, near present day Nashville, in early November 1783.  Mingo 
Houma, Piomingo, Fontontoba, Tobokoloby, and Toachoway represented the 
Chickasaws, while Joseph Martin and John Donelson represented Virginia.  During the 
negotiations, Donelson presented the Chickasaw representatives with “a string of wh[ite 
bea]ds . . . in the name of your Elder Brother the Governor of Virginia” in order to 
establish peaceful relations between the two groups.  As he accepted the Virginians’ 
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offer of peace, Mingo Houma blamed the Chickasaws’ transgressions on the influence 
the English formerly had among them.50  Although peace was established, neither side 
seems to have achieved its primary objective for negotiating the treaty in the first place.  
The Chickasaws did not secure any guarantee of trade to match that of their dealings 
with the Spanish; nor did they cede any land to the Virginians as the latter had hoped.51 
Whether or not Chickasaw leaders were aware of the seeming collusion between 
Harrison and Martin, the Chickasaws understood that it was necessary to obtain consent 
from North Carolina officials for the terms of the treaty.  In 1784, five Chickasaw 
leaders—Piomingo, Taskietoka, Paya Mataha, Piametahaw, and William Glover—
travelled to the fledgling settlement on the Cumberland near French Lick to hear if the 
“great men of Carolina” would abide by the terms of the treaty.  According to 
Piomingo, the Chickasaws had recently learned about an agreement in which the 
Cherokees ceded “Land on the Tennessee to the White People.”  Piomingo expressed 
dissatisfaction with this arrangement and claimed that the territory in question “is mine 
and my children’s land from which we get our living [i.e., hunting].”  Each leader, in 
turn, assured the Carolinians that they upheld the same diplomatic stance they 
established with the Virginians, despite the death of Mingo Houma due to measles 
earlier that year.  Taskietoka, who had become the Chickasaw high chief in the interim, 
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promised to uphold the “former talks” of his uncle “as I stand in his place & all is 
straight as before.”52   
Despite their opposition to the supposed Cherokee land cession, the Chickasaws 
recognized the need to tread lightly with the Carolinians and were careful to recognize 
the latter’s’ diplomatic kinship to the Virginians.  By referring to the Carolinians as 
Americans, the Chickasaws revealed that they saw the fledgling United States as they 
saw themselves or any other native group:  a united ethnicity politically divided into 
factions that did not have to agree with each other in political matters.  Even though the 
Virginians had agreed to establish peace with the Chickasaws less than a year earlier, it 
is probable that the Chickasaws feared involvement in a similar war with the 
Carolinians, which already engulfed factions of the Cherokee.   
Chickasaw participation in the Virginia treaty demonstrates that they were 
astutely maneuvering to align themselves favorably in the post-war system.53  
Moreover, the expression of unity among the Chickasaw leaders at Nashville in 1784 
demonstrates their desire to pursue a common diplomatic path.  However, the chosen 
path did not favor the Americans; rather, it actively balanced the Americans against the 
Spanish.  
*************** 
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In October 1782, the Chickasaws, in what seems to indicate a unified diplomatic 
policy, had worked to conclude peaceful relations with many of their neighbors in the 
southeast.  The Spanish Governor General, Esteban Miró, made the initial overture in 
this episode.  As part of the Spain’s unofficial carrot and stick policy to stifle the actions 
of James Colbert and his followers, Miró, through his governor at Mobile, Henrique 
Grimarest, invited Paya Mataha to meet with him “in Natchez to discuss matters of 
importance that will be advantageous and beneficial to you and your nation.”54  
According to Paulous, a Choctaw chief aligned with the Spanish, Paya Mataha delayed 
his journey due to illness.  However, he did intend to travel to Natchez “as soon as his 
health improves.”  Perhaps Paya Mataha did not feel a sense of urgency about meeting 
with Miró because he had made peace with Cruzat only one month earlier.55  
Undaunted, Miró sent a white flag and letters to Paya Mataha on October 24.  Paya 
Mataha did not receive the flag and letters, however, Mingo Houma did.  Despite 
Francisco Cruzat’s claim to Miró that Paya Mataha was “complete master among” the 
Chickasaws, the historical record reveals a much more complicated picture of 
Chickasaw politics in the 1780s.56   
Paya Mataha’s assertion to the North Carolina officials at Nashville in 1784 that 
he would follow the path established by Mingo Houma should at least make us question 
Cruzat’s understanding of the confederated, rather than unified, character of the 
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Chickasaw nation.57  The Mississippi shatter zone experience created factional divisions 
among the Chickasaws that no longer recognized the previous moieties of peace and 
war leaders.  In this new system, leaders from the various village clusters appropriated 
the responsibilities of both maintaining peace and conducting war with non-Chickasaw 
societies.58  Further, although they continued to reference the position of a high chief 
within their society, the individuals who filled this role seem to have served with no 
more public authority than did the other chiefs.  This does not mean that Chickasaw 
diplomacy did not appear to represent a coordinated policy when viewed from an 
external perspective, however.  Traditional native diplomacy allowed different leaders 
to be responsible for maintaining relations with different groups.  As the Chickasaw 
chiefs’ letter of July 28, 1783 to the American Congress indicates, the Chickasaws still 
believed in assigning fanemingos to maintain straight paths with their allies.   
Mingo Houma’s reaction to the receipt of Miró’s effects indicates that the 
Chickasaws pursued a unified policy through his own and Paya Mataha’s efforts during 
these early years.  Mingo Houma and the other Chickasaw chiefs and warriors present 
relayed the following message back to Miró:   
Not being able for the present to come with the chiefs who were conveying the 
flag and letters, they all begged that in their name they should advise the great 
Spanish chief that, having made peace with the Americans, they had sent their 
brother Paymataa and another chief to make peace with the Cherokees and 
Talapoosas. 
 
They further confirmed that they would travel to see Miró “to take the hand of the great 
Spanish chief, confirming the peace which they considered already made and assured,” 
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but only once Paya Mataha was once again available to travel with them.59  The 
prominence Mingo Houma accorded to Paya Mataha in dealing with the Spanish—
coupled with the leadership role Piomingo took to secure Carolinian approval of the 
peace he established with the Virginians the following year—reveals that Chickasaws 
intended to work through traditional native diplomats in their relations with the 
Americans and the Spanish. 
Despite Mingo Houma’s promise to travel to see Miró, the Chickasaws did not 
meet with the Spanish in a formal conference for almost one and a half years.  During 
that time, Spanish officials took the opportunity to secure Spain’s ability to sustain trade 
among the Indians of the southeast.  The Spanish governors in North America, as had 
their English counterparts and predecessors before them, knew that trade, rather than 
warfare, provided the most effective way to secure the loyalty of the native population.  
By spring 1784, the need to solidify trading agreements with the southeastern Indians 
convinced Miró that he should hold formal conferences with each of the major 
southeastern nations.  Before he could do so, however, Miró had to find a merchant 
ready to manage the trade in an economical and expedient manner. 
During the period of transition to Spanish governance over Florida according to 
the Treaty of Paris, British officials and merchants, in collusion with Creek leaders, 
worked to ensure that the Indian trade under Spanish governance fell to the firm of 
Panton, Leslie and Company.  Established in the waning years of the American 
Revolution by Scottish merchants, the firm already had connections among the southern 
Indians, most notably through the Upper Creek leader Alexander McGillivray.  The 
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firm’s prominent members, William Panton and Robert Leslie, worked feverishly to 
convince Spanish officials that their firm provided the most efficient platform on which 
Spain could establish its presence among the major native groups of the southeast.  
They succeeded in part because Spanish officials learned that they could not secure the 
Creek trade without appeasing McGillivray.  The firm established an agreement with 
the Spanish government by the end of 1783.  However, they would not grant Panton, 
Leslie and Company a full monopoly over the Indian trade.60 
The Creeks and Spanish met at Pensacola in late May 1784.  Despite Miró’s 
ambition to secure an alliance among the southeastern Indians, he, O’Neill, and Navarro 
met with the Creeks alone.  Spanish officials did not meet with other southeastern 
leaders until almost one month later in Mobile, during which conference they secured 
the trade with the Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Alabamons for the trading firm of 
Strother and Mather.  The Spanish officials paid special attention to the Chickasaws 
during the conference.  As James Colbert’s raids had proven, the Chickasaws controlled 
a strategic location, Chickasaw Bluffs, along the Mississippi River that afforded them 
unmatched control over transport between the Illinois territory and New Orleans.61  The 
Chickasaw Bluffs, near present-day Memphis, offered a strategic vantage point over a 
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portion of the Mississippi River that in the late eighteenth century contained a whirlpool 
that drew boats within gunshot against their crews’ will.62   
Not only were the Chickasaws important to the Spanish during the post-
Revolutionary era, but the same held true in reverse.  As such, every Chickasaw village 
sent representatives to the Mobile conference.63  Paya Mataha, the primary diplomat to 
the Spanish for the previous fourteen years, represented his home village of 
Chouculissa.64  Due to his prominent role in the negotiations with the Virginians at 
French Lick the previous November and at Nashville the following fall, Piomingo’s 
representation as the chief of Chuckafalya denotes the presence of a pro-American 
faction at the conference. 65  Some of the lesser villages—Tascahuilo, Malata, and 
Achucuma—most likely acted in concert, denoting factional interests that spread across 
villages.66  Mingo Houma could not be present at the conference.  He was most likely ill 
by this time as he died from measles shortly thereafter.  He did make a gesture of 
support for the conference, however, by sending “the white collar” along with his two 
emissaries, Conchi Matasha and Morigulacha Mingo, to represent him and his village, 
Talachao.67   
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Although he is not listed by any of his common names, Taskietoka was most 
likely present at the conference as well.  As Taskietoka would soon assume the position 
of high chief after his uncle’s death, perhaps he was one of Mingo Houma’s 
representatives.68  It is also interesting to note that Malata’s representative signed the 
treaty as “Fanni Mingo.”  As we will soon see, Piomingo assumed the role of 
fanemingo to the Americans no later than at the Hopewell Treaty in 1786.  Hindsight 
allows us privileged knowledge that a measles outbreak in the Chickasaw villages in 
1784 claimed both Mingo Houma and Paya Mataha.  Although highly speculative, 
perhaps the identification of a Chickasaw representative at the Mobile conference as 
Fanni Mingo could have been intended to signify who would assume the primary role 
among the Chickasaw for dealing with the Spanish after Paya Mataha passed.  As both 
Chouculissa and Malata were Large prairie villages, and part of Old Town, it is possible 
that this Fanni Mingo was, in fact, Taskietoka.69  As we will see in the next chapter, he 
became a fervent supporter of Spanish goals until his own death in 1794.  Another 
future leader who may have assumed the moniker is Ugulayacabe.  He emerged as the 
                                                 
68 Charles A. Weeks, “Of Rattlesnakes, Wolves, and Tigers: A Harangue at the 
Chickasaw Bluffs, 1796,” William and Mary Quarterly 67:3 (July 2010): 494; Vine, 
Deloria, Jr. and Raymond J. DeMaillie, eds., Documents of American Indian 
Diplomacy: Treaties, Agreements, and Conventions, 1775-1979, vol. 1 (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), pp. 125-130; Manuel Serrano y Sanz, España y 
los Indios Cherokis y Choctas en la Segunda Mitad del Siglo XVIII (Sevilla, 1916), p. 
82; and “Rations Given to Indians at Congress of Mobile, June 24, 1784,” Spain in the 
Mississippi Valley, 2:105. 
69 Stephen R. Cook, “Table 1 – Chickasaw Village Name/Area Associations 
(Cook Table 1),” The Chickasaw Indian Nation and their Villages, http://www. 
thechickasawvillages.com/table_1.html, accessed February 25, 2011. 
 58 
counterbalance to Piomingo’s pro-American tendencies over the next decade, eclipsing 
even Taskietoka in respect paid by Spanish officials.70 
The Spanish officials intended the Pensacola and Mobile conferences to produce 
a military alliance among the southeastern tribes that would be tied to and supported by 
the Spanish.  They failed to secure this objective.  The most success that can be 
attributed to the treaties is that they established formal trade relations for the post-war 
system.  Despite the efforts of Panton, Leslie and Company to control the Indian trade, 
the Chickasaw and Choctaw trade went to the firm of Strother and Mather.  According 
to the terms of the treaty, the Chickasaws essentially promised the Spanish sole right to 
trade within their nation.  Further, they promised to curtail the “piracy” committed by 
Colbert and his followers and to maintain peace with their native neighbors of the 
Mississippi valley.  They did reserve the right, however, to continue their ongoing war 
with the Kickapoos—whose aggression against the Chickasaws Cruzat had been unable 
to stop—until “our grievances are resolved, the groundwork may be established for the 
desired union, ceasing all types of hostilities and living in the most perfect union.”71   
The Chickasaws’ problems with the Kickapoos did not end quickly.  After a 
year of continued hostilities following the Mobile Treaty, Cruzat informed Miró that the 
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use of force against the Kickapoos to end the hostilities would be useless.  Cruzat 
offered three reasons for his conclusion.  First, the Kickapoos enjoyed the protection of 
the English, who refused to abandon their posts in the Northwest despite agreements 
made in the Treaty of Paris.  Second, the Kickapoos were allied with the Indians in the 
Wabash district.  Third, cutting the Kickapoos off from St. Louis would only raise their 
ire and invite violence upon the Spanish around St. Louis.  Cruzat recognized the need 
to find peaceful resolution for the two tribes as continued violence would decrease the 
probability of the Chickasaws trading at St. Louis and increase the probability of the 
Chickasaws supplying their needs only through the Americans.72  As we will see in 
Chapter 2, Cruzat’s inability to put an end to Kickapoo attacks on the Chickasaw 
probably had direct bearing on some Chickasaws’ decision to support American forces 
in the Ohio country against the Little Turtle’s confederation in the 1790s.  
Despite the seeming harmony between the Chickasaws and the Spanish achieved 
during the Mobile conference, the Chickasaws were not necessarily put at ease by the 
treaty.  Francisco Cruzat received a number of delegations from multiple Indian nations 
at St. Louis in August 1784.  These delegates, among who numbered some Chickasaw 
leaders, represented those nations affected by American encroachment into the Ohio 
valley.  Cruzat’s primary fear to come out of this meeting was that the Indian 
delegations expressed their concern that the Spanish would act like the newly formed 
nation of Americans.  More important to our study, however, is that the description of 
the United States offered by these delegates provides unique insight into a native 
understanding of their newly formed political neighbor.  
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‘The Master of Life willed that our lands should be inhabited by the English, 
and that these should dominate us tyrannically, until they and the Americans, 
separating their interests, formed two distinct nations.  That event was for us the 
greatest blow that could have been dealt us, unless it had been our total 
destruction.  The Americans, a great deal more ambitious and numerous than the 
English, put us out of our lands, forming therein great settlements, extending 
themselves like a plague of locusts in the territories of the Ohio River which we 
inhabit.’73 
 
As this passage implies, Native Americans understood that the citizens of the United 
States were dedicated to aggressive expansion and domination of the lands they 
occupied.  Equally important to our story is the notion that large polities develop 
separate interests, and that if those interests diverge too much, the political union may 
break apart.  If we take this passage to indicate that the Chickasaws understood that any 
competing interests within the United States needed to be balanced in order to stave off 
encroachment into their territory, the meeting Piomingo, Taskietoka, and Paya Mataha 
had with the Carolinians at Nashville to reaffirm and spread the peace established with 
Virginia in 1783 illustrates a concerted effort among Chickasaw leaders to act toward a 
common goal of maintaining independence and sovereignty.   
*************** 
That Chickasaw leaders seem to have pursued an overt national policy is not 
intended to dismiss the notion of factional interests among the Chickasaws.  Rather, it 
demonstrates how Chickasaw political culture recognized the legitimacy of factions to 
take action on behalf of the entire polity.  Factional interests were certainly at play in 
the post-Revolution world, and not all individuals among the Chickasaws agreed with 
the idea pursuing the Spanish as an ally.  As noted, Piomingo led the efforts to reaffirm 
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the peaceful relations established with the Virginians at French Lick in 1783 and to 
spread them to all of the American states.74  Nor was Piomingo’s desire to maintain 
favorable relations with the Americans one-sided.   
The Pensacola and Mobile treaties raised alarm among the Americans to a point 
that the central government finally had to take action.  The Americans were particularly 
concerned about the treaties’ stipulations that the Spanish hold a monopoly concerning 
trade with the southern Indians.  Further, United States officials worried that the call for 
a southern alliance among the nations would result in warfare as American settlers tried 
to assert their control over territory guaranteed to them in the Treaty of Paris.  A 
bicultural Chickasaw, Robert Tompson, traveling in the Arkansas valley in late fall 
1785, informed Spanish officials that the Chickasaw chiefs “had received a letter from 
General [George] Washington asking them to appear at the new city of Augusta in 
Georgia in order to have a conference with them in the name of Congress.”  According 
to Tompson, the Choctaws and Creeks received similar letters.75   
Washington’s proposed conference did not result in the intended negotiations 
with the southern Indians.  The Americans’ initial proclivities to treat the Indians of 
their western territories as defeated enemies—from whom they could confiscate land—
following the Treaty of Paris did not necessarily meet with native acquiescence.  
                                                 
74 James R. Atkinson asserts that Piomingo came to this action because, after 
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Alexander McGillivray worked to stifle negotiations between the United States 
government and any of the southern Indians.  Rather than treating these Indians to 
peaceful negotiations, therefore, the Americans resorted to threats of “Instant Death” to 
coerce the Creek delegates to cede land along the Oconee River.76  It is unclear whether 
any Chickasaw delegates attended this conference, but we can assume that they would 
have met such actions by the Americans with the same disgust that McGillivray 
exhibited.  Chickasaw leaders met in council with the Creeks and Cherokees in July 
1785, during which all three nations rejected the United States’ right to claim their lands 
as a result of the Treaty of Paris.77  By the mid- to late-1780s, the Confederated 
Congress shifted its Indian policy toward a more conciliatory method that promoted 
negotiation and purchase.78  It was during this transition that Chickasaw and United 
States delegates met near Hopewell, South Carolina in early January 1786 to formalize 
relations between the two nations.  
The documents related to the Chickasaw negotiations offer a matter of fact, 
business-like manner for interpretation.  The journals for the Americans’ negotiations 
with the Cherokees and Choctaws during the two months prior reveal an adherence to 
native rituals of diplomacy, however, that suggests the same probably held true for the 
Chickasaw council.  Unlike their counterparts dealing with the northern Indians, 
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American negotiators in the South still had to respect native rituals of diplomacy.79   
The presence of the Spanish in Florida and Louisiana, coupled with the vast territory 
still under native control, compelled American negotiators in the south to negotiate 
according to the terms of their Indian counterparts, even when they represented the 
larger confederation of the United States.  The Choctaws often performed elaborate 
ceremonies to open treaty negotiations with both state and national representatives 
during the 1780s and 1790s.  The Hopewell conference proved no different.  Those 
rituals included converting the American commissioners into fictive kin and sealing the 
approval of all by smoking the calumet.  Chickasaw delegates observed and participated 
in some of these rituals; therefore, it stands to reason that the Chickasaw-American 
negotiations were initiated in a manner that complied with Chickasaw notions of 
diplomacy.80 
Unlike their Choctaw brothers at Hopewell, the Chickasaws did not disavow the 
agreements made on behalf of their nation during the earlier Mobile conference.81  
Further, Piomingo asserted his position as the primary diplomat—much like that of a 
fanemingo—with whom the Americans should consult to negotiate with the 
Chickasaws.  He presented the commissioners with a string of white beads to affirm the 
friendship established between the Chickasaws and the Americans by Mingo Houma.  
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Despite Piomingo’s eventual affinity for the Americans, the opening speeches also 
indicate that he could not act alone for the Chickasaws.  He had a counterpart among 
the Chickasaws—Mingatuska, also known as Taskietoka—with whom he stood as 
“successors” to the roles played by Mingo Houma and Paya Mataha prior to their deaths 
the previous year.82  As we will see in the next chapter, the manner in which these two 
men played these complementary roles reinforced the Chickasaws the ability to play the 
Spanish and Americans against each other over the next decade.83  
*************** 
Despite attempts to assert the central government’s control over Indian affairs 
by the mid-1780s, the states continued to challenge the Confederated Congress’ 
authority in these matters.84  Not everyone approved of the treaty signed by the 
Chickasaw and the United States commissioners at Hopewell.85  Just as the Chickasaws 
and other native societies were subject to factional differences, so too were the United 
States.  William Blount attended the Hopewell treaty councils on behalf of North 
Carolina.  Blount openly “protest[ed] against the treaty” and presented a letter on behalf 
of his state objecting to the Continental Congress’ right to adjudicate territorial 
boundaries that conflicted with those claims “described in [the North Carolina] bill of 
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rights.”  Blount gave his letter to Hawkins, Pickens, and Martin just prior to the signing 
of the treaty on January 10, 1786.86   
That North Carolina officials refuted the legitimacy of treaties affecting their 
domain was not an anomaly at the time.  State leaders had every right to disregard a 
treaty made by the Confederation Congress.87  To complement Blount’s actions at 
Hopewell, the General Assembly of Georgia announced their state’s right to nullify any 
portions of the Hopewell treaties that impinged upon the rights of the citizens of 
Georgia.88  This resolution was most likely in relation to Georgian attempts to secure 
the Natchez District along the Mississippi River, an effort initiated in early 1785.  While 
Piomingo and Taskietoka negotiated the Treaty of Hopewell, William Davenport, one 
of the Georgian representatives, made his way among the Chickasaws to negotiate a 
land cession for the state.  After drawing the ire of the Spanish governor-general in New 
Orleans, the Georgian “retreated precipitately into the Chactaw Nation, & there 
assumed the character & had Since acted as American Superintendent for that 
[Choctaw] & the Chickesaw Nation.”89   
The examples of William Blount and William Davenport blurred the lines of 
authority which the Chickasaws had sought to have resolved in the early years after the 
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Revolutionary War.  Not only did the institutional nature of factionalism among native 
cultures allow for differences and competition among native leaders, the same seemed 
prevalent in American society.  Although Spanish officials attempted to present a 
unified front, even the carrot and stick counterbalance of Miró and Cruzat regarding 
Colbert’s raids in the waning years of the Revolution reveal that the Chickasaws could 
not trust their alliance with Spain to protect their sovereignty.  As such, the Treaty of 
Hopewell raised concern among some of the Spanish officials concerning the position 
the Chickasaws would ultimately take towards them. 
Although the Hopewell treaty stipulated that the Chickasaws were “under the 
protection of the United States of America, and of no other sovereign whatsoever,” the 
Chickasaw delegates’ primary objective was to secure a favorable trade relationship 
with the Americans along the lines of the one secured with the Spanish at Mobile in 
1784.90  The establishment of trade relationships with both the Americans and the 
Spanish was the key to Chickasaw security in the post-Revolution era.  If successful, 
they would have been able to check the ability of both the United States and Spain to 
make demands on the Chickasaws.  However, the resulting competition between the 
Spaniards and Americans for the Chickasaws’ favor promoted a level of rigidity among 
the factional leaders in which they would not be able to reconcile their differences. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
PEOPLE TO OUR SELVES? 
 
On October 26, 1793, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos, the Spanish governor at 
Natchez, convened a congress of the southern Indian nations at Nogales.  The purpose 
of the conference was to establish a pan-Indian alliance for the protection of the eastern 
Mississippi valley against further encroachment by the expanding American populace 
and to restore peace between the Chickasaws and Creeks, who had been at war since the 
late 1780s over Piomingo’s alliance with the United States.  Gayoso offered two 
metaphors designed to illustrate the danger of disunity both among and, more 
importantly, within the native nations.  In his first metaphor, Gayoso compared the 
Chickasaws to a family whose lack of unity was destined to result in ruin.  Gayoso 
claimed that Piomingo’s American proclivity went “away from the thinking of the rest” 
of the Chickasaws.  If allowed to continue, the result would be catastrophic to all of the 
southeastern native nations.  Gayoso built on this example for his second metaphor 
about what he considered the family of all native peoples.  Gayoso described “four 
houses [who] are close [enough] together [that] fire (will) threaten the one farthest 
away, if the residents of the others do not help to put it out.”  The fire was the threat of 
American incursion into the southeast and the subsequent control they would gain over 
each native polity should they refuse to ally against further American incursion.1   
In his reply before the entire congress, Ugulayacabe ignored Gayoso’s 
suggestion that Piomingo’s American proclivity was a threat to Chickasaw peace and 
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security.  Instead, he focused on Gayoso’s four houses, albeit through an alternate 
metaphor.  Ugulayacabe compared the four nations to the “four fingers of a hand that, 
when working together, can lift a great weight”; however, the Chickasaw chief 
indicated that in a world in which western imperial powers vied with Native Americans 
for control over the land, the four fingers were not enough.  Ugulayacabe stated that “if 
to the four fingers are added the help of a thumb, in this case the Spanish nation, then 
the power of all is increased significantly.”2  By publicly casting aside Gayoso’s 
reference to the internal divisions among the Chickasaw, Ugulayacabe most likely 
wished to assert his ability, and his alone, to negotiate on behalf of the Chickasaws.  
Further, Ugulayacabe’s metaphor reveals that the presence of at least two imperial-
minded, Euro-American powers was vital to the maintenance of native sovereignty, 
especially in the post-Revolution world of American efforts to build an empire of 
liberty. 
This chapter follows the progression of Chickasaw political factions as they 
became increasingly attached to either the Americans or the Spanish in the decade 
following the Hopewell treaty of 1786.  Although early state ambitions to assert their 
individual authority over that of the Americans’ central government offered a degree of 
flexibility during the late 1780s, the federal government attempted to consolidate its 
control over Indian affairs in the 1790s.  At the same time, Chickasaw leaders divided 
over how best to maintain their autonomy and sovereignty in the ten years following the 
Hopewell treaty when faced with an expanding American populace whose allegiance to 
any one imperial power seemed questionable.  The previous century of imperial 
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relations suggested that Native Americans use imperial officials to restrain the 
ambitions of individuals on the ground.  Consequently, Chickasaw leaders cemented the 
relationships established with Spain at Mobile and the United States at Hopewell.  As 
individual leaders performed their diplomatic roles as representatives to either Spain or 
the United States, they became convinced that their own European American imperial 
ally held the key to counteracting the external forces that threatened the independence 
of the Chickasaw polity.  Further, as evidenced by his disregard of Gayoso’s concern 
for the legitimacy of Piomingo’s alliance with the Americans, the former recognition of 
equal authority afforded to opposing factions within Chickasaw politics had eroded by 
the early 1790s and the surface of the Chickasaw nation’s diplomatic policies became 
fractured, exposing their divisions to the world.  The confederation of southern Indian 
nations approved by the Nogales Congress seemed to indicate a successful future for 
both Ugulayacabe’s and Gayoso’s attempts to thwart Piomingo and the Americans.  The 
subsequent Treaty of San Lorenzo halted the formation of an official pan-Indian 
confederation among the southeastern Native Americans, however, and further 
deepened the chasm of American dependency into which the Chickasaws were falling.  
*************** 
The stipulations resulting from the Hopewell treaty seemed to satisfy some of 
the Chickasaws concerns of the previous three years regarding their relations with the 
Americans.  Not only did the treaty establish peace with the United States, it also 
established Congress as the political entity among the Americans with whom the 
Chickasaws should deal.  As we will see over the course of this study, however, the 
Chickasaws always had to be mindful of individual and state ambitions regardless of the 
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laws passed by the federal government.  The treaty also upheld Chickasaw sovereignty 
over their lands.  Despite wording that recognized United States’ ownership of 
Chickasaw land, Americans who settled on Chickasaw land forfeited their right to 
appeal to the United States protection; rather, they became subject to Chickasaw laws.  
Further, as no purchase was made for those lands, we can assume that the Chickasaws 
did not recognize any transfer of land ownership, other than that given to establish a 
trading post.  
As William Blount’s protest on behalf of North Carolina at the conclusion of the 
Hopewell negations indicates, not everyone approved of the treaty signed by the 
Chickasaw and United States commissioners at Hopewell.  Among those particularly 
aggrieved were the American settlers who had begun moving onto the lands to which 
they believed they had finally won the right by defeating the British in the Revolution.  
Moreover, Americans living in this region did not necessarily demonstrate allegiance to 
the United States, nor to their own states for that matter.  As the southern states had 
proved in their willingness to negotiate directly with the Indians regardless of 
Congress’s claims to sole authority in such manners, many American settlers in the 
southeast demonstrated a willingness to negotiate as political entities with both the 
Indians and with Spain.   
Beginning in 1787, General James Wilkinson of Kentucky enjoyed a long tenure 
as a double-agent for Spain during which he worked to have Kentuckians separate from 
Virginia and align with Spain.3  Wilkinson promised to deliver Kentucky to the Spanish 
in return for trading rights in New Orleans.  His efforts failed.  Regardless, his attempt 
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exemplifies how many individuals living in the borderlands questioned the ability of 
either the federal government or the states to protect and secure their liberty.4  Even 
James Robertson—the future federal Indian agent to the Chickasaws once the 
Southwest Territory was established in 1792—appealed to the Spanish for protection 
against the Creeks and Cherokees on behalf of the settlement of Cumberland.  
Robertson informed Miró that the Cumberland settlement had determined to separate 
from North Carolina, and even suggested that the settlers would accept the sovereignty 
of Spain if such an action could protect their ability to retain the lands they recently had 
claimed.5  Further, as capitalism slowly took hold in the United States, these citizens 
needed to have access to markets back on the Atlantic coast and overseas.  The most 
efficient manner for transport was to use the extensive network of rivers that drained 
into the Mississippi River.  Despite the guarantee of access to the river according to the 
1783 Treaty of Paris, Americans had to secure their right to passage out of the continent 
at New Orleans by negotiating with the Spanish.6   
Although Wilkinson’s promise to deliver Kentucky into the arms of the Spanish 
Empire failed, it is likely that Spanish officials would have shared knowledge of such 
intrigues with native leaders in order to convince them of which western power to 
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support.  Further, other Americans made more overt efforts to align with the Spanish 
that would have caused Chickasaw leaders to question the allegiance of settlers to the 
United States.  In summer 1786, John Sevier, governor of the offshoot State of Franklin, 
offered the Chickasaws and Cherokees “forever protection against the Creek Nation.”7  
At face value, Sevier’s action may seem to be a clear indication that the United States, 
in some form or another, was offering help to the Chickasaws.  That is not necessarily 
the case.  Sevier most likely was attempting to garner native protection for the settlers 
against the Creeks and Over Hill Cherokees with whom they were at war.  As one of the 
founding members of the American settlement at Muscle Shoals, Sevier was at odds 
with North Carolina officials, who refused to recognize Franklin’s right to carve out its 
own sovereign territory within that state’s western territory.  Two years later, Sevier 
even appealed to Diego Gardoqui, the Spanish minister to the United States, to establish 
an alliance and trade agreement for Franklin, which was on the brink of failure.  North 
Carolina’s recent rejection of the U.S. Constitution threatened Sevier’s only hope to 
become an equal member of the United States.  Sevier suggested that the citizens of 
Franklin were willing to accept Gardoqui’s recent offer of Spanish protection.8   
Southeastern Indian leaders were concerned about their options after the 
American Revolution.  With Great Britain removed from the picture, Spain and the 
United States competed for the Indians’ allegiance.  Try as they might, these two former 
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allies could not commit the Chickasaws, into a one-sided alliance.  This was due in part 
to two factors.  First, the ambivalent allegiance of American settlers—demonstrated in 
the actions of James Wilkinson, James Robertson, and John Sevier—offered two 
avenues through which the Chickasaws could stave off western encroachment into and 
control over their society.  Second, the Americans and Spaniards failed to understand 
the complex dynamic presented by factional divisions among the southeastern Native 
Americans.   
Despite Piomingo’s seeming love of his new American brothers, even he 
understood that he had to hold his faction’s dependence upon American in check in 
order to stave off the ability of Americans to control Chickasaw lands.9  Therefore, he 
and the other Chickasaw negotiators at Hopewell agreed that the United States would 
establish a trading post at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River.  The Chickasaws 
designated the site as a means through which to invite American traders close to their 
homelands and yet keep them outside of the intimate spaces of their villages.  Although 
individual traders were not restrained from conducting business in the southeast, the 
treaty granted the Confederated Congress the authority to regulate all trade with the 
Chickasaws.  Further, Congress was allowed to take its time to determine if and how the 
central government would take an active role in the trade.10  The location of the trading 
post became a stumbling point for the Chickasaws and the United States over the next 
decade, however, as the Creeks claimed Muscle Shoals as part of their territory as well. 
By granting the Americans the right to establish a trading post and settlement at 
Muscle Shoals, the Chickasaws instigated a decade of open hostility between 
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Piomingo’s faction and the Upper Creeks led by Alexander McGillivray that would also 
help solidify the factional divisions among the Chickasaws along pro-American or pro-
Spanish lines.  Additionally, it opened a door through which the United States worked 
over the next decade to establish trading posts within the Chickasaw nation.  In a letter 
to the Spanish governor at Pensacola, Arturo O’Neill, dated May 12, 1786, Alexander 
McGillivray stated that the land the Chickasaw delegates ceded at Hopewell was not 
theirs to surrender.  Although McGillivray claimed that the Creeks drove off those 
Americans who had attempted to settle at the Shoals, he believed the Chickasaws’ 
action was in direct contradiction to an agreement they made with the Creeks and 
Cherokees the previous July.  McGillivray informed O’Neill that the “confederated 
[Indian] nations” found the act so egregious as to “attack and castigate” the Chickasaws.  
Further, he would travel to meet with the Chickasaw leaders for the purpose of ending 
the hostilities and to keep the Chickasaws “addicted” to the protection of Spain, which 
they obtained by the Mobile treaty in 1784.11   
*************** 
Despite the apparent success the Spanish had in securing treaties with the 
southeastern Indians at Pensacola and Mobile in 1784, Cruzat feared a pan-Indian 
alliance, rumors of which he had heard were being instigated by the Chickasaws and 
Abenakis.  According to Cruzat, the two nations wanted to unite all of the Indians in a 
“war upon the Spaniards, French, and Americans to see whether they can destroy them 
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or drive them from all these continents.”12  Miró, for his part, remained calm.  He 
trusted that his work during the 1784 conferences at Pensacola and Mobile would prove 
fruitful:  “I can flatter myself that I established the most solid foundations for the 
purpose of separating these nations [Cherokees, Chickasaws, and Creeks] from the 
American side although the inconstancy and unreliability of every Indian is such as not 
to give us entire security.”  Miró attempted to calm Cruzat’s suspicions about the 
supposed pan-Indian alliance.  Although he did not deny the plot’s existence, he 
claimed the Chickasaws “continue firm in their friendship to [Spain], which they prefer 
to that of the Americans against whom they are forming a powerful league.”13   
Miró had reason to believe that the southeastern natives preferred the Spanish to 
the Americans.  Continued American attempts to settle on Indian lands prompted joint 
efforts among the Creeks, Cherokees, and Shawnees to drive settlers out of their lands 
in Georgia and Tennessee.  Further, these war parties armed themselves with Spanish 
weapons.14   
Miró’s confidence was most likely misguided, however, as both Taskietoka and 
Piomingo sought to play the Spanish and the Americans against each other.  On June 1, 
1787, a young Chickasaw, who claimed to represent “the Great Chief Takapoumas, 
[his] uncle,” informed Carlos de Grand-Pre, commandant at Natchez, that half of the 
Chickasaws had thoroughly aligned themselves with the Americans, “but the other half 
refused them, saying they did not have or want to have any other fathers than the 
Spaniards.”  Grand-Pre expressed concern that his informant may not have been 
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forthright in his dealings with the Spaniard:  “Despite the many questions I put to this 
envoy I have not been able to clear up anything in all that he told me, for he 
contradicted himself every instant so that I did not and do not give any credence to his 
information.”15  By the summer 1787, O’Neill feared that if better trade goods and 
terms were not established with the Chickasaws soon, the friendship the Spanish 
enjoyed with the nation might be lost.16 
O’Neill’s concerns hit the nail on the head.  Securing and maintaining the 
Chickasaws’ favor was an economic concern from the beginning for both the 
Americans and the Spanish.  Even McGillivray observed that the Americans were able 
to gain a foothold among the Chickasaws during the late 1780s due to the poor trade 
relations the Chickasaws enjoyed with Spain.  By the mid- to late-1780s, the price of 
deerskins in Europe had dropped significantly, hindering the firm of Strother and 
Mather’s ability to adhere to the rates established by the Mobile Treaty in 1784.  
Sensing weakness in the Spanish Indian trade, Georgians attempted to capitalize on 
Chickasaw and Choctaw unrest in order to win allies for their ongoing problems with 
the Creeks.17  McGillivray, in turn, used this in an attempt to obtain Panton, Leslie and 
Company official access to the Choctaw and Chickasaw trade that had been denied to 
them since 1784.18  Although a joint threat—issued to Miró by Taskietoka and the 
Choctaw leader, Franchimastabe—that the Chickasaws and Choctaws would turn to the 
Americans if favorable trade was not established bolstered McGillivray’s claim, the 
                                                 
15 “Grand-Pre to Miró, November 1, 1787,” Spain in the Mississippi Valley, 
2:210-211. 
16 “O’Neill to Miró, July 20, 1787,” PLP, Reel 3. 
17 Weeks, Paths to a Middle Ground, p. 52. 
18 “McGillivray to Zéspedes, October 6, 1787,” PLP, Reel 3. 
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Creek leader’s intrigue did not succeed initially.19  Miró and Navarro continued to 
support Strother and Mather.  They pushed for better access for Strother and Mather to 
fill their warehouse in Mobile, fearing that the lack of readily available goods would 
“undoubtedly lose them, and they will be very difficult to regain once the United States 
is able to attract them to its friendship and trade.”20 
In the summer of 1787, a Chickasaw captain—Taskitetoka’s brother and 
successor as high chief, Chinubbee—traveled to Philadelphia and New York with the 
Choctaw leader, Taboca, to press the American congress concerning the establishment 
of a trading post at Muscle Shoals.21  This mission was most likely an attempt to 
implement the threat issued by Taskietoka and Franchimastabe the previous winter.  
These two leaders had even held a conference with the Spanish commissioner of 
Mobile, Pedro Juzan, in March to complain about unfair prices in the deerskin trade 
upheld by the agents of Strother and Mather.  Juzan left the conference satisfied that he 
had secured the allegiance of the Chickasaws and Choctaws for the Spanish; however, 
                                                 
19 Robert S. Cotterill, The Southern Indians: The Story of the Civilized Tribes 
Before Removal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), p. 75. 
20 “Miró and Navarro to Valdes, New Orleans, April 1, 1788,” PLP, Reel 3. 
21 “John Woods, Indian Interpreter, May 25, 1787,” CVSP, 4:290.  Various 
scholars have asserted that Piomingo was the Chickasaw chief who travelled with the 
Choctaws.  Arrell Gibson, for example, cites Samuel Cole Williams’ History of the Lost 
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Tennessee, in the Land of the Chickasaws, 1541-1841 (Johnson City: Watauga Press, 
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is actually a passage from a letter Piomingo wrote to Joseph Martin on February 17, 
1787; “A Talk to Colo. Joseph Martin—From Piomingo, One of the Cheifs of that 
Tribe,” CVSP, 4:241-242.  Further, the presence of Piomingo in Philadelphia does not 
coincide with the fact that Secretary at War Henry Knox addressed a letter to the 
Chickasaw chief in this delegation in the name of Chamby.  I am inclined to accept 
Robert S. Cotterill’s assertion that Chamby was also known as Tinebe, which is another 
variation of Chinubbe’s name.  See Gibson, The Chickasaws, p. 85-86, and Cotterill, 
The Southern Indians, p. 75n35.  
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the joint delegation en route to Philadelphia and New York suggests that Juzan’s and 
Miró’s confidence in the Spanish alliance with the Chickasaw was misinformed.22 
Conversely, the Americans should have questioned their own ability to secure 
Chickasaw allegiance via trade as well.  Recognizing the early influence the Spanish 
gained among the members of the nation, James Robertson, when serving as a 
representative for North Carolina, noted that financial security would be a very crucial 
component to securing favorable relations with the Chickasaw.23  In early 1787, 
Piomingo chastised Joseph Martin for not visiting the Chickasaws to discuss the delay 
of trade agreed upon in the Treaty of Hopewell.  Piomingo told Martin that the 
Americans’ noncompliance made the Chickasaws “Very Uneasy, and seems as if You 
only ment to Jockey us out of our Lands.”  He also said that although he did not want to 
trade with the Spanish, he would if necessary:  “necessity will oblige us to Look for 
new friends if we cannot get Friends otherwise.”24   
Although Chinubbee walked away from his 1787 mission with promises of trade 
that would remain unfulfilled for several more years, the timing of his journey could not 
have been more fortuitous.  He and the Choctaw delegates arrived in Philadelphia 
amidst the debates regarding the creation of the U.S. Constitution.25  According to 
                                                 
22 Weeks, Paths to a Middle Ground, pp. 52-53. 
23 “Col. James Robertson to Gov. Martin, August 5th., 1784,” M.F. 1114, Reel 
1, Box 3, Section 2, William A. Provine Papers, Tennessee State Library and Archives, 
Nashville, TN. 
24 “A Talk for Colo. Joseph Martin—From Piomingo, One of the Cheifs of that 
Tribe,” CVSP, IV:241-242. 
25 Cotterill, The Southern Indians, p. 75. 
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Benjamin Franklin, the elder statesman with whom they sought an audience,26 they 
could not meet with the elected members of the United States government:   
I am sorry that the Great Council Fire of our Nation is not now burning, so that 
you cannot now do your Business there. In a few Months the Coals will be rak’d 
out of the Ashes, and the Fire will be again kindled. Our wise Men will then take 
the Complaints and Desires of your Nation into Consideration, and take the 
proper Measures for giving you Satisfaction. 
 
Franklin’s statement offers unique insight into how the Chickasaws could have 
understood the nature of the American union.  That Franklin referred to the coals being 
“rak’d out of the Ashes” implies that although the Pennsylvanian believed that the 
system of government established under the Articles of Confederation had faltered, the 
American union had not necessarily come to an end.  Even though Franklin referred to 
himself as a Pennsylvanian and called on “all the Citizens of Pennsylvania” to treat the 
chiefs kindly, his words indicate that the American leaders were committed to the 
international compact they established a decade earlier.27  As noted in the previous 
chapter, this implies that Americans would continue to expand west following the 
                                                 
26 “From Tobocah and a Chichasaw Captain (unpublished), [June 19, 1787],” 
643678=045-u064.html, in unpub. 1787-88, Benjamin Franklin Papers (website), 
sponsored by the American Philosophical Society and Yale University, digital edition 
by The Packard Humanities Institute, http://franklinpapers.org/franklin/ 
framedVolumes.jsp, accessed on May 2, 2011. 
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creation of the Constitution, with a structure better capable of building an empire of 
liberty.28 
Despite the fact that it would take several more years before the Americans 
opened a steady trade with the Chickasaws, the mission provides more than simply 
insight into the organization and psyche of the Chickasaws’ newly independent 
neighbors to the east.  The trip added fuel to the Spanish officials’ fire concerning the 
faithfulness of the Chickasaws in upholding their alliance with Spain.  Although the 
chiefs did not get to have an audience with Congress, Secretary at War Henry Knox 
appealed to the members on their behalf.  On July 18, 1787, Knox reported, “it is highly 
politic and proper that the [Hopewell] treaty and the expectations of [the Chickasaws 
and Choctaws] of being supplied with goods by the citizens of the United States should 
be fully complied with.”29  Apparently, the members of Congress agreed.  They 
approved Knox’s recommendations and even appropriated funds to cover the Indians’ 
travel back home.30  The Spanish minister to the United States, Diego de Gardoqui, 
                                                 
28 The best illustration of how an expansive United States were seen to be 
compatible with the republican values espoused in the United States Constitution 
among the Founding Fathers is Peter Onuf’s Jefferson’s Empire.  Onuf claims that 
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29 Worthington C. Ford et al., eds., Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-
1789 (Washington, D.C.: 1904-37), 32:368.  
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obviously believed the delegates’ presence in New York deserved attention.  He 
informed the Spanish governor in East  Florida, Vicente Manuel de Zéspedes, that the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw delegates who traveled to Philadelphia and New York had also 
been regular traders in Mobile and New Orleans.31   
Among Knox’s recommendations to the Congress in July 1787 was the need to 
establish a stronger military presence along the Ohio River for protection of the United 
States’ frontier citizens.32  One possible method Knox arranged was for the 
establishment of an American post at Chickasaw Bluffs.  That fall, Carlos de Grand-Pre 
learned that “two great Chickasaw and Choctaw chiefs”—most likely Chinubbee and 
his Choctaw companions—traveled home from Philadelphia by way of Fort Pitt and the 
Ohio River “at the expense of the General Congress,” accompanied by a party of four 
American businessmen.  The four Americans, having left their Indian companions at the 
Chickasaw Bluffs, traveled on to Natchez where they spoke to Grand-Pre.  These men 
told Grand-Pre that the “chiefs were invited by the Congress to go to Philadelphia 
where a treaty was made with them, forming an alliance against the Talapoosa Indians, 
and that the two chiefs are to have their people armed immediately so as to join the nine 
hundred Americans ordered to be raised by the State of Virginia.”  The men also 
claimed that the Chickasaws and the Virginia militia would join forces on November 1, 
1787 to initiate their campaign against the Tallapoosas.33   
                                                 
31 “Zéspedes to Sonora, July 27, 1787,” PLP, Reel 3. 
32 Journals of the Continental Congress, 32:370-375. 
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Although this report played on Spanish administrators’ fears about whether the 
Chickasaws supported Spain or the United States, the presence of factionalism within 
Chickasaw society combined with the desire to preserve independent sovereignty meant 
that the Spanish did not have to look far to find Chickasaw support to push back 
American ambitions on the east side of the Mississippi River.  According to Grand-
Pre’s dubious Chickasaw informant in May 1787, the pro-Spanish Chickasaws  
‘were to unite [with members of the Shawnees, Lobos, Cherokees, and 
Abenakis] and descend the Mississippi River as far as Chickasaw Bluffs, in 
order to surprise and destroy the Americans established on it and all the 
Chickasaws at present with them.  It was their concerted project to intercept all 
the boats that go up to [Illinois], leaving at the same time the Talapoosas to 
make attacks in the rear and ruin all the villages that have taken sides with the 
Americans.’34 
 
As Taskietoka’s and Franchimastabe’s threat to obtain goods from the Americans 
demonstrate, Grand-Pre’s reservation about his young informant’s veracity was not 
necessarily misguided.  The Chickasaws never devolved into an open and hostile civil 
war between the pro-American and pro-Spanish factions.  Regardless, this passage 
suggests that a schism was emerging by the mid- to late-1780s among the Chickasaws 
about which Euro-American imperial power could best serve their own interests.  
Further, given the agreement Chinubbee and Taboca achieved with the Americans 
during their mission to Philadelphia and New York to ally against the Tallapoosas, we 
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can assume that Piomingo approved of the mission’s objectives even if he may not have 
been involved with their formulation.   
*************** 
Despite American promises to respect Chickasaw sovereignty according to the 
Hopewell Treaty, neither the federal government nor the individual states stopped 
working to establish control over the Chickasaws’ land.  Knox’s second 
recommendation to Congress in July 1787 helps demonstrate that by the late 1780s, 
Americans would not be content with establishing simple trade relations with the 
Chickasaws.  Following their unsuccessful attempts to claim native lands as the spoils 
of war and paint the Chickasaws, among others, as defeated allies of the British, United 
States officials realized that they must change their tactics.  American officials adopted 
a more conciliatory tack that included negotiating for land cessions, a key component of 
which approach was to create a situation of economic dependency and indebtedness 
among Native Americans through which the government could demand land as 
payment to decrease debt.35  One method to ensure that Native Americans became 
dependent upon the United States, as opposed to Spain, was to establish a trading 
factory at a key location within a nation’s territory.  For the Chickasaws, as the Spanish 
and the Americans both well knew, the key location was at Chickasaw Bluffs.36   
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Knox raised another concern in light of his interaction with Chinubbee and 
Taboca in his message to Congress.  Knox recommended that the central government 
negotiate with Georgia and North Carolina to cede their western lands, which would 
allow the federal government to provide a buffer between their own citizens and the 
Indians.  Knox reasoned that the federal government needed to play the role of 
moderator between the states and the natives in the southeast.37  Although Knox’s 
recommendation alone did not result in the southern states ceding their western 
territories, both North Carolina and Georgia eventually did so following the creation of 
a stronger federal government under the U.S. Constitution.   
As noted earlier, individual citizens did not relent in their desire to control the 
Old Southwest despite the cession of the western territories by the southern states.  
Throughout the post-Revolution period, the Chickasaws objected to many attempts by 
Europeans to form companies—collectively known as the Yazoo Land Companies—
that, with the backing of a political entity, sought to gain control over the lower 
Mississippi valley.  The individuals leading these efforts, among who included James 
Robertson, William Blount, and John Sevier, enjoyed the backing of various southern 
states within the new American confederation.  To call these men Americans 
misconstrues the facts to some extent.  Gen. James Wilkinson even sought Spanish 
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cooperation with his enterprise, the South Carolina Company.  Although Wilkinson 
failed to secure Spanish support for the effort, his replacement, James O’Fallon, 
continued to press the issue.  In a letter to Miró on July 16, 1790, O’Fallon offered to 
create a buffer state between the United States and Spain if Governor-General were to 
offer favorable trade relations at New Orleans to the South Carolina Company.  Noting 
that the American settlers in the southeast must be “led by their Interests,” O’Fallon 
revealed the fragile nature of the American alliance in this early stage of the United 
States’ history.  O’Fallon stated, 
that the Inhabitants thereof, can derive no Commercial or political advantage 
whatever, by their being Subjected to Congressional Supremacy placed in the 
Atlantic States; and that their last hope of ever rising into any consequence, as a 
people, must be founded, on confederating, independently, among themselves, 
on the basis of a Separate Sovereignty from that of the present Congress and, on 
the Stipulation of a general Market or free trade at New Orleans, for their 
productions, firmly to coalesce, as sincere Allies, with that European power, 
who shall hold it.38 
 
The diplomatic fallout that accompanied the Nootka crisis thwarted O’Fallon’s efforts, 
but not before giving Spanish officials a crucial bargaining piece to help convince their 
native neighbors east of the Mississippi River of the need for a pan-Indian alliance.39  
During a private session on May 12, Gayoso informed Taskietoka about the 
growing unrest among the United States citizens in the American South. 
I began making him an individual report about the project of the Carolina 
Companies and about the O’Fallon operations in Kentucky, with the fixed 
purpose of coming to establish themselves in Nogales, although without the 
authority of the Congress.  I explained to him how the United States was at 
peace with [Spain] and that it was a nation that we looked upon as friends, but 
that among them there were many people who disregarding their country’s laws, 
were gathering together in groups and usurping Indian lands and that the 
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mentioned companies, through O’Fallon, were also intending to come and 
occupy our (lands).40 
 
Given the nature of Gayoso’s comment regarding the inability of the United States to 
control its own citizens, we can probably assume that he also informed Taskietoka of 
O’Fallon’s offer to swear allegiance to the Spanish crown.  That individual land 
speculators and American-based land companies deliberately offered to create a buffer 
state between the United States and Spain—and expected that Spanish officials would 
buy it—indicates a ready understanding among southeastern peoples during this time 
period that southern Americans did not necessarily hold any great loyalty to the 
fledgling United States.  As has been shown with the American settlers in the Northwest 
Territory, the loyalty of these southerners was up for grabs in the late eighteenth 
century.  Unlike those settlers north of the Ohio River, however, loyalty in the 
American South could be won by offering favorable economic opportunities rather than 
protection from Indian hostilities.41 
By spring 1790 Chickasaws were aware that the Americans intended to expand 
into their territory and that these settlements would eventually be integrated the new 
nation as states.  On May 8, 1790, Alexander McGillivray wrote to Miró and claimed:   
I am informed that it has been some time since the legislative body of Georgia 
has disposed of a certain western territory, which evidently is within those lands 
to which Spain has a right, in favor of the three most powerful American state, 
and that they (L.C. 34) are determined to settle them regardless of the 
consequences and the danger involved.  I am also informed as to the full extent 
of their plans through true authoritative reports, and that their intention is to 
establish three new states upon the Mississippi as soon as each settlement can 
count 30,000 persons, after which, according to the American Constitution, they 
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will have the right to call themselves new states.42   
 
The western territory of which McGillivray wrote included the Natchez District, of 
which both the Chickasaws and Choctaws claimed portions.  Although McGillivray and 
the Upper Creeks were at war with the Chickasaws, the neutral and pro-Spanish 
Chickasaws certainly had opportunities to learn the information that the Creek chief 
shared with the Spanish Governor-General.  Less than one week later, Taskietoka, along 
with Franchimastabe and several of the other Choctaw chiefs, reaffirmed their nations’ 
friendship with the Spanish in a treaty signed at Natchez.  In the treaty, all three parties 
defined their respective geographic territories east of the Mississippi and promised to 
keep the Natchez district free from American influence. Further, the treaty formalized 
the establishment of a trading post at Nogales—near present-day Vicksburg—a move 
designed to fulfill the Spanish obligation to provide favorable trade relations with the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws according to the terms of the 1784 Mobile treaty.43 
In May 1792, the Spanish governor at Natchez, Manuel Gayoso de Lemos 
convened a congress with the Choctaws and members of the Chickasaw led by 
Taskietoka.  Gayoso’s purpose was two-fold:  to secure the right for the Spanish to 
establish a fort at Nogales; and to garner Chickasaw support for Carondelet’s plan of a 
pan-Indian alliance.44  Although the Chickasaw and Choctaw representatives had 
previously agreed to the establishment of a fort at Nogales, Franchimastabe, the 
Choctaw leader, objected when the Spanish initiated construction of the fort in 1790.  
According to Franchimastabe, the land around Nogales actually belonged to the 
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 88 
Chickasaws, whom he said “would never consent to these lands being settled by any 
species of people.”45  The Choctaw chief may have been playing coy, however, relying 
on the Chickasaws factionalism and influence over the Choctaws in international affairs 
to avert a situation from which the Choctaws would have received no benefit.46   
Franchimastabe confirmed the influence the Chickasaws held over the 
Choctaws, and possibly several of the other southeastern groups, when he nominated 
Taskietoka to represent the Choctaws during the Natchez Congress at the opening 
ceremony on May 11.  According to the Choctaw chief, “all the Indian nations look to 
him [Taskietoka] as our older brother…thus you will discuss with him whatever you 
may have to tell us, assured that he is the one who has all the power.”47  The following 
day, Franchimastabe also informed Gayoso “that lately the Cherokees, the Talapuches, 
the Chactas, and the Chicachas made an alliance in which they now form a single 
Nation for their defense.”  Further, the four nations “chose for the head, the King of the 
Chicachas, for which reason it was to him [Taskietoka] that the Cherokees sent the 
strings of beads that he might distribute them among the rest of the nations.”48  
Although Minor had informed Gayoso of the alliance, he did not mention the 
prominence accorded to Taskietoka—and therefore the Chickasaws—among the 
southern Indian nations.  This should give us reason to believe that maneuvers to create 
such a confederation during this time were not only the designs of Europeans to keep 
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the Americans out of the eastern hinterland; the Chickasaws, or at least members 
thereof, were at the forefront of such efforts. 
The legitimacy of this alliance to represent all of the major native southern 
nations is questionable, especially among the Cherokees, the Creeks, and even the 
Chickasaws.  Recent studies have demonstrated the divided nature of these socio-
political groups during this eighteenth century.49  By the end of the congress, all sides 
had agreed to the establishment of the fort, but not before Gayoso had to purchase the 
land from the Chickasaws and Choctaws by opening the Royal Warehouses and leaving 
the amount of goods for the purchase at Taskietoka’s discretion.  What this does show, 
however, is Taskietoka fulfilling his obligation to maintain peace among those portions 
of the Native South who were willing to support the Spanish in an attempt to hold the 
Americans at bay, but only as long as the Spanish played by native rules.  50 
During a private meeting between Taskietoka and Gayoso on May 12, 1792 at 
the Natchez Congress, Taskietoka revealed that he believed that the Indians could not 
resist European encroachment into their lands forever, but that by playing the Spanish 
and the Americans against each other, they could maintain the upper hand.  As the high 
chief informed Gayoso of his attempt to convince Franchimastabe to allow the Spanish 
to build a fort at Nogales, “he (Taskietoka) told him (Franchimastabe) that it was 
madness to fight with us over the Nogales territory; that if they persisted, we [the 
Spanish] had the means to deprive them [Indians] of all trade.”51  Taken at face value, 
this statement reveals that Taskietoka believed the Chickasaws were dependent upon 
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the Spanish.  However, he later informed Gayoso that he had recently received gifts 
from the Americans, a situation made possible by Piomingo’s alliance.  Although 
Taskietoka understood that the Americans “want[ed] to take his lands,” he could not 
ignore their presence.  Despite Gayoso’s threatening reply that the Spanish, “being 
master[s] of all the waters over which goods can be carried to his country,” could easily 
cut the Chickasaws off from all trade, Taskietoka “could (do) no less than deal with 
them [the Americans] sometimes because he found himself bordering on their lands, 
and to live in peace it was necessary to sometimes listen to them, but he would never 
form any alliance at all with them, because he knew them too well.”52 
*************** 
Despite the prominence bestowed upon Taskietoka by the Choctaws at Natchez, 
his authority among the Chickasaws seems to have been waning.  Over the next three 
years, he fell out of favor with the two preeminent chiefs in Chickasaw society, 
Piomingo and Ugulayacabe, the latter of whom replaced him as the principle negotiator 
with the Spanish.  As Taskietoka’s statement about the inevitability of foreign intrusion 
into the Chickasaws’ world indicates, he could use the threat of American support to 
check the Spanish from gaining too much influence.  Native leaders successfully 
employed such tactics throughout the previous century.  That ability would soon end for 
the Chickasaws as leaders became cross and threw their support firmly in support of 
either the Spanish or the Americans.   
According to some insiders, the entire balance of power in the American South 
may have rested on the ability of either the United States or Spain to appease the 
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economic interests of the southeastern inhabitants, native as well as European.  On 
July 4, 1790, William Panton informed Miró that Piomingo only held the ear of a 
minority of Chickasaws concerning the Chickasaw-American alliance.  According to 
Panton, the remaining Chickasaws were “well enough satisfied to live under [Spain’s] 
protection, and to take their supplys from Mobille.”  Further, Panton indicated his belief 
that Piomingo could be swayed from favoring the Americans if the Spanish were to 
appeal to his capitalistic side.53  What Panton did not understand, however, was that 
Piomingo’s connection to the Americans offered an all-too-important source for 
combating the Upper Creeks who warred against the Chickasaws regardless of pro-
American or pro-Spanish affiliation.54   
By the early 1790s, Alexander McGillivray had rescinded his strong aversion to 
negotiating with the Americans.  In late summer 1790, the Creek leader signed a peace 
treaty with Secretary of War Knox, in which he ceded lands along the Oconee River.55  
William Augustus Bowles, a Maryland loyalist during the Revolution who continued to 
support British efforts to disrupt trade and diplomatic relations in the southeast, used 
this to discredit McGillivray with a large portion of the Creeks.  Despite this apparent 
shift in Creek diplomacy against pro-Spanish southern Indians, the Chickasaws refused 
an invitation from the Tallapoosas to join the latter in warfare against the Choctaws in 
fall 1791.  According to Gayoso, the Chickasaws refused the offer because they 
considered the Choctaws akin to sisters, signifying a notion that southeastern native 
polities were closely related and must stick together in their attempts to fend off 
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European and American encroachment.56  Regardless of the turmoil among the Creeks, 
McGillivray did not lose all of his influence after negotiating with the Americans.  In 
spring 1792, he told John Ormsbay, an American trader, “that the Creeks were much 
displeased at the Chickasaws and Choctaws, in consequence of the latter having favored 
the Americans, and some of them acted with their army, to the northward.”  Ormsbay 
informed James Seagrove that McGillivray “expected the Creeks would go to war with 
the Chickasaws and Choctaws.”57 
As he had several years earlier, Piomingo continued to work to compel his 
American allies to provide relief from the Creek attacks.  His efforts were bolstered in 
part due to his support of the United States government’s activities in the Ohio country.  
Piomingo was able to recruit a party of fifty warriors to join him in support of the 
American effort.58  However, Piomingo’s participation in the Americans’ campaign 
against the Wabash tribes was not some sort of blind allegiance or due to an inescapable 
state of dependency.  Malcolm McGee claimed that the Chickasaws had been at war 
with the Wabash tribes from at least the mid-1760s until the Treaty of Greenville was 
concluded in 1795.59  Given the inability of Francisco Cruzat to quell the Kickapoo 
threat—as noted in Chapter 1—it seems likely that Chickasaw cooperation with the 
federal army in the Ohio country was in part due to the ongoing hostilities between the 
Chickasaws and their native neighbors to the north.  Although the expedition ended in 
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defeat, Secretary of War Knox expected the Chickasaw leader to “join the [American] 
army the next campaign, with a body of three hundred of his warriors.”60 
Spanish officials worried about Piomingo’s attachment to and willingness to 
fight alongside of the Americans.  Don Francisco Luis Héctor de Carondelet replaced 
Miró as governor-general of Louisiana and West Florida in 1791.  Over the next five 
years, Carondelet worked to secure a pan-Indian alliance among the southeastern tribes 
in an attempt to stave off American encroachment into the area.  The Chickasaws were 
a key component to his strategy.  As noted earlier, their geographic location allowed 
them to control transport along the Mississippi River, most notably at Chickasaw 
Bluffs.61  As the Americans and Spanish were continuing to negotiate for rights to 
passage along the river, obtaining Chickasaw consent to maintain a presence at the 
Bluffs became a key component of both groups diplomacy during the first half of the 
1790s.  Despite Piomingo’s proclivity to side with the Americans on most issues, 
Spanish officials did not write him off.  Carondelet knew he had to secure the allegiance 
of the prominent chiefs among the Chickasaws.62  Although the Spanish had a willing 
ally in Taskietoka, the position of high chief did not carry very much weight in late 
eighteenth-century Chickasaw society.  Carondelet’s lieutenant among the Chickasaws, 
Juan de la Villebeuvre, identified Ugulayacabe, a chief of increasing importance, on 
whom to focus his attention. 
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The Chickasaw leadership became increasingly divided as the Americans and 
Spaniards continued to vie for southeastern native allies and focused their respective 
efforts on Piomingo and Ugulayacabe.  These leaders slipped further into a dependent 
state to one of the European American competitors, and the Chickasaws’ ability to play 
off those same powers waned even as the factional nature of Chickasaw politics 
prolonged the nation’s ability to maintain independence.63  Regarding the factionalism 
in the late 1700s, Malcolm McGee claimed that Long Town (Piomingo) favored the 
Americans and Post Oak Grove (Ugulayacabe) the Spanish.  “Old Town where 
[Taskietoka] resided was neutral,—the smaller towns had, it is thought, no separate 
voice in the matter, but joined with one or the other of the three chief towns.”64   
Perhaps having the lesser towns follow the lead of the three prominent towns allowed a 
de facto national strategy of playing the Americans and Spanish against each other.  As 
Gayoso indicated in a letter to Carondelet in July 1792, one faction could not act 
without affecting the rest of the nation.65  In this way, play-off was a policy that the 
Chickasaws could not hope to avoid. 
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Piomingo’s efforts against the Chickasaws’ enemies had earned him the respect 
of Ugulayacabe, even as the two men diverged on which Euro-American power to 
support.66  This point was made clear at the Nashville conference in August 1792.  After 
the adoption of the U.S. Constitution, the federal government divided all of the non-
state-owned lands into territories. The first governor of the Southwest Territory was 
William Blount, a man with whom the Chickasaw leaders had established a relationship 
as early as the Hopewell Treaty.  At the 1786 council, Blount had represented his state 
of North Carolina and lodged that state’s official protest against the ability of the federal 
government to take any action that contradicted the decisions of that state.  On March 
31, 1792, Secretary of War Knox informed Blount that President Washington approved 
“the calling of the Chickasaws and Choctaws to Nashville the first of June next, for the 
purpose of conciliating and attaching them cordially to the interest of the United 
States.”67  Nearly a month later, Knox again informed Blount that Washington approved 
of the proposed conference with the Chickasaws and Choctaws.  In this same letter, 
Knox informed Blount of James Robertson’s appointment as “temporary agent” to the 
Chickasaws and Choctaws.  It seems that the reason for holding the conference was to 
introduce a new relationship of patronage between the United States and the Indians.  
However, this may not have been a whole-hearted effort to replace the hammer and fist 
of the immediate post-Revolution years.  Rather, it seems that Washington wanted to 
emphasize that punishment would follow if the southeastern tribes behaved the way the 
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northwestern tribes did at the same time that the U.S. was actively recruiting them to 
assist American efforts to assert control over the Northwest Territory.68 
During late spring 1792, Anthony Forster met with the Chickasaw leaders to 
invite them to Nashville for Blount’s conference.  He tried to meet with Taskietoka first, 
but the chief was not in his village.  After calling on Piomingo, whose village was only 
three miles away, Forster attended “a convention of the chiefs of the Chickasaw nation  
. . . on the fourteenth day of June, at which appeared all the chiefs of the nation, 
(together with a number of others) of whom I acquired my information, except the 
Wolf’s Friend [Ugulayacabe].”  According to Forster, Piomingo took the central role of 
representing the nation despite the presence of Taskietoka.  “The dispositions of the 
whole assembly appeared to be friendly and candid,” Forster informed Blount, “except 
the Hair-lipped king, whose conduct indicated an aversion to the views and measures of 
the council.”  When Forster inquired as to a reason for Taskietoka’s hostility, the chief 
claimed to be insulted that Piomingo had been approached before him concerning this 
most recent round of courting by the Americans.  Forster replied that “the great officers 
of the United States [namely Blount and Secretary of War Knox]” had done so because 
they had not yet personally met Taskietoka, but that they had met Piomingo.69  Further, 
the Americans demonstrated that they understood the need to cultivate and maintain 
Piomingo’s prominence among the Chickasaws if they were to achieve their objectives 
among this nation. 
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By summer 1792, it is clear that Taskietoka was at odds with both Piomingo and 
Ugulayacabe.  Despite his absence during the June meeting with Forster, Ugulayacabe 
travelled to Nashville for the conference in August.  Although he and Piomingo 
attempted to persuade Taskietoka to hear what the Americans had to say, the high chief 
refused.  Instead, he travelled to the Tallapoosas with whom he collaborated to secure a 
joint alliance with the Choctaws to defend all of their lands against the Americans.70  
Whereas Taskietoka was referred to as the Chickasaw high chief at the Natchez 
conference the preceding spring, Chinubbee was listed in this position at this 
conference.71  By late 1792, Taskietoka seems to have lost credibility to act on behalf of 
the Chickasaws.  In a letter to William Panton on November 28, 1792, Alexander 
McGillivray reported that “the old Mingo [was] wandering an exile among the 
Choctaws.”72  Therefore, it appears that Taskietoka had hurt himself enough to have lost 
almost all political influence among the Chickasaws.73   
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Regardless of Chinubbee’s designation as high chief, Ugulayacabe emerges 
from the records as the most prominent Chickasaw present at the Nashville conference.  
In his account of the proceedings, William Blount referred to Ugulayacabe as “a great 
man [who] in council ranks among the first of his nation.”  When he addressed the 
American delegation, Ugulayacabe referred to Piomingo as “a great warrior under me,” 
indicating his desire to assert his authority over the entire Chickasaw delegation.  
However, he did not indicate that Piomingo had to follow his lead.  Recognizing the 
factional nature of Chickasaw politics, Ugulayacabe acknowledged Piomingo’s right to 
continue his relations with the Americans:  “whatever he had done on the part of the 
nation, is binding on the whole.”74  It would seem, therefore, that despite personal 
assessments of what was best for the Chickasaws, factional leaders had not moved to a 
state in which they were willing to deny their common relationship as part of an 
ethnically-identified and united community.  But that would soon change. 
To confirm that he accepted the friendship Piomingo had established for the 
Chickasaws with the Americans, Ugulayacabe presented Blount with a string of white 
beads and referred to Americans and Chickasaws “as one people; I love them well, and 
as brothers [i.e., equals].”75  Further, he indicated his desire that Blount keep the 
wampum “clean and unstained that the day should never come that he would let it 
slip.”76  In this instance, the Chickasaw chief placed the onus for maintaining peace 
between the Chickasaws and the Americans on Blount.  With these words and the 
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presentation of native symbols of diplomacy, Ugulayacabe revealed a change in the 
Chickasaws’ practice of recognizing a fanemingo:  acceptance of the Americans’ choice 
without having selected Blount themselves. 
This does not mean that the Chickasaws were only going to negotiate through 
Blount, nor that they had recognized the federal government as the highest authority 
within the political structure of the United States.  While the Chickasaw leaders were at 
the Nashville conference, some held private sessions with Andrew Pickens.  He was a 
representative from South Carolina who had negotiated the Cherokee Hopewell treaty 
in 1785.  When Pickens reported the content of these conversations to the Governor of 
South Carolina, he claimed, “all agree that the Spaniards are using all their influence 
with the Southern Indians to engage them against the United States.”  Although he 
expressed concern that the Creeks were gearing up for war, he indicated that “the 
Chickasaws appear well attached to the interest of the United States.”77  Pickens’ report 
seems to have been sound.  Pickens wrote that the August 1792 conference had nothing 
to do with Americans wishing to obtain land cessions from the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws, but rather was intended to establish trade between the Americans and the two 
native groups.   
Knowing what we do concerning the Spanish attempts to establish forts among 
the Choctaws and Chickasaws, however, it would appear that the Chickasaws were 
deliberately playing the Americans and Spaniards against each other.  While at 
Nashville, Piomingo and Ugulayacabe rejected the American proposal to establish a 
trading post at Bear Creek as was originally provided for in the Treaty of Hopewell 
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(1786).  This does not mean that the two chiefs opposed the idea; rather, they urged 
patience because if established when proposed, they cautioned that the Tallapoosas 
would destroy the post immediately.78  The two chiefs preferred to have the trading post 
established near Nashville, where the conference was held.  Both men may have 
objected to the original location of Bear Creek because it lay too far into their nation 
and would give Americans a perceived right to come into and settle in the Chickasaws’ 
land.  Piomingo admitted that the Chickasaw had received word from the Indians north 
of the Ohio River that the troubles between them and the Americans erupted because 
the Americans wanted to take their lands.  Despite Blount’s assertion that the warfare 
occurred in response to the violence perpetrated by the Indians upon white settlers, it is 
plausible that by keeping the trading post out of official Chickasaw territory, the 
Chickasaw leaders saw a way to avoid such a problem for themselves.79 
*************** 
Reports about American intrigues among the Chickasaws and the agreements 
reached at the Nashville conference reinforced Carondelet’s resolve to establish a 
confederation among the southern Indians.  On August 23, 1792, Carondelet wrote to 
his superior, the Conde de Arana, concerning the American fort near the Tombigbee.  
“This establishment has already caused intrigues in the congress in the Chickasaw 
nation; its party is at present reduced to one principal chief, called Payo Mingo, and 
some warriors, provided the mentioned establishment can supply the entire nation they 
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will turn to the Americans.”80  Although Carondelet downplayed the influence 
Piomingo’s party in his report to Arana, his opinion changed throughout the fall and 
into winter.  On October 1, 1792, Carondelet again wrote to Arana to express his 
concern that the Americans had changed their policy of trying to win the Old Southwest 
by force to one that emphasized trade and conciliation.  By December, he told Gayoso 
that “the party of Payemingo has been strengthened and increased considerably since 
his last trip to Cumberland, the greater part of his warriors having been won over 
through the large presents given to them by the Americans.”81  As Carondelet learned of 
Piomingo’s surging influence among the Chickasaws, the Spanish governor adopted an 
economic policy of free trade:  “Freedom to all the Indian nations to trade with [New 
Orleans] . . . is the only recourse left to us, in order that the residents here can be able to 
give the Indians a more advantageous trade than the Americans and so hold them 
entirely dependent on Spain and form of them a powerful Barrier against the 
Americans.”82  If Arana did not agree with the idea of free trade, Carondelet strongly 
urged that Panton, Leslie & Company should be allowed to establish a trading post at 
Nogales, which Carondelet believed would deter the Americans from establishing 
trading posts among the Chickasaws.83 
The Chickasaws were the key to securing Carondelet’s strategy among the 
southern Indians:  “The Chickasaw nation, although it is the most reduced, is the one 
which gives me the most uneasiness, for it will always draw along the Choctaws with 
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it.”  Although Taskietoka agreed with Carondelet’s plan for a southeastern Indian 
alliance, even Spanish officials knew that the old chief’s influence had diminished 
greatly among the nation.  Carondelet and his lieutenants recognized that they could not 
obtain Chickasaw participation without winning the favor of both of the leading war 
chiefs, Ugulayacabe and Piomingo.  On December 18, 1792, Carondelet told Gayoso 
that “It is necessary, then, to win Payemingo, and even Ugulayacabe, at any price.”  He 
invited the two leaders to visit him in New Orleans, and, although Ugulayacabe made 
the journey, Piomingo did not.84  On January 17, 1793, James Robertson informed 
William Blount that “Missuages have been sent from Orleans & Pensacola to invite the 
Mountain leader to Visit them his answer was that he is engaged in other business.”85 
In the meantime, Carondelet continued to pursue the longstanding Spanish 
objective to secure the Chickasaw Bluffs as a trading post.  Regarding the construction 
of the Spanish fort at Chickasaw Bluffs, Carondelet instructed Gayoso to  
consult with John Turnbull in order to get him to work through the sons he has 
in the Chickasaw Nation about the question of permission for him to construct at 
Chickasaw Bluffs a trading post protected by a fort which Spain will build at 
that place.  . . . for it is extremely important to remove from the Indians any 
suspicion that we intend to occupy their lands, and that Turnbull’s sons obtain 
from the Nation its consent for the erection of this fort, without which the 
trading post cannot exist.86  
 
Further, Carondelet instructed Gayoso not to mention the subject during the proposed 
upcoming “general Assembly of the Indians [Nogales Assembly], as the circumstances 
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indicate, or wait for his sons to negotiate the matter in the Nation itself, in case Your 
Lordship considers it unwise to mention it in the Assembly.”87 
As was clear to Carondelet, the Chickasaws were more willing to have European 
traders working directly among them who had married into one of the clans.  Following 
the Natchez congress, the leaders of Panton, Leslie & Company tried to influence who 
Carondelet would appoint as the Chickasaw agent for the Spanish.  Panton desired to 
have John McIntosh installed in that capacity, but Carondelet and his lieutenants feared 
that the Chickasaws may have favored John Turnbull.88  Although Panton had 
attempted to discredit Turnbull as a swindler and Taskietoka as his puppet, it seems 
likely that the Chickasaws favored Turnbull over any of Panton’s desired traders for 
two reasons:  “Turnbull has children in that nation” and, as noted by Panton, he was 
willing to trade on behalf of either Spain or the United States.89  In late 1792, 
Taskietoka threatened Carondelet that the Chickasaws would “go to the Americans” if 
the Spanish governor did not acquiesce to the chief’s demand that Turnbull be granted a 
license to trade.90   
Following a renewed outbreak of violence between the Chickasaws and Creeks 
in early 1793, the Chickasaws, including Piomingo’s faction, preferred to have Turnbull 
deliver goods to the nation, upholding Carondelet’s suspicions.  Turnbull’s familial 
relations could not give any foreign power carte blanche in Chickasaw national affairs, 
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however.  Chickasaw leaders wanted Turnbull to avoid the Chickasaw Bluffs, rather 
than give the Spanish a leg up on the Americans in securing that strategic location.  
They requested, instead, that the trader bring the goods up the Yazoo River.91   
Carondelet’s vision of a pan-Indian alliance among the southern Indians stood 
on the brink of collapse in early 1793.  A new phase of violence erupted between the 
Chickasaws and Creeks that threatened to derail Carondelet’s plans for a large assembly 
to be held at Nogales.  According to Villebeuvre, the conflict between the Chickasaws 
and the Creeks occurred because the Creeks “killed a boatman in the Chickasaws and 
stolen a Negro and a dozen Horses from a trader named Carney, all of which has done 
very much harm, and has given a terrible blow to your plans.”92  Carondolet feared that 
open war would break out between the two groups, especially in light of his belief that 
the Chickasaws were being instigated to retaliate by William Blount.93  According to 
William Panton, however, “altho’ there will be no way preventing the Creeks, from 
taking satisfaction on the Chickesaws . . . with proper management War may not only 
be prevented between [the two native groups], but the Chickesaws may be forced to 
remain neutral in the quarrel with the Americans.”  Panton further suggested, “no 
expence should be spared to bring [Piomingo] over to [Spanish] interest.”94  
On February 7, 1793, Villebeuvre wrote to Carondelet and urged him to  
make peace [between the Chickasaws and Creeks] immediately cost what it 
may, for if, as you observed to me, the Americans gain the Margot River and the 
Chickasaw Bluffs as a result of it, they will control the whole area, they will 
inject themselves into the Chicasaws and will make themselves masters of all  
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that part, doing to us what they wish, hindering the meeting of the Nations you 
have planned. 
 
Carondelet’s urgent need to secure peace between the Chickasaws and Creeks in 1793 
was driven in part by a threat issued by Piomingo to “call in the Americans from the 
Cumberland settlement to help” the Chickasaws against the Creeks.  As the Chickasaws 
and Creeks stood on the brink of war, Carondelet believed that such assistance from the 
Americans would push the majority of the Chickasaws into the pro-American faction.  
If that happened, it would irrevocably shift the balance of trade in the nation towards the 
favor of the Americans, which “would ruin Panton and make those Indians dependent 
on, and devoted to, the United States.”  Therefore, he also instructed Gayoso to “devote 
all your efforts to winning [Piomingo] over to Spain.”95 
On March 22, 1793, Ugulayacabe appealed to Gayoso to send arms and 
ammunition to the Chickasaws to defend themselves against the Creeks, whom he 
claimed started the recent troubles between the two groups.  He also informed Gayoso 
that Taskietoka was unable to deliver the talk Gayoso sent to Piomingo as the latter was 
already out on the warpath.  Ugulayacabe closed his letter by claiming that his talk 
represented the entire nation, possibly even Piomingo:  “My Father, we are not many 
that talk, but all the great men in this Nation join in this Talk and desire your assistance 
in what we sent for, that we may not die shamefully, and for want of Amunition, as 
there will be Indians along, we desire that the supply be sent to the mouth of Yockny 
Pattafan up the Yasou.”96 
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The death of Alexander McGillivray in mid-February only complicated matters. 
Carondelet had lost his most effective advocate among the Creeks.  He needed to 
reestablish Spanish influence among the Creeks quickly if he was to achieve his goal of 
creating a buffer zone in the southeast.  Carondelet relied on Panton and the trade he 
provided to the Creeks as his avenue to accomplish this mission.  The war between the 
Chickasaws and Creeks in 1793 was actually a war between the Chickasaws and the 
Upper Creeks, most notably the Tallapoosas.  The Lower Creeks refrained from joining 
their Upper Creek cousins against the Chickasaws, as they had for most of the previous 
six years.  The neutrality of the Lower Creeks provided an avenue for Panton to mediate 
the peace Carondelet so desperately desired.  According to Tus-se-kiah Mico, the 
“‘Cussetah and Chickasaw consider themselves as people of one fire . . . from the 
earliest account of their origin.’”97  As this statement indicates, the Chickasaws shared a 
fictive kinship relationship with the Lower Creek town of Cusseta, whose leaders in 
turn had an open diplomatic path to the Upper Creeks through their connection as a 
“friend town” to the Upper Creek towns of Okfuskee and Tallasee.98  Thus, Panton 
could rely on the relationship the Cussetas had with the Chickasaws to mediate the 
latter’s problems with the Upper Creeks.  As Hawkins noted, “During the late war 
between the Creeks and Chickasaws, Cussetah refused her aid, and retained her long 
established friendship for the Chickasaws; and when the Creeks offered to make peace, 
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their offers were rejected, til Cussetah interposed their good offices.”99  By threatening 
to withhold trade from the Creeks, therefore, Panton may have been able to exploit lines 
of kinship diplomacy between the Creeks and Chickasaws.100   
By spring, it seems that the Spanish efforts to mediate a peace were working.  
The Cowetas and Tuckabatches beseeched the Choctaws to deliver a peace belt to the 
Chickasaws.  As the Choctaws seemed to think both the Creeks and the Chickasaws 
were their “elder brothers,” they agreed.  On June 1, 1793, Tuscoonopoy delivered the 
wampum to Piomingo’s faction at Long Town.101  Although Piomingo accepted the belt 
and confirmed his desire to reestablish peace, he was certainly no closer to dissembling 
his alliance with the Americans as Carondelet had hoped.  When Piomingo accepted the 
peace belt sent by the Creeks, although he acknowledged that the Chickasaws’ Spanish 
“fathers” had promoted peace with the Creeks, it was their American “brothers” who 
“were good enough to send us a little corn to support life” during this most recent 
outbreak of hostilities.102  During this meeting, Piomingo indicated that he had intended 
to go see Robertson but since the Choctaws were asking him to attend Gayoso’s 
intended congress at Nogales, he stated that he would “go the straight path to the 
Assembly.”103 
Although Piomingo’s words indicate that his allegiance to the Americans was 
not absolute, he did not attend the conference that fall as he had indicated.  This is most 
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likely due to his commitment to keeping the path open between the Chickasaws and the 
Americans, a path that soon fell under threat of closing.  On June 25, 1793, Secretary of 
War Henry Knox notified the Chickasaw chiefs and warriors that President Washington 
“has understood through Governor Blount that you are greatly in want of arms and 
ammunition, and corn, and therefore, he has taken the earliest opportunity of proving to 
you his friendship, and the desire of being serviceable to you.”  Knox did not indicate if 
the desired weapons and food would be provided to the Chickasaws.  By referring to the 
troubles in the Ohio country, however, he used the opportunity to send a warning to 
those who might resort to war against the United States:  “If they listen to the dictates of 
justice and moderation they will make peace; if not, they will be made to repent their 
persisting hostilities; although the United States are slow to anger, yet when once 
roused their wrath will be destructive to their enemies.”104  As a result of this threat, it 
appears that Piomingo chose to tend to his American connections rather than honor his 
promise to “go the straight path to the Assembly.” 
Piomingo’s absence from the Nogales Assembly coincided with a pronounced 
shift in the way Chickasaw factional leaders represented their society to the outside 
world.   Only one year earlier, Ugulayacabe had confirmed Piomingo’s right to take 
action on behalf of the nation.  At Nogales, however, it appears that the respect the 
factional leaders accorded to each other’s ability to commit the nation to specific 
diplomatic paths—that became binding on the whole—had dissolved.  In a private 
meeting between Ugulayacabe and Gayoso several days before the congress was 
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supposed to convene, the Chickasaw leader told Gayoso that “Payemingo had gone to 
see the Americans and that from now on it was necessary not to count on him nor think 
that he might have influence in the affairs of his nation since, in view of his persistence 
in favor of the Americans, it had entirely abandoned him.”105  Two days later Gayoso 
informed Carondelet of Piomingo’s weakened state:  
the two principal individuals that supported [Piomingo] . . . are won over to our 
side, and entirely devoted to Ougoulayacabe:  these are the two mestizos named 
[William and George] Colbert, persons of means, and one of which is also called 
Piomingo; so the famous Piomingo is now alone, abandoned by all his partisans, 
a circumstance that will be of little help to the Americans.106 
 
Although Ugulayacabe may have overstated his case to Gayoso, 320 Chickasaws 
accompanied the Spanish-leaning leader to the Nogales Assembly, giving a significant 
amount of legitimacy to his cause.107   
By October 24, two days before the congress officially opened, both Gayoso and 
Ugulayacabe had agreed to work through the Chickasaw assembly “to try to increase 
contempt for Payemingo and to make an effort for Turnbull to have a trading post on 
the Bluffs,” a location at which the chief claimed “the Chicacha nation was determined 
not to let any nation” establish a presence.108  Heeding Carondelet’s caution from the 
previous winter, Gayoso knew that he had to secure acceptance of a delivery of goods at 
the Bluffs through the course of negotiations during the public sessions of the assembly.  
Even Ugulayacabe understood that his own influence among the Chickasaws was 
precarious in nature, and that his ability to secure support for the commitments he made 
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on behalf of the nation during the conference would depend in large part on the number 
and quality of gifts that he could claim to have obtained for his fellow chiefs.  
Ugulayacabe claimed that “many of [his party] had been of Payemingo’s party, and if 
now they did not experience the effects of our generosity they would hesitate 
concerning the party that they should support.  He also asked [Gayoso] for a special 
present for the two Colbert brothers and some clothing for him to distribute at his 
discretion.”  Therefore, the two leaders seem to have orchestrated the presentation of 
gifts during the congress in a manner that allowed Ugulayacabe to work around the 
Chickasaws’ aversion to having either the Americans or the Spaniards establish a 
presence at the Bluffs.109 
Gayoso claimed that the Spanish could “count on the blind adherence of 
Ougoulayacabe to our interests.” This was more a statement of bravado than belief, 
however.  Gayoso understood the Chickasaws’ desire to remain independent and to 
stem the influence of foreigners in their society, especially if that influence did not 
conform to Chickasaw notions of authority.  “Respecting Turnbull’s trade in the 
Chickasaw nation,” Gayoso wrote to Carondelet, “be assured that although this nation 
honors and loves Turnbull and wants to trade with him, it is not to the exclusion of 
Panton, for what they ask is not to have a single store run by Turnbull to provide them 
with necessities, but to have stores in any place so that one will be Turnbull’s and 
another Panton’s to avoid either one of them laying down the law.”110  Therefore, 
Gayoso knew he had to move cautiously in regard to achieving Carondelet’s objective 
to establish a Spanish trading post at the Chickasaw Bluffs.  Gayoso worked behind the 
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scenes, appealing to Ugulayacabe to secure “some spot [along the Mississippi River] 
where Turnbull might set up shop” as the trade along the Yazoo was becoming too 
inconvenient for the latter to continue. 
In his account to Carondelet, written one and one-half months later, Gayoso 
gave a detailed description of the proceedings that offers immense insight into the 
intertribal relations and the Chickasaws’ understanding of imperial diplomacy.  In 
accordance with their agreement to work through normal native protocol to secure 
acceptance of their secret objectives, Gayoso afforded Ugulayacabe the central place of 
honor among the native delegations when the assembly officially convened on October 
26.111  As Franchimastabe had indicated during the Natchez conference one and one-
half years earlier, the Chickasaws held a special place among the southeastern tribes, 
especially when a pan-Indian alliance was in question.  The same held true at Nogales 
despite the recent troubles between Piomingo’s faction and the Upper Creeks.  As such, 
Carondelet’s strategy to obtain a mutlitribal coalition was not a hard one to accomplish.  
We should not discredit Ugulayacabe’s support for the Spaniards’ plan as a result of 
Gayoso’s bribery and assertion of Ugulayacabe’s “blind adherence” to the Spanish 
cause.  Ugulayacabe wanted an alliance regardless of Gayoso’s ability to influence his 
behavior, a fact that he demonstrated very well in his reply to Gayoso’s call for unity 
among the southeastern Indians. 
The notion of a southern pan-Indian alliance had origins within the native world 
as well as Spanish policy.  Both Gayoso and Ugulayacabe threw their weight behind the 
concept during the Nogales Assembly, albeit through slightly different rhetoric.  
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Gayoso had presented the idea of a coalition among the Cherokees, Chickasaws, 
Choctaws, and Creeks as one involving “four houses in which help is needed from all of 
the dwellings to save the one that is on fire.”  As this phrase indicates, the Spanish 
official intended the southeastern nations to form a compact in which they could protect 
each other from danger.  When he addressed the council, Ugulayacabe offered another 
metaphor to support the creation of a pan-Indian alliance.  Ugulayacabe compared the 
nations to the “four fingers of a hand that, when working together, can lift a great 
weight.”  The Chickasaw leader agreed that his people had to work with the other 
southern polities if they were to secure their objectives in this world.  It would not 
necessarily be prudent for one nation to work alone.  In both metaphors, Gayoso’s “fire” 
and Ugulayacabe’s “great weight” represented the threat of American attempts to 
control the southeast.  Although Ugulayacabe obviously accepted the Spaniard’s 
premise, he did not think it necessarily identified the best solution. Consequently, 
Ugulayacabe altered Gayoso’s metaphor to better reflect the reality of the post-
Revolutionary world in which they all lived.112 
According to Ugulayacabe, the introduction of the United States into the 
imperial system had altered the way natives should approach diplomacy with Euro-
American powers.  The Chickasaw leader believed that although the Spanish merely 
wanted to control the southeastern trade, the Americans wanted to control the land 
itself.  In a world in which western imperial powers vied with Native Americans for 
control over the land rather than resources alone, therefore, the four fingers were not 
enough.  Ugulayacabe stated that “if to the four fingers are added the help of a thumb, 
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in this case the Spanish nation, then the power of all is increased significantly.”  As both 
the natives and the Spaniards stood to lose if the Americans were to accomplish their 
objectives, he reasoned, “nothing is better for us all then as keeping ourselves united.”  
By assigning the Spanish to the specific position of the thumb, however, the Chickasaw 
leader indicated that despite their common goal to thwart the Americans, the Spanish 
were clearly different from the other polities considering the alliance proposed during 
the Nogales Assembly.  Within Ugulayacabe’s metaphor, Native Americans held a 
common identity or purpose in the world, whereas the Spanish—or any other European 
American power for that matter—belonged in a position that contrasted, but could be 
made to enhance and complement, the efforts of native polities.113 
Ugulayacabe’s analogy of the fingers supported by an opposable thumb clearly 
articulates a recognition among Chickasaw leaders that the era of the play-off had 
changed to some extent.  The play-off strategy could remain a component of native 
diplomacy, but one could only go so far in provoking the ire of the non-American 
power in order to ensure a counterbalance to the United States at all times.  In contrast 
to the ambitions of the European monarchs, who wished to exploit the resources of the 
Native South for capital gains, the Americans’ empire would be built by providing 
access to the land for settlement.  Leaders in the Native South could no longer expect to 
be able to keep the individual ambitions of settlers at bay simply by appealing to their 
political leaders as they had during the colonial era.  As the previous fifteen years had 
revealed, the United States government could not—and as some of the states proved, 
would not—hold back its citizens from expanding into native territory as the British had 
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attempted to do after the Seven Years’ War.  Therefore, Ugulayacabe stated that Native 
Americans had to choose the lesser of two evils—the Spanish—if they were to hold the 
Americans back from further encroachment onto their lands.  At the end of 
Ugulayacabe’s speech, the leaders representing the Alibamons and Choctaws indicated 
their support for Ugulayacabe’s stance, laying the ground work for the congress’s major 
accomplishment:  a confederation among the major southeastern tribes that existed on 
paper, even if not in reality.114 
Although Ugulayacabe had agreed to support the establishment of a Spanish 
trading post at Chickasaw Bluffs, an actual cession of land did not occur for almost two 
years.  Despite Ugulayacabe’s proclamation at Nogales that Piomingo had lost all 
authority to act on behalf of the nation, the latter chief continued to oppose Spanish 
influence in the nation and his efforts delayed Ugulayacabe’s ability to obtain consent 
for his agreement with Gayoso.  Finally, in June 1795, Gayoso and Ugulayacabe 
negotiated the cession of the Chickasaw Bluffs “to the Spanish Nation so that they 
should be able to occupy them in a way they choose forever without any future claim by 
the Chickasaw Nation.”  According to Carondelet’s officially submitted document 
recording the transaction, before the agreement was formally sealed, Ugulayacabe “took 
part in a general Council with [the Chickasaw] King, Chiefs, and Warriors who 
approved it and as a consequence named as envoys William Glover or Ulathaupaye and 
Payehuma to treat definitively . . . about the expressed cession and its boundaries.”  The 
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parties came to an agreement on June 20, opening the door for the establishment of a 
Spanish fort named San Fernando de las Barrancas.115   
*************** 
Despite having seemed to follow the appropriate channels to secure approval 
among the Chickasaws for the cession, many Chickasaws contested Ugulayacabe’s 
authority to negotiate such an agreement.  In early 1794, Piomingo issued a warning to 
Benjamin Fooy.  The Chickasaw chief was determined to keep his nation a “people to 
our Selves,” and he informed Fooy that he would not permit any “Commishon men” to 
reside among the Chickasaws any longer.116  By August 1795, a delegation from Long 
Town, led by Chinubbee and one of Piomingo’s nephews, met with Gayoso to protest 
the Spanish presence at the Chickasaw Bluffs.  Although the two men recognized that 
Ugulayacabe was a man of power among the Chickasaws, the pro-Spanish leader had 
overstepped his bounds.  According to Chinubbee, neither Ugulayacabe nor Piomingo 
had the authority to cede the Bluffs to anyone.  It seems that Gayoso was able to earn 
Chinubbee’s, and therefore the remainder of the delegation’s, consent by reminding the 
Chickasaw representatives about the avarice Americans had shown over the previous 
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fifteen years and the inability of the federal government to stop both individual and 
state-sponsored attempts to control the Chickasaws’ land.117   
The objections raised about Ugulayacabe’s authority during this meeting reveal 
that a deep schism had emerged in the way Chickasaw politics played out.  By 1795, 
factional differences had become so hardened that leaders refused to recognize each 
other’s ability to make commitments that the whole nation had to accept.  This did not 
end the Chickasaws ability to balance the influence of both the Spanish and the 
Americans within their society, however.   
Even Piomingo continued to use play-off diplomacy to imply a position of 
strength in his commitment to the United States.  In late September 1795, Piomingo 
appealed to James Robertson for assistance against the Creeks, with whom violence 
with the Chickasaws had erupted yet again.  In his letter, Piomingo stated that although 
he was asking the Americans for protection, he still thought of the Chickasaws and the 
Americans as brothers, and therefore as equals.  Piomingo also implied that he had 
avenues through which he could influence the Spanish, and that the factionalism among 
the Chickasaws did in fact offer him the ability to secure alliances with two Euro-
American powers even if the latter did not want it so.  He stated, “If you Send your men 
to assist me, you may think that the Spaniards wont allow of it, but dont think it for I 
Shall send to them not to interrupt anything that comes nor the people that comes for it 
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is my request that you Should come there, if you Send a boat it will not be 
interupted.”118 
The Spanish presence at the Chickasaw Bluffs did not last long.  After nearly a 
decade of negotiating between Spain and the United States, the Spanish agreed to grant 
the Americans full rights to navigate the Mississippi River and surrendered their claims 
along the river’s eastern shore in the Treaty of San Lorenzo.  The treaty was signed only 
one month after Piomingo’s letter to Robertson.  For the Chickasaws, the treaty seemed 
to signal Spanish abandonment of their allies in a manner akin to the perceived 
deception of the British at the end of the American Revolution.  By the following year, 
the Spanish were moving out of the lower eastern Mississippi valley.  Ugulayacabe 
protested the Spanish betrayal when he delivered a speech to the commandant of San 
Fernando de las Barrancas in December 1796.  The chief lamented, “We have [heard] 
the Treaty it was read to us in our nation, and we see that our Father abandons us, not 
only like insignificant animals in the power of the wolf or the Tyger, but still to oblige 
these wolves to devower us.”119  In what appears to be an appeal to preserve the alliance 
forged at Nogales in October 1793, Ugulayacabe indicated that he viewed both the 
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Chickasaws and the Spanish in similar weakened positions to that of the United States, 
especially concerning the Americans’ desire to expand westward.  Recognizing how 
their engagement in the market economy had made the Chickasaws dependent upon 
western powers, he stated, “In spight of all our efforts to oppose their entering our wood 
& to [settle] themselves on our Lands, we [know] we shall be overcome, but that at least 
we shall [Die].”  To further convince the commandant that the Spanish position across 
the river would not be safe, Ugulayacabe stated that the Americans “go much farther 
than we do towards the great country where you get silver, we meet them every day 
with horse loads of Peltry, there are some who even live with Red People of that 
Country with a view certainly, through time, to take” the land west of the Mississippi 
River as well. 
*************** 
By summer 1797, the Americans were making preparations to take over the 
Spanish posts along the eastern side of the Mississippi River.  United States Secretary 
of War Henry Knox instructed Captain Isaac Guion, the officer in charge of the project, 
to inform him as soon as he “assumed his posts at or near Walnut Hills and Natchez.”  
As Knox advised Guion to “send dispatches and duplicates by a trusty Indian through 
the Creeks & Chickasaws to Knoxville in Tennessee,” he clearly believed that the 
cultivation of friendship by United States officials among Chickasaw leaders such as 
Piomingo over the previous decade had not yet guaranteed the United States favorable 
relations with the Chickasaws.120  Despite the apocalyptic tone of Ugulayacabe’s speech 
at Chickasaw Bluffs in December 1796, the Chickasaw leader did not give up the fight 
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against American intrusion into the Chickasaws’ world simply because Spain and the 
United States signed the Treaty of San Lorenzo.  In a move similar to Piomingo’s 
warning to Benjamin Fooy in 1794, Ugulayacabe sought to challenge the American 
occupation of the Chickasaw Bluffs shortly after Guion arrived in the summer of 1797.  
Further, much like Piomingo’s promise to keep the Chickasaws a “people to our 
Selves,” Ugulayacabe’s attempt proved incapable of asserting a unilateral policy on 
behalf of the Chickasaws.121 
The pro-American faction, led by Piomingo and William Colbert, declared their 
unending commitment to an American alliance for the Chickasaws.  However, it was 
the bicultural son of James Logan Colbert who presented the most resounding 
opposition to Ugulayacabe.  In his account of the incident to Secretary of War James 
McHenry, written several days later, Guion described Colbert’s statement as “an 
animated and bold talk.”  According to Guion, Colbert announced that Ugulayacabe 
would never succeed in his opposition to the American presence in the Chickasaw 
nation “while [Colbert] was living:  that the works [the Americans] were beginning was 
done with [Colbert’s] consent and his peoples, [and that he] wished to know who was 
the [chief] in his nation that should make nothing of his promise.”  As if this 
demonstration was not enough to dissuade Ugulayacabe from his objective, Colbert 
reminded the former “that he would do well to recall of who were the warriors of his 
nation.”  Further, Colbert proclaimed that he would “he [Colbert] would be killed by 
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their side and buried here” before Ugulayacabe could succeed in removing the 
Americans.122 
Although we do not have a direct recitation of William Colbert’s words on 
October 16, 1797, much can be gleaned from Guion’s summary.123  Guion’s assertion 
that Colbert spoke for himself and “his peoples” illustrates not only that James Logan 
Colbert’s sons had emerged on the center stage of Chickasaw international policy by the 
turn of the nineteenth century, but that the Colbert brothers identified themselves as 
Chickasaws first and foremost, not European Americans with native ancestry.  Further, 
the distinction Colbert made between his and Ugulayacabe’s peoples points to the way 
factionalism had become potentially violent over the previous five years.  Colbert was 
willing to threaten war against another Chickasaw faction, further indicating how 
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Chickasaw leaders discounted each other’s ability to commit the nation to a single, 
unified policy.  Colbert taunted Ugulayacabe with the fact that although the latter may 
have commanded the attention of most of the Chickasaws, the warriors did not have to 
listen to him.  They would continue to support the Americans as long as the latter 
supplied them with goods to stay in a position of influence among the Chickasaws.   
That men such as Piomingo, William Colbert, and Ugulayacabe sought to fill 
both civic and military roles within the Chickasaw political structure illustrates that the 
moiety system was no longer representative of Chickasaw internal relations.  Although 
the factions among the Chickasaws were willing to work together during the 1780s, 
they did not have to, as their actions during the 1790s illustrate.  Ugulayacabe’s 
unwillingness to take his antagonists up on Colbert’s proposition that only their deaths 
would change the situation demonstrates that only the Chickasaws’ commitment to their 
common ethnicity and shared kinship, not their political organization, could prevent 
them from bringing their disagreements to the point of civil war.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
BECOMING A NATION WITHIN A NATION 
 
During fall 1798, Ugulayacabe traveled to Philadelphia with George Colbert to 
meet the American president, John Adams.  Along the way, the two men stopped by 
James Robertson’s house to acquire supplies for their journey.  Robertson felt obliged to 
fill their request even though he was no longer the Chickasaw Agent—Samuel Mitchell 
had recently replaced him.  After all, Robertson reasoned, James Wilkinson had 
instigated the two chiefs’ journey.1  Robertson wrote, “Wilkinson must have had some 
valuable object in view from sending those Indians on to the President of the United 
States at this time.”  For his own part, Ugulayacabe may have agreed to undertake the 
journey due to a desire to retain as much control as possible in Chickasaw foreign 
affairs.  During their stay, the chief asked Robertson to provide “a detail of his 
character” to President John Adams.2  Although he had not given up on his Spanish 
allies completely, it appears that Ugulayacabe accepted that the Chickasaws would have 
to court the United States federal government if they were to maintain their 
independence and sovereignty in the unraveling imperial world of North America.   
Despite Ugulayacabe’s previous opposition to the United States—and the 
demonstrated loyalty of Piomingo and his followers—both Robertson and Wilkinson 
                                                 
1 “Stipends, Dividends & Gift Sums to Indian Nations [James McHenry to John 
Adams, January 27, 1799],” Center for History and New Media, George Mason 
University, “Papers of the War Department, 1784 to 1800,” http://wardepartmentpapers 
.org/docimage.php?id=30267&docColID=33205, accessed online on December 3, 
2011.  This is a digitized copy of the original, which is contained in the John Adams 
Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society. 
2 “James Robertson to [John Adams], October 20, 1798,” in “Correspondence of 
General James Robertson,” American Historical Magazine, 4:4 (October 1899): 368-
369. 
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promoted the idea that obtaining the chief’s allegiance would be vital to the United 
States in its relations with the Chickasaws moving forward.  In his letter to Adams, 
Robertson stated that Ugulayacabe held more “influence” than Piomingo and that “three 
fourths of the Nation” still followed him.  As such, Robertson claimed that Ugulayacabe 
was “the most useful Chief in the Nation.”  Further, Robertson promoted Ugulayacabe’s 
commitment  
to keep his Nation at peace with the whole world, and particularly with 
neighboring people and States, and although he has been greatly caressed by 
another government, I am pretty well informed he has at all times answered 
them that he was determined to be at peace with the United States, and if white 
people fall out, the Chickasaws would remain Neutral.3   
 
Wilkinson, for his part, informed Secretary of War James McHenry that an offer of an 
annual stipend for the chief could win Ugulayacabe over to the American cause and 
away from the Spanish for good.4 
McHenry did not share his subordinates’ opinions.  In a letter informing 
President John Adams of Ugulayacabe’s desire to meet with him, McHenry noted that 
the United States had already secured the allegiance of the Chickasaw faction “strongly 
attached to the United States, at the head of which are Opiomingo & George Colbert.” 
The secretary suggested that this faction provided an adequate avenue toward securing 
the future amity of the Chickasaw.  He reminded Adams that the Chickasaws were 
already “connected to the United States by treaty” through which the United States paid 
                                                 
3 Ibid. 
4 “Stipends, Dividends & Gift Sums to Indian Nations.”  It is likely that 
Wilkinson was attempting to help Ugulayacabe secure his objective of usurping 
Piomingo’s role as fanemingo—and ensure that George Colbert did not rise to the 
position—between the Chickasaws and the Americans.  Wilkinson was working as a 
double agent at the time, and his recommendation could have been an attempt on behalf 
of the Spanish to use their relationship with Ugulayacabe to control the Chickasaws’ 
relationship with the Americans. 
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them “three thousand dollars annually.”  McHenry cautioned Adams that offering 
Ugulayacabe an annual stipend as a means to cull his favor might not be the best course 
of action.  To give the chief a separate stipend, McHenry intimated, would threaten the 
status quo of gift giving in which no chief received an annual stipend apart from that 
which he was due under the annuity.  Further, McHenry cautioned that to court 
Ugulayacabe might provoke conflict between Spain and the United States.  Therefore, 
he recommended that both Ugulayacabe and George Colbert should each receive “a 
present of one hundred dollars, in addition to the presents in articles of dress, which it 
has been usual to give to Indian visitors,” thereby solidifying United States’ acceptance 
of George Colbert as Piomingo’s successor.5 
This chapter traces how the factional strife of the 1790s ended as Chickasaw 
access to distinctly separate western imperial powers dwindled in the early nineteenth 
century.  As the two main protagonists of the 1790s, Ugulayacabe and Piomingo, 
succumbed to old age, a new generation of Chickasaw leaders associated with the 
latter’s faction emerged to assume responsibility for Chickasaw governance.  Within 
this new generation, bicultural individuals—such as the sons of James Logan Colbert—
displayed a greater aptitude to negotiate with the United States.  Consequently, these 
men often appeared at the forefront of Chickasaw diplomacy and therefore dominate the 
historical record.  Unfortunately, this has led to the dominance of past interpretations 
that contend a group of bicultural men hijacked Chickasaw politics at the turn of the 
nineteenth century who worked to realize their own capitalist ambitions rather than 
protect the independence and sovereignty of the Chickasaw people.  Over the past 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
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fifteen years, however, scholars have worked to revise such notions, implying that 
bicultural individuals saw themselves as native first and acted according to the customs 
of their native ancestry.6  Examining the relative authority specific individuals held at 
the negotiating table further supports the idea that although these bicultural individuals 
appeared to be in control of Chickasaw politics during the early nineteenth century, they 
did so in cooperation with their fully native contemporaries.7  Over the next twenty 
years, the factional differences of the 1790s died out and the Chickasaws reunited 
behind a shared purpose of keeping their society as free from American control as 
                                                 
6 Americans created most primary accounts about Chickasaw society during the 
early nineteenth century, which has been to the detriment of recognizing diplomatic 
activities that the Chickasaws undertook concerning their neighbors to the south, west, 
and north.  The most prominent study that has influenced the popular understanding of 
the Colberts as self-aggrandizing individuals at the expense of Chickasaw independence 
is Gibson’s The Chickasaws, especially pp. 80-131. For those studies that spend 
considerable time revising this interpretation, see Craig, “The Colberts in Chickasaw 
History”; Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People; and Inman, “Networks in 
Negotiation.” 
7 The terms for individuals who had both European and native parents have 
ranged widely over the years.  Most of the terms often carry a negative connotation, 
such as half-breed or mixed-blood, which the user may or may not have intended.  
Others, seeking to be more politically correct have at times used “progressive” to 
indicate biculturals connections to the western world and supposed adoption of its tenets 
and “traditional” to indicate those of native ancestry only.  However, this presumes that 
individuals of native ancestry would never want to adapt their society and cultural 
values to the realities of existing in a changing world, thereby unjustly portraying those 
who wanted to remain faithful to native customs in a negative light.  Further, use of 
progressive and traditional in the early nineteenth century could confuse the meanings 
behind the adoption of Progressive as a moniker that Chickasaw political parties 
adopted after the U.S. Civil War when the Chickasaws had already made strides toward 
acculturating their society to compete within a western-dominated world.  Although 
southeastern native societies in the first half of the nineteenth century would have 
recognized individuals with a European father and a native mother who chose to live 
according to native customs as simply native, I have chosen to use the modern term 
bicultural in order to indicate immersion in two distinctly different cultural traditions—
native and western.  O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, pp. 103-104; Theda 
Perdue, “Mixed Blood” Indians: Racial Construction in the Early South, paperback ed. 
(Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2005), pp. 39-40. 
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possible.  As the American states looked to expand west in pursuit of an empire of 
liberty, Chickasaw leaders looked to establish a relationship in which their society 
accepted a protected status of a nation within a nation akin to that among native polities 
during the previous century.  Further, through their negotiations with federal officials, 
they defined a fanemingo-like role for the Office of the President wherein the 
incumbent was required to promote amicable relations between natives and settlers and 
to protect Chickasaw sovereignty against the claims of the states and their citizens.   
*************** 
Following his failed attempt to secure control of Chickasaw-United States 
relations in winter 1798-99, Ugulayacabe’s support from the Spanish dwindled and his 
ability to provide for his Chickasaw followers diminished greatly.  Nevertheless, 
American officials still took his authority among the Chickasaws seriously, with good 
cause.  Despite the popular myth that he returned from Philadelphia dejected and 
broken, Ugulayacabe continued to serve his nation as a high political figure for several 
more years.  During his visit among the Chickasaws in summer 1799 to promote the 
establishment of a religious mission in their lands, the Reverend Joseph Bullen 
anxiously awaited an audience with Ugulayacabe.  When the two men finally met, 
Bullen reported that they had “a good long to talk” with the man who was “head man of 
this nation.”8  Ugulayacabe even sent his own separate address, apart from that of 
George and William Colbert’s, to the Board of Directors of the New-York Missionary 
Society when Bullen returned to garner support for a permanent mission among the 
                                                 
8 “Extracts from the Journal of the Rev. Mr. Bullen, Missionary to the 
Chickasaw Indians from the New-York Missionary Society,” New-York Missionary 
Magazine, & Repository of Religious Intelligence 1:4 (1800): 262-274; quotations on p. 
272. 
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Chickasaws.9  Further, the chief even indicated that he wished Bullen to educate his two 
youngest sons once a mission was established among the Chickasaws.10  Finally, he was 
the primary addressee in David Henley’s February 1, 1800 letter announcing the death 
of George Washington to the Chickasaws.11  Although he apparently had lessened his 
resolve when it came to negotiating with the Americans, Ugulayacabe continued to 
believe the Spanish would not abandon the Chickasaws per the alliance he helped to 
create at Nogales almost seven years earlier. 
In 1801, Chickasaw and American officials concluded a treaty to allow the 
construction of a road running through Chickasaw territory that would connect 
Nashville to the Natchez District.  Despite his absence from these negotiations, 
Ugulayacabe remained a principal figure in Chickasaw relations.  In fact, his absence 
from the council is notable:  his subsequent actions reveal the persistence of discord 
among Chickasaw leaders regarding each other’s authority when it came to 
international relations that had erupted in the early 1790s.  Following the negotiations to 
build the Wilderness Road, Ugulayacabe travelled to New Orleans “to express his 
dissatisfaction with [the treaty] & to request the interference of Spain that nothing 
further should be attempted by [the United States] Government.”  The Spanish governor 
                                                 
9 “Report of the Directors of the New-York Missionary Society,” New-York 
Missionary Magazine, & Repository of Religious Intelligence 1:1 (1800): 162-163. 
10 “Extracts from the Journal of the Rev. Mr. Bullen, Missionary to the 
Chickasaw Indians from the New-York Missionary Society,” New-York Missionary 
Magazine, & Repository of Religious Intelligence 1:5 (1800): 366. 
11 “Requested Delivery of Sundry Items for Indians,” Center for History and 
New Media, George Mason University, “Papers of the War Department, 1784 to 1800,” 
http://wardepartmentpapers.org/docimage.php?id=37755&docColID=40993, accessed 
online on December 11, 2011.  This is a digitized copy of the original, which is 
contained in the National Archives and Records Administration: David Henley, Letters 
Sent, RG217.  
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apparently ignored Ugulayacabe, who “retired in disgust.”  Having failed yet again to 
hold his former allies to the role they committed to under the Nogales Assembly in 
1793, the chief “surrender[ed his] annual Pension of 500 dollars which has been 
constantly & regularly paid him by order of the Court of Spain, saying that as he was to 
become an American he would do so in earnest.”  Daniel Clark, the American who 
reported these events to Secretary of State James Madison, saw the opportunity to win 
over the allegiance of the majority of the Chickasaws, which had long eluded the 
Americans in spite of their efforts to cultivate the friendship of other Chickasaw leaders.  
Clark stated, “The ignorance, incapacity, & dotage of the old Spanish Governor have 
thus effected a Breach with those Indians whom his Predecessors have so long courted 
& which his successor will make the greatest efforts to repair.”12 
Clark’s message caught the attention of senior Jefferson administration officials.  
By the end of August, the news of Ugulayacabe’s disgust with the Spanish had reached 
President Thomas Jefferson’s desk.  Jefferson instructed Secretary of War Henry 
Dearborn to follow through on Clark’s suggestion “to cultivate the friendship of the 
chief.”13  Dearborn, in turn, turned the task over to James Wilkinson.14  Whether 
Wilkinson followed up on Dearborn’s instructions remains unresolved.  The paper trail 
                                                 
12 “Daniel Clark to James Madison, 16 August 1802,” The Papers of James 
Madison Digital Edition, J. C. A. Stagg, editor. Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press, Rotunda, 2010, http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/JSMN-02-03-02-
0620, accessed on December 8, 2011.  Original source in Secretary of State Series, 
Volume 3 (1 March–6 October 1802). 
13 “Thomas Jefferson to Henry Dearborn, August 30, 1802,” The Thomas 
Jefferson Papers, Series 1, General Correspondence, 1651-1827, The Library of 
Congress, American Memory website, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib011693, 
accessed on December 8, 2011. 
14 “The Secretary of War to James Wilkinson, 14th September 1802,” Carter, 
ed., Territorial Papers: Mississippi Territory, 1798-1817, 5:177. 
 129 
seems to fall dead after Dearborn’s letter, and Wilkinson’s personal reminiscences, 
written later in life, are quiet on this subject.  Regardless, the attention Jefferson and his 
officials gave to the situation indicates both the very real influence Ugulayacabe could 
still wield concerning Chickasaw diplomacy and the potential for Native Americans to 
check the ambitions of the United States against other imperial-minded powers.  Clark’s 
fear that the Spanish would attempt to rekindle the friendship they once held with 
Ugulayacabe abated, however, when the United States surreptitiously acquired the 
Louisiana Territory less than a year later.  Without access to a competing imperial 
power, the pro-Spanish faction seems to have lost its ability to provide for the material 
wants and needs of Ugulayacabe’s followers and drops out of the historical record. 
*************** 
William Colbert’s opposition to Ugulayacabe at Chickasaw Bluffs on 
October 16, 1797, signified the emergence of a new generation of Chickasaw leaders.15  
Some of these men were bicultural individuals, such as George and Levi Colbert.  These 
sons of a European trader who had married Chickasaw women would rise to the upper 
echelons of the Chickasaw political structure over the next thirty years due to their 
matrilineal connections and their ability to navigate the European American imperial 
system, the cultivation of which their native Chickasaw elders recognized and 
promoted.  Although these men followed the matrilineal customs of their native 
kinsmen, they also seem to have adopted some of their father’s patrilineal tendencies.  
They helped each other’s children become some of the prominent members of the 
succeeding generation of Chickasaw leaders.  Following their peoples’ removal west 
                                                 
15 Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, p. 179. 
 130 
during the 1830s and 1840s, this next set of politicians guided the Chickasaw people 
through the consolidation of their society and transformation of their political system 
into a blend of traditional southeastern native political ideology and what can be seen as 
a western, democratic nation-state. 
The rise of Colbert’s sons to the forefront of Chickasaw politics during the early 
nineteenth century is most likely attributable to four factors.  First, half-brothers 
William and George supported Piomingo in his attempt to establish strong ties with the 
United States against the efforts of their common father-in-law, Ugulayacabe.  In their 
efforts to earn the Americans’ as a faithful ally for the Chickasaws, these two men 
earned recognition from President Washington for their participation in the American 
army’s campaigns against the Indian confederation north of the Ohio River in the first 
half of the 1790s.  Second, their father undertook efforts to educate them in navigating 
the emerging market economy of the southeast, thus helping them learn how to interact 
with European Americans according to western terms.  The knowledge of western 
economic methods also improved the Colbert brothers’ ability to garner and sustain 
political loyalty among the Chickasaws by providing goods and performing services for 
those less connected than them.  Third, these men all had Chickasaw mothers, through 
whom they obtained kinship among the Chickasaws’ upper echelon of society.  George 
and Levi’s uncles recognized their ability to negotiate with the European American 
powers at the turn of the century and thus promoted them to positions of authority 
within the Chickasaw political system.  Fourth, George Colbert’s marriage to 
Ugulayacabe’s daughter may have provided kinship ties into his father-in-law’s political 
faction, just as James Logan Colbert’s marriages provided him access to various 
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Chickasaw kinship groups in the mid-eighteenth century.  These ties may have 
facilitated the reconciliation process between the two factions in the years immediately 
following the Louisiana Purchase when Ugulayacabe died.16 
                                                 
16 James Logan Colbert married three Chickasaw women with whom he had 
eight children in total.  George and Levi Colbert his third and fourth sons, born in 1764 
and 1765 respectively.  They shared the same mother—along with their older brother 
Samuel (second son; born 1762) and younger brother Joseph (sixth son; born 1769)—
Noe, James Logan Colbert’s second wife.  Joseph Colbert, too, held a prominent 
position within the Chickasaw-United States diplomatic realm.  Having displayed an 
aptitude for reading and writing the English language during Reverend Bullen’s first 
visit to the Chickasaws in 1799, Joseph continued to study the English language and 
eventually served as the interpreter at most negotiations in the 1810s.  The eldest son of 
James Logan Colbert, William, was their half-brother, born to James Logan’s first wife 
in 1760.  As noted in the text, William established himself as a warrior during the 
campaigns in the Ohio country and against the Creeks during the 1790s.  He remained 
among the prominent war chiefs until the late 1810s.  Another half-brother, James 
Pitman Colbert (fifth son; third wife; born 1768), became a successful cattle rancher by 
the late 1790s.  He capitalized on the American presence at the Chickasaw Bluffs by 
selling beef to the contingent at Fort Adams.  Like his brothers, however, cattle farming 
was not the extent of his economic enterprises.  James Pitman Colbert served as an 
apprentice in the firm of Panton, Leslie and Company during the 1780s.  He also 
married a half-Choctaw daughter of Benjamin James, a trader living among the 
Choctaws who had connections to Panton, Leslie and Company.  His apprenticeship to 
the firm as a young man and his marriage into one of the Choctaw families that had 
connections to the same firm most likely provided James Pitman Colbert an easy 
avenue to continued procurement of Spanish goods being traded out of Mobile after the 
Louisiana Purchase, which Chickasaw leaders, such as the Colberts, continued to use 
despite Ugulayacabe’s falling out with the Governor General in New Orleans and 
American attempts to tie them down economically.  Finally, the Colbert brothers had 
two half-sisters, Sally (first wife; born 1770) and Susan (third wife; born 1775), who 
married Thomas Love and James Allen respectively.  Craig, “The Colberts in 
Chickasaw History,” pp. 116-124, 204-206; Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, 
pp. 199-200; Inman, “Networks in Negotiation,” pp. 127-232; and Theda Perdue, 
“Mixed Blood” Indians, Ch. 2.  Benjamin James had been appointed to act on behalf of 
the Georgia government in 1786 after he first arrived in the Choctaw Nation in 1785.  
However, we should not take this to mean that he provided a source of pro-American 
sympathy in the familial connections of James Pitman Colbert.  In a letter to Mather and 
Strother, he attempted to disassociate himself from this task and proclaimed his 
allegiance to the two traders’ house and the Spanish government.  Further, he 
disavowed William Davenport as “a Bankrupt” individual.  “Benjamin James to Mather 
and Strother, Jul. 23, 1787,” PLP, Reel 3.  Both William Panton and John Forbes 
recommended Benjamin James as a man through whom the firm of Panton, Leslie—
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As noted earlier, George Colbert assumed the role previously held by Piomingo, 
that of principal diplomat to the United States.  Despite the Chickasaws’ continued 
appointment of fanemingos in the late eighteenth century, however, George Colbert was 
not allowed to act unilaterally as his predecessor had been.17  In 1801, George Colbert 
served as chief representative for the Chickasaws when United States officials came to 
negotiate the building of the road through the Chickasaws’ lands to expedite travel and 
transport between Nashville and Natchez.  In his 1840 interview with Lyman Draper, 
Malcolm McKee recalled that Chinubbee appointed George Colbert “to act as principal 
chief in all matters with the U.S. government” due to “his knowledge of English.”18  
Although McGee’s statement was probably accurate, it only reveals a partial truth.  
Chinubbee did not have the authority to determine matters of such importance on his 
own.  The role of high chief in Chickasaw politics in the early nineteenth century was 
primarily symbolic in nature.  Therefore, it is more likely that Colbert had attained the 
                                                                                                                                               
and, therefore, the Spanish—could maintain influence among the Choctaws, “for he is 
Now entirely detached from the other Side and has more influence in that Nation than 
any other Man.”  “John Forbes to Alexander McGillivray, June 30, 1792,” and “Wm. 
Panton to the Baron de Carondelet, Sept. 7, 1792” in PLP, Reel 7; quote from Forbes to 
McGillivray.  James lived among the Choctaws until 1797, during which time he 
fathered three children.  Greg O’Brien, Choctaws in a Revolutionary Age, p. 88. 
17 During the summer and fall 1797 negotiations to end the Chickasaw-Creek 
wars of the 1790s, Chinubbee presented four chiefs in response to Tussekiah Mico’s, 
the Coweta chief, comment that he no longer knew any of the Chickasaw chiefs.  The 
four chiefs that Chinubbe presented were “Fan Omingo, Tusscuppatapa Omingo, 
Whelocke Emautlau, and Insuchela.”  Although the record in which these names are 
listed is an American transcription of a speech Tussekiah Mico gave several months 
after the described events, if accurate, we can see that the Chickasaws were beginning 
to present a united front among the new generation of leaders—at least within the realm 
of native polities—at the same time that Piomingo and William Colbert made their 
demonstration against Ugulayacabe at the Chickasaw Bluffs.  “The speach of the 
Cowetas, Cussetas and other lower towns to the Chickasaws, 28th October, 1797,” The 
Collected Works of Benjamin Hawkins, p. 213. 
18 Atkinson, ed., “A Narrative Based on an Interview with Malcolm McGee by 
Lyman C. Draper,” p. 65. 
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position through his kinship connections and his service to the pro-American cause over 
the previous decade.  As the more diplomatically minded of the two most prominent 
Colbert brothers—William Colbert only ever served as a war chief—George was a 
member of several delegations sent to negotiate with the United States Government 
during the 1790s, including the visit to President Adams in 1798-1799 from which he 
emerged as an equal to Ugulayacabe in American officials’ eyes.  As the Chickasaws’ 
ambassador to the United States, therefore, George would soon be called into service 
once again, but this time it would be on behalf of the entire nation. 
*************** 
In fall 1801, federal commissioners arrived among the Chickasaws to negotiate a 
new treaty between their two confederated polities.  Thomas Jefferson’s attention was 
drawn to the western territories of the American south soon after his election in 1800.  
The states of Georgia and Tennessee demanded that federal assistance be given to 
procure certain lands from the southeastern nations and that the president acquire the 
right to build a formal road connecting these states with the settlers in the Natchez 
district.  Jefferson appointed Benjamin Hawkins, William R. Davie, and James 
Wilkinson to negotiate the desired road with the southeastern native polities.  Despite 
Jefferson’s vision of expanding west to create an empire of liberty, however, Executive 
Branch officials knew that the United States could not impose their will over the native 
populations just yet.   
In his letter of instructions to the commissioners, Secretary of War Henry 
Dearborn instructed the men to take “all fair and proper means” to convince their native 
counterparts of “a really friendly disposition on the part of the United States.”  Further, 
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he instructed the commissioners to portray the president in a manner that the 
Chickasaws could have easily transcribed into native methods of diplomacy.  According 
to Dearborn,  
It is of importance that the Indian nations generally within the United States 
should be convinced of the certainty in which they may, at all times, rely upon 
the friendship of the United States, and that the President will never abandon 
them, or their children, whilst their conduct towards the citizens of the United 
States and their Indian neighbors shall be peaceable, honest, and fair.19   
 
Davie declined the appointment and Andrew Pickens subsequently filled his position.  
When the commissioners finally commenced the negotiations, therefore, they did not 
act as if the United States Government held the upper hand in any aspect of relations 
east of the Mississippi River.   
The commissioners used native metaphors to describe the political situation 
within the United States that once again revealed a relationship among the states similar 
to that of any native confederation.  The commissioners were appointed to negotiate 
with the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks.  They opened negotiations 
with the Cherokee on September 4, 1801.  In their opening speech—which therefore 
also initiated their conversation with all the tribes—the commissioners described the 
manner in which the Americans had recently elected Jefferson as president:  “About six 
moons past the people of the sixteen fires assembled in their grand council house 
thought proper to elect our beloved chief, Thomas Jefferson, to be the President of the 
United States in the place of Adams, who had succeeded Washington.”  Having become 
acquainted with the manner of representative government among the states over the 
previous twelve years, Chickasaw leaders who learned of this speech probably 
                                                 
19 “Instructions to William R. Davie, James Wilkinson, and Benjamin Hawkins,” 
ASP:IA, 1:650. 
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understood the commissioners’ statements to indicate that Adams had fallen out of 
favor with the majority of the states and had been replace, much as their own symbolic 
leader, Taskietoka, had been in the early 1790s. 
As Dearborn had instructed, the commissioners quickly sought to quash any 
notion among their native audience that a change in president threatened the 
relationship established by previous administrations.  The commissioners stated, “No 
sooner did our new father, Thomas Jefferson, find himself at the head of all the white 
people and sixteen fires than he turned his thoughts towards his red children, who stand 
in most need of his care, and whom he regards with the same tenderness that he does his 
white children.”20  That Jefferson viewed both his white and red children “with the 
same tenderness” could have also implied that the Americans viewed the Office of the 
President as their version of a native fanemingo, through which amicable relations 
between the two cultures would be maintained.  Further, by referring to Americans as 
“the people of the sixteen fires,” Hawkins, Pickens, and Wilkinson probably reinforced 
the notion that the United States were a confederation of autonomous and sovereign 
polities joined together for mutual benefit but without any real obligation to cooperate 
unless they so desired.21 
Not only did the commissioners’ words reinforce the separate socio-political 
identities that comprised the United States, the 1801 treaty set the stage for Chickasaw 
                                                 
20 “Journal of the Commissioners of the United States Appointed to Hold 
Conferences with Several of the Indian Nations South of the Ohio, Commenced by M. 
Hawkins, One of the Commissioners,” The Collected Works of Benjamin Hawkins, 
p. 377. 
21 As noted in Chapter 2, even native peoples of different ethnic groups referred 
to themselves a being “of one fire” when they wanted to reinforce the idea of a joint or 
shared identity.  Benjamin Hawkins, “A Sketch of the Creek Country in the Years 1798 
and 1799,” The Collected Works of Benjamin Hawkins, p. 83s. 
 136 
efforts to use the office of the President of the United States to protect themselves 
against the encroachments of the states and American citizens for the next thirty years.  
Article 2 of the original negotiated treaty during this 1801 conference required the 
President of the United States to protect the Chickasaws’ right to their lands “against the 
encroachment of unjust neighbors, of which he shall be the judge; and also to preserve 
and to perpetuate the friendship and brotherhood between the white people and the 
Chickasaws.”22  Although this statement was not necessarily included at the behest of 
the Chickasaws, their agreement to the terms of the treaty indicates the acceptance of a 
protected position when dealing with the United States.  The role prescribed to 
President Jefferson in Article 2 of the treaty resembles the functions attributed to a 
fanemingo, which we know the Chickasaws had sought to establish with the United 
States in the immediate aftermath of the American Revolution.  For his part, Jefferson at 
least attempted to play the role in the public arena even if he did not believe that native 
peoples should have an equal footing within the international arena.  He appealed to the 
citizens of the United States to respect the promises made to the Chickasaws as part of 
the treaty, hinting specifically at the obligation of the president to protect the 
Chickasaws rights to ownership and control over their lands.23  Most likely, the 
positioning of the president as the protector of the Chickasaws’ relationship with the 
United States was instigated from the American side of the negotiations, lending further 
credence to the idea that the president, or his designated deputy, served in a capacity 
very similar to that of a native fanemingo.   
                                                 
22 The Collected Works of Benjamin Hawkins, p. 90. 
23 National Intelligencer (Washington, DC), 12 May 1802, p. 3. 
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As had anti-American leaders such as Ugulayacabe and Taskietoka during the 
previous fifteen years, Chickasaw leaders in the early nineteenth century feared that 
Americans would come into Chickasaw lands determined to control not only the 
economy but the land as well.  Despite their eventual support of Piomingo’s faction in 
the internal political competition of the 1790s, this new generation of leaders 
consistently negotiated for recognition of their control over the land their people had 
inhabited since before the arrival of Europeans.  On the second day of the 1801 
conference between the Chickasaws and the U.S. commissioners, Chinubbee announced 
the Chickasaws’ relief that the United States “does not require the cession of land or 
any thing of that kind.”  Further, George Colbert, as national spokesman for the 
Chickasaws, announced that  
The nation agrees to that a waggon road may be cut thro’ this land, but do’s not 
consent to the erection of houses for the accomodation of travelers.  We leave 
that subject to future consideration, in order that time may enable our people to 
ascertain the advantages to be derived from it.  In the meantime travelers will 
always find provisions in the nation sufficient to carry them through.24 
 
Despite the seeming success of the Chickasaw leaders in maintaining control over their 
land and engagement with the American economy, not all leaders shared in the belief 
that they could hold the Americans to the obligations agreed to under the terms of the 
treaty, as was demonstrated in Ugulayacabe’s final appeal to the Spanish in 1802.   
The Louisiana Purchase compelled Chickasaw leaders to accept the need to treat 
with the United States for the political security of their polity.  As has been well 
                                                 
24 “Minutes of a conference held a the Chickasaw Bluffs by General James 
Wilkinson, Benjamin Hawkins, and Andrew Pickins, Esq., Commissioners of the 
United States, with the mingco, chiefs, and principal men of the Chickasaw nation, the 
21st, and ending the 24th of October, 1801,” The Collected Works of Benjamin 
Hawkins, p. 389. 
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established, the origins of removal had begun in Jefferson’s administration.  Throughout 
the 1790s, American emissaries promoted the idea of civilization according to western 
customs.  This included the abandonment of hunting in order to adopt a more 
agricultural lifestyle.  Further, to be civilized in the western world of the nineteenth 
century meant to engage with the growing global market and the adoption of capitalism.  
Consequently, Jefferson used his territorial administrators to push his hidden agenda of 
exploiting Native American dependency and indebtedness as a means to compel them to 
sell their lands to the United States.   
*************** 
Although they would not give up hunting entirely until sometime after 1820, the 
scarcity and decreased purchasing power of game that occurred over the previous 
decade compelled many Chickasaw families to adopt an agricultural lifestyle that 
incorporated aspects of western European culture.  In 1801, Benjamin Hawkins stated, 
“The Chickasaws are setting out from their old towns and fencing their farms.  They 
have established and fenced within two years nearly two hundred.  All of these farmers 
have cattle or hogs and some of the men attend seriously to labour.”  Hawkins credited 
George Colbert for much of the transformation:  “Major Colbert, who ranks high in the 
government of his nation and was the speaker at the treaty here, has laboured at the 
plough and hoe during the last season, and his example has stimulated others.”  Further, 
Hawkins noted that “Several of the families have planted cotton, which grows well, and 
some of the women spin and weave.”25   
                                                 
25 “[Benjamin Hawkins] to Henry Dearborn, 28 October 1801,” The Collected 
Works of Benjamin Hawkins, 1796-1810, p. 393; Usner, American Indians in the Lower 
Mississippi Valley, p. 97. 
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Not only had many of the Chickasaws embraced some tenets of western 
civilization and interaction with the market, Chickasaw social and political organization 
shifted to some extent by the early 1800s.  The final cessation of hostilities with the 
Creeks in 1797 created a secure environment for Chickasaw families to disperse from 
their towns and village settings to the individual farms that Hawkins wrote about in 
1801.  Over the next few years, Chickasaw politics would alter to recognize this shift in 
settlement patterns.  By 1805, four districts replaced the town-based system through 
which the Chickasaws had previously determined national policy.  Three of these four 
districts seem to have derived their names and constituencies from three of the late 
eighteenth century mother towns:  Chatala, Chouculissa (Big Town), and Chuckafalya 
(Long Town).  The fourth, Pontatock, probably assumed the role of providing for the 
former towns of Tascahuillo, Malata, and Achucuma, which seemed to align politically 
under the former town-based system.26  The continued dispersal of Chickasaw families 
out of the towns over the next twenty years increased the need for leaders to cooperate 
                                                 
26 Dr. Rush Nutt named the four districts in the 1805 journal of his visit among 
the Chickasaws.  Nutt spelled them as Pontatock; Ches, ha,ta,lia; Chuc,an,fa,li,ah; and 
Chuguilisa; I have chosen to stick with my previous spellings for consistency.  
Although Nutt proclaimed that the Chickasaws settled out of their towns due to the 
suggestion of U.S. agents, I am hesitant to place the full shift to the district structure 
among the Chickasaws prior to 1805 due to a letter from Henry Dearborn to James 
Wilkinson, dated February 18, 1803, in which the former wrote that “the convention 
made with the Chickasaw towns [concerning the 1801 agreement to construct the 
Wilderness Road] has been ratified.”  If Nutt was correct that the Chickasaws’ dispersal 
came about in part due to “the advice of the agent & other officers of government,” then 
Dearborn’s reference to the primacy of “towns” in Chickasaw-U.S. diplomacy indicates 
that American officials respected the Chickasaws ability to determine how they would 
be represented at the negotiating table.  Therefore, we should not define the transition 
until they presented chiefs for each of the four districts at the 1805 negotiations to settle 
their debts to the firm of Panton, Leslie and Company.  Jesse D. Jennings, ed., “Nutt’s 
Trip to the Chickasaw Country,” New York Historical Society Quarterly 37:3 (July 
1953): 42-43, quote from 43; “The Secretary of War to James Wilkinson, 14th 
September 1802,” Territorial Papers: Mississippi Territory, 5: 187. 
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and avoid the factional divisions of the past, especially as Americans increased their 
control over the Mississippi valley and individual Chickasaws began to engage actively 
with the global market. 
Agricultural labor by native men conflicted with traditional gender roles, 
however.  Those more knowledgeable in the ways of western civilization, such as the 
Colbert brothers, adopted the plantation lifestyle of the American South by acquiring 
slaves to produce goods for the market along with the food required for subsistence.  In 
1839, census records indicate that 255 Chickasaws owned approximately 1200 slaves.  
Pitman Colbert, one of George’s sons, owned the most slaves:  150.27  Further, the 
adoption of plantation economics allowed these men to devote their time to other 
economic and political pursuits that those individuals whose existence was dominated 
by the daily demands to make ends meet could not afford.28 
*************** 
Chickasaw leaders seem to have accepted the role of a protectorate under the 
guidance of the federal government according to the 1801 treaty.  They did not 
necessarily accept American hegemony wholesale.  Rather, Chickasaw leaders efforts to 
deny Americans immediate access to their citizenry as a market for American goods 
reveals a desire to curtail their society’s slide into a state of complete dependency on the 
Americans.  Over the next few years, they worked to ensure that the flow of money did 
                                                 
27 Daniel F. Littlefield, The Chickasaw Freedmen: A People Without a Country 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1980), p. 10; Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid 
People, p. 93. 
28 Christina Snyder offers a comprehensive interpretation of how southeastern 
Native Americans incorporated the plantation system of slave ownership into the 
cultures’ already existent notions of captivity during the early republic.  Snyder, Slavery 
in Indian Country, passim. 
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not simply follow a one-way path into American coffers.  Instead, Chickasaw leaders 
sought to find ways to ensure that American incursions into their territory brought 
revenue into their own society through the control of the trade in which individuals 
would inevitably engage when members of the two cultures met.29 
The United States decided to establish a trading post, or factory, at Chickasaw 
Bluffs following the ratification of the 1801 treaty.30  The post was most likely 
supposed to be part of a grand scheme Thomas Jefferson devised to compel Native 
American societies to adopt western agricultural practices and, ultimately, to sell their 
lands to the United States in order to pay off debts they would incur because of the 
Americans’ monopoly to provide goods in the Indian trade.  Although Jefferson best 
articulated the second part of this policy in a confidential letter to William Henry 
Harrison in February 1803, it is highly likely that Jefferson already intended to take 
advantage of the powers given to the president by the Trade and Intercourse Acts of the 
1790s to compel Native Americans to assimilate or remove west of American 
communities in the territories south of the Ohio River as well as to the northern territory 
that Harrison governed.  In a letter to Benjamin Hawkins, dated February 18, 1803, the 
                                                 
29 Despite this seeming adoption of a defensive mechanism to restrain their 
incorporation into and the influence of a dominating American economic system, 
Chickasaw leaders were too late.  Even within their strategy to keep the operations of 
service industries along the Wilderness Road in Chickasaw hands, they could not avoid 
the condition that their ability to turn a profit depended upon the Americans continued 
intrusion and expansion into their world.  In making this assessment, I am drawing on 
White, The Roots of Dependency, pp. xvii, 97-146 for a definition of dependency and 
defensive strategies employed by the Choctaws—a native culture closely related in 
spatial- and time-experience to the Chickasaws—against the United States. 
30 “H. Dearborn to W.C.C. Claiborne, June 7th—1802,” Dunbar Rowland, ed., 
Official Letterbooks of W.C.C. Claiborne, 1801-1816, vol. 1 (Jackson, MS: Mississippi 
Department of Archives and History, 1917), p. 150; Gibson, The Chickasaws, p. 95; 
Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, p. 193. 
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president instructed the Indian agent to “encourage” the Indians to “live on less land” in 
order to accommodate westward migrating Americans who “will be calling for more 
land.”  The soon-to-follow acquisition of Louisiana offered Jefferson the outlet he 
needed into which Indians could emigrate to if they chose to remain separated from the 
American polity.31   
The establishment of the factory was done cautiously, most likely to avoid 
exciting the Chickasaws who had expressed concern that the Americans wanted to 
acquire their lands during the 1801 negotiations for the Wilderness Road.  Despite the 
appointment of Thomas Peterkin as factor on July 28, 1802, William C.C. Claiborne, 
the Mississippi territorial governor, cautioned Chickasaw Agent Samuel Mitchell to 
“mention [the post] to the Indians as a probable event; or rather as an object 
contemplated, and not as one determined upon.”32  The following March, Claiborne 
charged Mitchell to investigate the disposition of the Chickasaw leadership concerning 
their willingness to sell some of their lands to pay off debts incurred to the United States 
                                                 
31 “Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, February 18, 1803,” The Thomas 
Jefferson Papers, Series 1, General Correspondence, 1651-1827, The Library of 
Congress, American Memory website, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib012159, 
accessed on December 28, 2011.  See also Sheehan, Seeds of Extinction, passim; 
Richard Drinnon, Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1997), pp. 83-84; Wallace, Jefferson and the 
Indians, Ch. 7; Lawrence S. Kaplan, Thomas Jefferson: Westward the Course of Empire 
(Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1999), pp. 146-151; and Robert M. Owens, 
“Jeffersonian Benevolence on the Ground: The Indian Land Cession Treaties of 
William Henry Harrison,” Journal of the Early Republic 22:3 (Autumn, 2003): 417. 
32 “W.C.C. Claiborne to Saml. Mitchell, August 15th. 1802” and “W.C.C. 
Claiborne to H. Dearborn, September 17 1802,” Official Letterbooks of W.C.C. 
Claiborne, 1801-1816, 1:156, 182. 
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as opposed to the Chickasaws’ desire to use the annuity payment due them.33  
Chickasaw leaders did not welcome Mitchell’s inquiries, however, and the pursuit of 
land cessions had to wait for several more years.  For their part, the Chickasaws most 
likely contributed to this reticence among United States officials to push the idea of 
land.  Their alliance with the United States offered an affordable way to ensure safety 
and security along the Wilderness Road.  According to Claiborne, George Colbert 
claimed that the road “should remain a clear and white path” since the Chickasaws had 
“freely granted” the right to build the road to the United States.  Further, Chickasaw 
leaders lent their support to American efforts to quash violent activity along the road 
committed by Creeks and Choctaws against white travelers.34  In their letter to the 
Choctaw leadership, Chinubbe and the other Chickasaw chiefs advised their “younger 
brothers” to quit harassing white travellers through their territory.  The chiefs wrote,  
We fear that such conduct may be of fatal consequences to your Nation in time 
to come, and we beg you will in future treat travellers friendly, and take nothing 
from them, and such horses you find that have been lost by travellers either 
deliver them to Governor Claiborne or the Agent of your Nation and you will 
thereby insure [sic] to your Nation the friendship and attention of the White 
People by whom red People are supported.35 
 
As the chiefs’ statement indicates, Chickasaw leaders understood that their lifestyle was 
“supported” by the ability to enjoy amicable relations with the Americans. 
                                                 
33 “William C.C. Claiborne to Samuel Mitchell Esq., Agent to the Chickasaws, 
March 23, 1803” Journal: Indian Department, 1803-1805, SG3113, Alabama 
Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL, p. 14. 
34 “William C.C. Claiborne to Samuel Mitchell, Agent &c. Chickasaws, June 
1803” Journal: Indian Department, 1803-1805, pp. 24-25. 
35 “To the Kings Chiefs and Warriors of the Chactaw Nation, 25th Augt. 1802,” 
in “Mississippi Territorial Transcripts, 1800-1808,” Folder 1, Mississippi Territory, 
Governor’s Records, Correspondence, 1798-1819, SG3114, Alabama Department of 
Archives and History, Montgomery, AL.  Originals on file at Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History. 
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The factory at Chickasaw Bluffs was never successful in drawing the 
Chickasaws fully into a state of dependency upon their American neighbors.  This 
failure to achieve Jefferson’s goals came about primarily due to the desire of the 
Chickasaws to control the trade themselves and the proximity of the post to the majority 
of Chickasaws living in northeastern Mississippi and northwestern Alabama.36  In 
spring 1803, the Chickasaw chiefs requested that Governor Claiborne “permit Messrs. 
Grub & Bright to establish a trading House at the Chickasaw Bluffs.”37  Claiborne was 
hesitant to acquiesce to the Chickasaws’ request, which would have provided direct 
competition to the United States Factory, now run by Cato West.  Through an apparent 
series of miscommunications among Dearborn, Claiborne, Mitchell, and West, 
however, it appears that Jacob Bright obtained a six-month license to trade at the Bluffs 
the following winter.38 
Despite the Chickasaws’ desire to have other white traders operating at the 
Bluffs to compete with the U.S. Factory, they clearly maintained their desire to keep 
such economic matters outside of their living areas.  As the United States continued to 
push for the establishment of accommodations along the Wilderness Road to support 
travelers and “post” riders, Claiborne approached the Chickasaws to “consent that 
Taverns should be erected every Twenty Miles distant through [their] land.”  Claiborne 
desired that the Chickasaws would lease the land for these posts to white men “who 
would be agreeable to both them and me”; however, he would also consent to the 
Chickasaws establishing the taverns on their own so long as they “would take honest 
                                                 
36 Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, pp. 193-194. 
37 “William C.C. Claiborne to Henry Dearborn, Secretary at War, May the 17th 
1804(3?)” Journal: Indian Department, 1803-1805, p. 22. 
38 Journal: Indian Department, 1803-1805, pp. 22-46. 
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White men into partnership.” 39  Although Mitchell followed Claiborne’s instructions to 
effect this proposal, he “could not prevail upon the Chickasaws to take White men into 
partnership upon any terms.”  In a letter to Dearborn, Claiborne indicated that he might 
be more successful if he addressed the situation personally.40  However, he belied this 
confidence in a separate letter to Silas Dinsmoor on that very same day:  “I have not yet 
received an Answer from the Chickasaws, but I must confess, that I fear they will not be 
as accommodating as is desired.”41  Claiborne’s fear was justified.  He soon learned 
from Mitchell that the Chickasaws wished to have any “houses [established along the 
road within their territory] under the care of Indians alone.”42  As such, it is clear that 
the Chickasaws intended to keep their society as a distinct entity apart from the United 
States, despite Jefferson’s inclination to have the southeastern Indians become citizens 
as he had indicated to Benjamin Hawkins earlier that same year.43 
Some historians have claimed that because the operation of ferries, inns, and 
taverns often fell into the hands of a few elite bicultural individuals, such as the Colbert 
brothers, these men were more interested in lining their pockets than they were in 
protecting the interests of their native brethren.  Most of these interpretations are 
                                                 
39 “A Talk from William C.C. Claiborne, Oct. 5, 1803,” Journal: Indian 
Department, 1803-1805, pp. 38-39. 
40 “Claiborne to Dearborn, Oct. 23, 1803,” Journal: Indian Department, 1803-
1805, pp. 39-40. 
41 Ibid., pp. 40-42. 
42 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
43 “Thomas Jefferson to Benjamin Hawkins, February 18, 1803,” The Thomas 
Jefferson Papers, Series 1, General Correspondence, 1651-1827, The Library of 
Congress, American Memory website, http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.mss/mtj.mtjbib012159, 
accessed on December 28, 2011.  James Atkinson asserts that the involvement of 
bicultural Chickasaws, most notably the Colbert brothers, played key roles in helping 
the Chickasaws to maintain this arrangement that prevented the intrusion of official 
U.S. traders into their society.  Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, pp. 199-200. 
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derived from the protests made by U.S. officials who sought to discredit biculturals 
within their own communities.44  Recently, however, historians have presented 
interpretations that suggest that bicultural individuals did not usurp the authority of the 
traditional power structure within their society.  Rather, they acted in accordance with 
goals proscribed by their native leaders.  One such example among the Creeks involving 
the objection to American-owned operations along the Federal Road through their 
territory was that such operations would increase the opportunity for conflict or theft to 
arise between individual Creeks and American citizens.  These incidents would 
certainly rise to the level of the Creek council, whose members may have feared that 
American representatives would use accusations against individual Creeks to make 
demands for the entire society to surrender land or agree to more treaties restraining 
their ability to coexist on an equal plane in the southeast.45   
Given the fact that a faction of Chickasaw warriors threatened to continue an 
ongoing war with the Osages—that went against the established policy of the 
Chickasaw headmen—this interpretation of Creek reasoning may also represent an 
underlying reason for the Chickasaws’ refusal to allow non-Chickasaw-owned 
operations along the Wilderness Road.46  Another possibility deserves consideration, 
                                                 
44 The majority of interpretations pre-dating 1980 reflect this idea.  The primary 
example among historians of the Chickasaw is Arrell M. Gibson in his 1971 
monograph, The Chickasaws.  Gibson argued that Chickasaw culture changed 
fundamentally at the turn of the nineteenth century as mixed-bloods seized control of 
the social and political hierarchy for their own personal gain.  Gibson, The Chickasaws, 
Chs. 4 and 5. 
45 Angela Pulley Hudson, Creek Paths and Federal Roads: Indians, Settlers, and 
Slaves in the Making of the American South (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 2010), p. 80. 
46 The diminishing availability of game east of the Mississippi River by the late 
eighteenth century compelled many Chickasaw men to expand their range of hunting 
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however.  The actions of George and Levi Colbert over the course of the next thirty 
years reveal a profound commitment to the kinship group in which they were raised—
and therefore Chickasaw society as a whole.  Although the Colbert brothers certainly 
profited from their ability to operate the ferries and inns established to support travelers 
along the Wilderness Road, they most likely did not want to disgrace their elders who 
helped them to achieve their positions of status within Chickasaw politics.  As 
suggested previously, Chickasaw elders at the turn of the eighteenth century saw in 
bicultural children the ability to help the entire society negotiate a changing world that 
included the ability to interact with the western-oriented market economy.47   By 
allowing the brothers to operate the ferries and inns along the road, therefore, the 
Chickasaw leadership possibly put their faith in the Colberts to adhere to traditional 
                                                                                                                                               
west into the Arkansas valley.  Their continued pursuit of game in this region provoked 
a long-term, yet intermittent, period of conflict with the Osages, regardless of the 
Chickasaws’ negotiations with the Spanish and Quapaws in the 1770s.  On August 25, 
1802, the principle Chickasaw leaders—Chinubbe, Mattaha Muo, William Glover, and 
Mingo Mattaha—sent a letter informing the Choctaws that the Chickasaws anticipated 
forming a treaty with the Osages.  “We have received a talk from the [Spanish] 
Commanding Officer of the Post of Arkansas [Francisco Caso y Luengo] inviting us to 
a treaty with the Osages, it is our desire to have Peace with all Nations, and as it is a 
peace endeavouring to be brought about by the White People it is very pleasing to us, as 
we can hunt and trade with safety.”  The Chickasaw leaders expressed skepticism that 
the Osages would follow through with the negotiations, but they invited the Choctaws, 
whom they referred to as their “younger brothers,” to be a party to the treaty as well.  
According to Samuel Mitchell, the U.S. Agent to the Choctaws and Chickasaws who 
helped to broker the proposed peace, William Colbert had fallen out with the Chickasaw 
leadership and was determined to keep the war with the Osages ongoing with the help 
of those warriors who would follow him.  Although Mitchell expressed his belief that 
Colbert would be unable to command many warriors from the nation, warfare between 
the Chickasaws and the Osages continued until about 1821, with Chickasaw warriors 
often joining forces with the Cherokees.  “To the Kings Chiefs and Warriors of the 
Chactaw Nation, 25th Augt. 1802”; Gibson, The Chickasaws, p. 129; and DuVal, The 
Native Ground, p. 138-139. 
47 Craig, “The Colberts in Chickasaw History,” passim; Atkinson, Splendid 
Land, Splendid People, pp. 197-200; and Inman, “Networks in Negotiation,” pp. 162-
191. 
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native notions of political survival:  if they wanted to retain their status within the entire 
society, they had to provide for the comfort of their constituents and protect them from 
American infringements on their autonomy and sovereignty. 
Unfortunately for the Chickasaws, the reality of westerners’ recognition of the 
Treaty of San Lorenzo and their willingness to deny Native Americans the full right to 
an equal say in the system meant that Native Americans would be unable to avoid 
ceding lands to the United States regardless of how much control they retained over the 
American trade coursing through their territory.  Despite American attempts to gain 
control of the southeastern Indian trade in the late eighteenth century, the firm of 
Panton, Leslie and Company managed to dominate the market as part of their 
agreements with the Spanish.  During this time, the Chickasaws amassed a substantial 
debt to the firm, especially after Panton secured control of the Spanish trade from 
Strother and Mather in the early 1790s.  According to the terms of the Treaty of San 
Lorenzo, the Chickasaws domain fell within the recognized territory of the United 
States.  This did not deter Panton, Leslie and Company from trading with the 
Chickasaws; however, it did prompt a shift in company policy towards working with 
United States officials to secure payment of their debts.  As of late August 1803, the 
Chickasaws owed Panton, Leslie and Company approximately $11,178.48  As company 
leaders knew that the debts had risen too high for most of their native customers to pay 
                                                 
48 “General Abstract of the Debts due the House of Panton Leslie & Co. by the 
Creek, Cherokee, Chickasaw, and Choctaw Nations of Indians,” PLP, Reel 15. 
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in specie, they adopted a policy of payment that mirrored that of the Jefferson 
administration:  through the sale of land.49 
*************** 
Following the death of William Panton in 1801, Panton, Leslie, & Company’s 
assets and debts transferred hands to John Leslie and Company.  By mid-1804, John 
Forbes and Company controlled the firm and continued their predecessors’ attempts to 
resolve the company’s debts through land cessions.  William Simpson, one of the 
partners in Forbes and Company, initiated negotiations with the Choctaws to settle their 
debt through the sale of land along the Mississippi River, one of the primary objectives 
of Jefferson administration officials.  Simpson lobbied the Choctaws to agree to a 
cession in which they would sell land to the United States through a formal treaty and 
that the latter would in turn use the funds to pay the Indians’ debts owed to the 
company.  Although U.S. officials were able to secure a land cession, it did not meet 
with Jefferson’s approval, possibly because the final cession did not include any lands 
along the Mississippi River.  The president refused to submit the treaty for approval to 
the Senate even as Simpson began similar lobbying efforts among the Chickasaws.50 
James Robertson and Silas Dinsmoor, the United States officials appointed to 
obtain a land cession from the Chickasaws, convened their negotiations with 
Chickasaws leaders and Simpson’s designee, John Gordon, on July 17, 1805.  
According to Rush Nutt, George Colbert no longer served as speaker of the nation by 
                                                 
49 Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 
pp. 49-250; Usner, American Indians in the Lower Mississippi Valley, pp. 77-78. 
50 Coker and Watson, Indian Traders of the Southeastern Spanish Borderlands, 
pp. 250-256; “John Forbes & Co., Successors to Panton, Leslie & Co., vs. The 
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this year.  His replacement was Tisshamastubba, or Tishomingo as he would later be 
remembered.51  Nutt’s statement should not be taken at face value, however.  The 
official treaty lists George Colbert’s name in the position immediately behind that of 
Chinubbee.52  Nutt’s observation that Colbert was no longer the national speaker more 
likely records the rise of another Chickasaw leader to the forefront of national politics 
as opposed to the demotion of Colbert.  Throughout the negotiations for this cession of 
land, George Colbert presented the Chickasaws’ case publicly.53  Further, Tishomingo, 
who signed the treaty under the name O Koy, attended the 1805 negotiations as one of 
the district chiefs.54  Tishomingo demonstrated some of his recently acquired authority, 
however, even if hidden somewhat in the background, by withholding his acceptance of 
the quantity of land to cede in payment until all the other chiefs agreed.55  Therefore, we 
can assume that the position of speaker of the nation was flexible and dependent upon 
the nature of the diplomacy to be conducted and not necessarily an indicator of the most 
influential man among the Chickasaws in the early nineteenth century.  Both George 
Colbert and Tishomingo each received $1,000 according to Article 2 of the treaty.  This 
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payment was made “at the request of the national council for services rendered to their 
nation.”56  Colbert’s was the more business oriented mind of the two, which indicates 
that the national council could call upon whichever leader held the best skill set to 
understand the specific requirements being negotiated, not that the Chickasaws were not 
under the control of the Colbert brothers or other bicultural individuals. 
As he had concerning the negotiation of the Wilderness Road, George Colbert 
continued to serve in the role of Chickasaw speaker in diplomacy involving the United 
States.  According to the speeches he made during the negotiations, Colbert had been in 
correspondence with Simpson for quite some time.  When he addressed the U.S. 
commissioners on July 18, Colbert objected to the idea that all the Chickasaws should 
sacrifice land in order to pay debts incurred by only a few.  Although Colbert indicated 
that the Chickasaw leaders had agreed to such a sale this one time, he was adamant that 
such a scenario would not recur in the future.  Colbert stated, “It is the wish of our 
people, that if the house of John Forbes & Co Should hereafter Credit our people—they 
should be obliged to look to individuals whom they trust for their pay. . . . I mean not 
that house only, but the Merchants in every part.”57 
While Colbert presented the public face of the Chickasaws to the outside world 
during these negotiations, Tishomingo emerged as a man who held internal sway.  
According to Gordon’s account of the treaty council, Tishomingo, or Ockoy, 
continually gave final approval of the amount of land that would pay off the debts of the 
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Chickasaws to John Forbes and Company.  Further, on the final day of negotiations, 
July 22, Tishomingo  
shook hands with General Robertson, & the treaty was to be made out & signed 
to-morrow—Ockoy then harangued the red men, which was not interpreted, but 
I understood through some of the Interpreters, that it was not to blame him for 
what they had now done, they had agreed by mutual consent to pay their 
merchants, & that the door was now open to them that they had also paid off 
their traders and general satisfaction was spread throughout.58 
 
That Tishomingo’s speech was not deliberately translated for the benefit of the non-
Chickasaw attendees at this conference indicates that both he and George Colbert 
served complimentary roles during the 1805 negotiations for the land cession.  
Although Colbert and his brother James continued to meet with the representatives of 
John Forbes and Company concerning the particulars of the payment over the next 
several days, it seems that the Chickasaws realized they had to negotiate a world in 
which the United States held primacy within the international arena. 
*************** 
In the years following the 1805 cession, it appears that the Chickasaws did not 
foresee any viable ability to thwart the encroachment of American citizens through 
appeal to another foreign power.  Spanish officials continued to meddle in southeastern 
Indian affairs despite the Americans’ purchase of the Louisiana territory in 1803.59  
Some southeastern native groups, such as the Six Towns faction of the Choctaws, 
welcomed these agents enthusiastically.  Although some enterprising Chickasaws 
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continued to use the Spanish for trade, the Chickasaws did not seem to be inclined to 
take advantage of the opportunity to continue political relations with the Spanish 
anymore.  Rather, they needed to exploit the systemic differences concerning 
responsibility and authority within the Americans’ union of states.  Except for a small 
number who chose to emigrate west rather than live under United States control, the 
majority of Chickasaws focused on holding the federal government, particularly the 
executive branch, to its duties of protecting the relations between themselves and the 
American citizens. 
Article 4 of the 1805 treaty required the federal government to restrict American 
citizens from settling “on that part of the present cession included between the present 
Indian boundary and the Tennessee, and between the Ohio and a line drawn due north 
from the mouth of the Buffaloe to the ridge dividing the waters of the Cumberland from 
those of the Tennessee river [for a] term of three years” following the ratification of the 
treaty.60  Although the treaty was signed on July 23, 1805, it was not ratified for almost 
two more years:  May 22, 1807 to be precise.  The purpose of the three-year delay 
before Americans could settle within the designated territory was to offer those 
Chickasaws inhabiting that portion of the cession the time to move if they so chose.  
Therefore, the Chickasaws should have enjoyed unencumbered use of this portion of the 
cession until late spring 1810.  This, however, was not the case.  As with most cessions 
involving the Chickasaws lands in the early years of the nineteenth century, other 
southeastern polities also claimed the lands.  In this case, the Cherokees had also 
claimed a portion of this cession. 
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Shortly after he left office as president in 1809, Thomas Jefferson informed his 
successor, James Madison, that he had received information the previous fall about 
“many intruders [who] had settled on the lands of the Cherokees & Chickasaws.”  Some 
of these settlers had moved to the region as early as 1807.  Jefferson relayed that Henry 
Dearborn had instructed Colonel Return J. Meigs to use “military force” if necessary to 
remove those individuals who refused to leave the Indians’ lands.61  Once again, 
Jefferson seemed to agree that the president should promote peace and security between 
the Chickasaws and the American citizenry, as he had done concerning the 1801 treaty.  
As we know, however—and was further indicated in this same memorandum—
Jefferson advocated that all Indians should be removed west of the Mississippi River to 
an area of territory undesired by whites.  Jefferson believed that separation from white 
neighbors for an extended period of time would allow Native Americans to achieve a 
level of civilization in which cohabitation with westerners would not necessarily result 
in the Indians’ destruction nor the latter’s devolution to a lesser stage of advancement.  
He had even suggested such a move to a delegation of Chickasaw leaders, including 
Mingo Mattaha and Tishopolatta, who visited him just prior to the 1805 treaty 
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negotiations.62  Therefore, he left the task of enforcing the removal of the settlers to 
Madison. 
As far as can be ascertained, Madison did not take any immediate action to 
remove the squatters.  The Chickasaws continued to press their agent, James Neelly, to 
resolve the situation.  Neelly was unable to persuade his superiors to take action.  He 
eventually petitioned the territorial governor of Mississippi, David Holmes, for 
assistance in the matter.  Holmes assured him that a force of U.S. Army soldiers would 
see to the removal of the settlers, although the success of the endeavor would take some 
time.63  Regardless of any assurances Madison’s administration offered to ameliorate 
Chickasaw fears that they would lose their lands, or the continued recognition of their 
independence, we should be able to assume that they fell on wary ears. 
*************** 
By summer 1811, Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa had embarked on their famous 
recruitment campaign among the southern Indians.  Despite the Shawnee warrior’s offer 
to join his efforts to build a pan-Indian confederacy dedicated to the expulsion of white 
people encroaching on their lands, Chickasaw leaders politely refused.  Although they 
harbored Tecumseh no ill will, they relied on the president to protect them from 
external conflict.  Consequently, they upheld their duty as a protected people.  
Chickasaw leaders sent a message to President Madison about “a combination of the 
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Northern Indians, promoted by the English, to unite in falling on the frontier 
settlements, and are inviting the Southern tribes to join them.”64   
The exact reasons for the Chickasaws’ rejection of Tecumseh’s offer remain 
obscure.  Tecumseh apparently recruited a small number of Chickasaw warriors, but no 
large contingent opted to join in his effort.  As some of the Chickasaw leadership had 
fought alongside the Americans in the Ohio country during the 1790s, they probably 
remembered their animosity toward the primary groups that comprised Tecumseh’s 
confederacy.65  Even those who opposed the American influence in their society at the 
end of the previous century may not have put much faith in the commitment of the 
British to support the Indian allies they were recruiting for their war against the United 
States.  After all, neither the British nor the Spanish had been able to uphold similar 
promises over the previous thirty years.  Chickasaw families were also probably trying 
to recover from a poor crop-growing season due to excessive heat and widespread 
flooding in the Mississippi and Ohio valleys, which made American assistance a vital 
component in their capability to survive what was reportedly a harsh winter.66  
Regardless of any lingering inclinations to join in the impending fight against the 
Americans, the Chickasaws were soon dealt a blow that certainly would have disrupted 
any ability to do so. 
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In the early morning hours of December 16, 1811, an earthquake occurred with 
an epicenter near present-day New Madrid, Missouri.  This earthquake was stronger 
than any other ever recorded in the United States.  Moreover, it sparked a series of 
aftershocks over the next few months and was accompanied by two more earthquakes 
near the same location on January 23 and February 7, 1812.  The effects of these 
earthquakes were felt as far east as Philadelphia and were followed by severe 
aftershocks in January and February 1812.  According to one eyewitness account, the 
effects of the initial earthquake were severe enough to cause the banks of the 
Mississippi River near the Chickasaw Bluffs to crumble into the water “in such vast 
masses, as nearly to sink our boat by the swell they occasioned.”67  Although the 
physical damage to man-made structures southeast of the epicenter appears to have been 
minimal, primary accounts of the Chickasaws’ experience do not seem to exist.  Given 
the proximity of the Chickasaw homelands to the epicenters of the earthquakes, we 
should not discount the potential mental anxiety such a far-reaching event can have on 
people.  One gentleman as far away as Knoxville, Tennessee, described the morning of 
December 16 in the following manner:  “For several hours previous to the shock the 
most tremendous noise was heard from the neighboring mountains.  At intervals it was 
quiet; but would begin with so much violence that each repetition was believed to be the 
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last groan of expiring nature.”68  Following an already natural disaster-ridden year, 
therefore, it is highly unlikely that the Chickasaws were in any condition to become 
actively involved in an act of rebellion against the cultural influences represented by the 
United States.69 
George Colbert and other Chickasaw leaders issued statements to calm 
American anxieties that the Chickasaws would join in the British-supported pan-Indian 
confederation.70  These men commented on their people’s commitment to the peace 
between themselves and their American neighbors and that U.S. officials need not fear 
conflict with the Chickasaws even when a civil war among the Creeks threatened to 
engulf the entire South.  Inspired in part by Tecumseh’s message, the Red Stick faction 
among the Upper Creeks attempted to recruit other southeastern natives to their cause to 
cleanse Muskogee society of European influences.  For the most part, southeastern 
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native polities, including the majority of Lower Creek towns as well as the Chickasaws, 
Choctaws, and Cherokees again refused to join in a battle that portended to erupt not 
only among the Creeks, but against the United States as well.  As they were coming out 
of the deleterious natural disasters of 1811 and early 1812, Chickasaw leaders most 
likely believed that they still needed access to American goods and markets to complete 
their recovery.71 
As the Creek civil war threatened to draw the Chickasaws into the fray, the 
Chickasaw leadership took steps to ensure they had the right people available to 
conduct diplomacy on their behalf.  In late 1813, George Colbert supposedly resigned 
as principal chief, but as illustrated by the 1805 treaty negotiations, it seems more likely 
that he did not hold such a position permanently, certainly not at his own discretion.72  
George Colbert continued to correspond with U.S. officials, but from this moment on, 
Tishomingo seems to have fully assumed the role of principal chief of the Chickasaws, 
except in times of illness.73 
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Aside from William Colbert, who joined the third regiment of the United States 
Infantry, the majority of Chickasaws who fought in the War of 1812 were members of 
Major Uriah Blue’s Chickasaw detachment from November 3, 1814 to February 28, 
1815.74  Blue’s mission during this time was to pursue any remaining Red Sticks who 
had fled into Spanish-controlled Florida while Jackson focused on the British in New 
Orleans.75  Although the Chickasaws mostly likely participated in this campaign in 
order to cement their relationship with the United States, their involvement once again 
could have reinforced a notion among the Chickasaws that the United States were a 
confederation of autonomous, sovereign states that joined together for security within 
an international system.  Chickasaw soldiers served under the leadership of a federal 
officer, but they also fought alongside militiamen from the states of Georgia and 
Tennessee.76  As such, we can draw a parallel to the Chickasaws’ understanding of 
warfare in the eighteenth century and earlier:  the state contributions to the United 
States effort could have translated into a similar understanding of how native political 
groups that were members of confederacies such as the Creeks or Iroquois would have 
done so prior to the nineteenth century. 
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Following the conclusion of the Creek Civil War, the United States Government 
demanded land cessions from the Creeks.  As often happened in determining the full 
extent of those cessions, the fluidity of native claims to borderlands drew the 
Chickasaws back to the negotiating table.  Both the Chickasaws and Cherokees objected 
to certain cessions along the Tennessee River based on the idea that those specific lands 
did not belong to the Creeks.  On February 13, 1816, Jackson wrote to Coffee that the 
Chickasaws had made no claim to the lands in question at the time of the Creeks’ defeat 
in 1814; therefore, “any claim set up by the Chickasaws or Choctaws to that section of 
the country must be unfounded.”77  Despite Jackson’s grumbling, Secretary of War 
William H. Crawford instructed him, David Meriwether, and Jesse Franklin to secure a 
cession of the contested lands from the Chickasaws.  Crawford understood that this was 
a sensitive subject for the Chickasaws and directed the three men to conduct themselves 
in a “conciliatory” manner, “calculated to inspire [the Chickasaws] with a just sense of 
the equity and magnanimity of the Government towards them.”78 
Before the official proceedings opened on September 8, however, Jackson and 
Meriwether made a dramatic statement regarding the power the President of the United 
States held over Native American polities.  When Jackson, Meriwether, and Franklin 
arrived at the Chickasaw Council House on August 29, they were met by Creek runners 
representing Big Warrior.  According to Jesse Franklin, the two runners presented 
“broken sticks” to Jackson and Meriwether.  The intent of the sticks was to “excus[e] 
himself [Big Warrior] & [his Creek] warriors from attending at the Treaty, and inviting 
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all the Southern Tribes to meet him at Turkey Town” approximately one month later on 
October 1.  Franklin went on to relate that Jackson and Meriwether “wrote to the Big 
Warrior in a style that will convince him, that his power is but secondary & that he has 
no authority to alter the appointments of the President of the U States, who will convene 
the nations at his will.”79  We can assume that such statement were not made quietly, 
but publicly to reinforce the same effect among the Chickasaws and Creeks who were 
already present.  If so, then how would they have interpreted the power of the individual 
states over the next twenty years, especially after Jackson’s proclamations that he would 
not buck the authority of the states within their own jurisdictions? 
*************** 
Ten years later, the Chickasaws found themselves confronted by American 
demands that they move west.  On October 27, 1826, the Chickasaw chiefs offered a 
statement that provides insight into their understanding of the diplomatic relationship 
they shared with the Americans.  In full recognition of their dependence on the United 
States, the chiefs acknowledged their existence as of a protected and supported polity:  
that is, a nation within a nation.  The statement reflects their understanding of their 
situation as one similar to that of the Natchez following the French attempt to 
exterminate that Lower Mississippi polity.  In the 1730s, the Chickasaws offered refuge 
to splinter groups of Natchez seeking refuge from French persecution.  The Chickasaws 
originally intended to absorb the Natchez into their own coalescent structure.  But the 
Natchez had other ideas.  The situation that actually resulted was one in which the 
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Natchez established their own town within the Chickasaw political structure.  
Regardless of the Natchez’s ability to avoid incorporation into the Chickasaw polity, 
they could not take external action without the Chickasaws’ consent.  Once the French, 
with the help of the Choctaws, turned their rage on the Chickasaws for sheltering the 
Natchez, the British, Cherokees, and Creeks arranged a similar situation in which some 
Chickasaws sought protection by establishing villages among their native neighbors to 
the east.80   
Rather than increasing their security by allying with the United States to quell 
the Creek Civil War, the aftermath of the War of 1812 decreased the Chickasaws’ 
ability to thwart American ambitions for their land even further.  Following the war, the 
United States continued to consolidate their hold on North America.  The Spanish, beset 
by revolutions in their Latin American colonies, surrendered their New World colonies 
by 1820.  Although Great Britain tried to stop American expansion well into the second 
half of the nineteenth century, the European colonial empires would never again 
provide a substantial option for Native Americans against the intrusion of the United 
States within their world.81  Only the assertions of authority and sovereignty by the 
individual members of the United States would provide that opportunity.  Over the next 
twenty-five years, the Chickasaws would witness firsthand the frailty of federal power 
in the American union as southern states clamored for control over the Indians’ land:  
lands that were supposedly protected through the international norm of treaty-making 
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among sovereign powers and that the president—as mediator between the white and red 
polities east of the Mississippi River—was required to protect. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
A FATHER’S BETRAYAL 
 
On September 2, 1825, shortly before he resigned from the U.S. Senate, Andrew 
Jackson informed John Coffee, “The object of the Govt. is to obtain a cession of this 
Indian country for lands west of the Mississippi.”1  Nearly one year later, Coffee 
gathered the principle Chickasaw leaders together in a conference to discuss their 
removal west of the Mississippi River.  During the council in late October 1826, Coffee 
informed the Chickasaws that the United States wished to acquire their remaining lands 
in order to secure the defense of the south.  However, he also alluded to one of the 
primary reasons Mississippians wanted control over the Indian lands within their state 
boundaries:  to generate revenue. 
In response to Coffee’s offer that the Chickasaws sell their land and emigrate 
west, the chiefs objected to the argument that their situation in relation to the Americans 
would improve on the other side of the Mississippi.  They did not expect the Americans 
to stop settling westward once they reached the Mississippi River.  Rather, the 
Chickasaws believed that a similar situation would result in the future.  The chiefs 
asked, “Has not our father the president and our white brothers the same power there, as 
they have here?”2  With this question, the Chickasaw chiefs revealed an understanding 
of the unique challenge the United States presented to Native American societies, one 
with which they had never before had to contend despite the previous three centuries of 
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interaction with imperialistic European powers.  Americans ability to gain the upper 
hand in frontier diplomacy, and therefore to compel Native Americans to move 
elsewhere, was their commitment to an Empire of Liberty.  Unlike their European 
colonial predecessors, American territories on the North American continent were not 
destined to remain colonies of a distant metropole.  Rather, American territories earned 
the opportunity to become equal members of a growing empire.  Although states often 
clashed with the federal government over how to expand, especially in the south, the 
fluid nature of the United States’ representative government system meant that the 
states could influence the central government to a much greater extent than the colonies 
of the various empires that the Indians previously dealt with could have ever done. 
In their statement to the commissioners on October 27, the chiefs acknowledged 
their polity’s weaker position in the diplomatic relationship with the United States.  
They stated, “Our father the president must exercise his own judgment, we are his 
children and are at the discretion of our parent . . . . We have every confidence in them 
[the President and commissioners], that they will discharge the duty of a father and 
brothers.”3  As the Chickasaws still determined familial identity through their 
matrilineal relations, the chiefs’ metaphorical use of children and fathers should be 
interpreted in accordance with native concepts of diplomacy expressed immediately 
following the American Revolution.4  While they could play coy and show deference to 
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their American neighbors using the same terms, the Chickasaws had not yet come to 
accept the permanent authority of the United States in their world.  The Chickasaws 
recognized themselves as being under the protection of the United States—embodied by 
the metaphor of the president as their father—but remaining a distinct and separate 
entity that existed within a non-permanent, semi-sovereign status. 
This chapter explores the Chickasaws’ understanding of their diplomatic 
relationship with the United States during the time in which Americans adopted an 
official policy of removal.  I examine the rhetoric of state versus federal authority 
employed by Chickasaw, state, and federal officials to negotiate the Chickasaws’ 
removal to land west of the Mississippi River.  Examining the debates from this 
perspective allows us to see removal in a much more complicated light than is typically 
envisioned, one that was contingent upon multiple factors that converged at the right 
moment.  Removal did not result simply from the assertion of one side’s individual will 
over the others.  Unlike their fellow southeastern tribes, Chickasaw removal was not 
accomplished at the point of a bayonet.  Chickasaw leaders chose removal rather than to 
continue living under the laws of polities—the states of Alabama and Mississippi—they 
believed were equal to their own, but ones with whom they did not share a common 
culture.  Nor, for that matter, did the states force the federal government to push 
removal against the will of the subordinate executive branch.  During James Monroe’s 
tenure as president, factional differences over the moral legitimacy of removal divided 
                                                                                                                                               
the fish family, &c. . . . . the children all belong to the family of the mother, and are not 
considered at all related to the father’s family.  A man therefore can do nothing towards 
building up his family.  On account of this regulation, all hereditary honours necessarily 
descend, not from the father to the son, but from the uncle to his nephew, that is his 
sister’s son[.]  His brother’s son as well as his own, belong to some other family.”  
“Chickasaw Mission,” The Pittsburgh Recorder, March 16, 1824, vol. 3, iss. 7, p. 37. 
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the federal Congress.5  John Quincy Adams’ administration demonstrated the federal 
executive’s ability to protect native societies from the fervent demands of the states and 
their citizens.  Rather, Chickasaw removal required the combination of state frustration 
concerning federal intrusion in what they considered to be local affairs and a strong-
willed federal executive who shared the states’ goal.  President Andrew Jackson hid 
behind the rhetoric of states’ rights contained within the U.S. Constitution to portray an 
American union in which the states were the true holders of power and authority.  The 
use of such rhetoric influenced how the next generation of Chickasaw leaders’ 
conceptualized their nation’s ability to retain sovereignty in the face of continued 
American expansion, which is reflected in the Chickasaws’ own arguments to deny 
early demands for their removal and in the terms they eventually requested as 
compensation for their emigration away from their traditional homelands.  As such, I 
argue that we cannot understand the political change and decisions made by Chickasaws 
following removal without understanding how the rhetoric of state versus federal 
authority used to negotiate removal influenced the debates. 
*************** 
According to Jesse Franklin, the Chickasaws entered the 1816 treaty 
negotiations in an agitated and somewhat confused state.  Not only had one of the 
principal chiefs recently died, Cherokee delegates in attendance during this council 
ceded land on the south side of the Tennessee River to U.S. Commissioners Andrew 
Jackson and David Meriwether shortly after the conference commenced.  This 
                                                 
5 David C. Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire: The American Debate Over 
International Relations, 1789-1941 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2009), 
Ch. 4 
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“alarmed” the Chickasaw chiefs who believed that the Cherokees had surrendered lands 
that were not theirs to give.6  The Chickasaws were quite alarmed at the idea of 
surrendering more land to the United States.  On the second day of the council, 
Tishomingo presented the Chickasaws’ case for rightful ownership of the disputed 
lands.  To combat Jackson’s claims that they held no legitimate claim to the lands in 
question, the Chickasaws relied on the statements of white men, which they most likely 
believed Jackson would have trouble refuting.  The first item of evidence offered was a 
“certificate from General Washington, [when he was] President of the U. States.”7  
Washington gave the certificate to the delegation led by Piomingo during the summer of 
1794.  Further, the Chickasaws submitted affidavits of several men who attested to the 
Chickasaws’ long-term occupation of the lands in question.  U.S. Agent William Cocke 
produced these statements on the Chickasaws behalf at the request of the secretary of 
war.8  By presenting these documents in support of their claims, the Chickasaws were 
most likely drawing upon President Madison’s responsibility to uphold the agreements 
and promises of his presidential predecessors when it came to protecting the 
Chickasaws’ rights, regardless of the demands made by his own constituents. 
                                                 
6 Jesse Franklin, “Jesse Franklin Indian Treaty Papers, 1816,” p. 55; ASP:IA, 
2:92. 
7 Jesse Franklin, “Jesse Franklin Indian Treaty Papers, 1816” pp. 8-10; quote is 
on pp. 9-10. 
8 “General John Coffee’s Diary—1816,” Reel 3, Box 3, Folder 5, John Coffee 
Papers, LPR 27, Alabama Department of Archives and History, Montgomery, AL; Jesse 
Franklin, “Jesse Franklin Indian Treaty Papers, 1816,” pp. 9-21 in Jesse Franklin Indian 
Treaty Papers, #3656-z, Southern Historical Collection, The Wilson Library, University 
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 
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Jackson acknowledged the certificate’s validity, as it had been affirmed by the 
1801 treaty that established the President in a role akin to a fanemingo.9  Cocke’s 
presence at the council, however, should have surely called into question the ability of 
the president to protect native peoples’ sovereignty in the face of Americans’ demands 
that threatened to undermine them.  In a letter defending himself against the 
Chickasaws’ accusations levied against him during the 1816 treaty council, Cocke 
informed Jackson of a statement he made that previous spring that called into question 
whether there truly was a balance between the president’s and the states’ abilities to 
influence life in Indian country.  According to Cocke, the Chickasaw leaders had 
requested him to “drive all the traders trading under regular license out of the nation” on 
several occasions.  “This demand was also made by Tishomingo in council, early last 
spring, when I informed him that the power exclusively belonged to Congress to 
regulate trade with foreign nations, among the several States, and with the Indian 
tribes.”10  Cocke’s assertion offers an intriguing interpretation of the Trade and 
Intercourse acts of the 1790s, which modern scholars often cite to assert the federal 
government’s primacy over the states in dealing with Native Americans.  By claiming 
that the right to govern trade with the Indians belonged to Congress, not to the 
Executive Branch, Cocke brought the states right back into the equation.  The 
implications of such a statement were probably not lost on the Chickasaws.  Having 
observed the United States organize themselves and their relationships to their sister 
states within the construct of the federal government over the previous forty years, the 
                                                 
9 “Mr. Monroe and Gen. Jackson,” National Journal (Washington, DC), May 
15, 1824, p. 1. 
10 ASP:IA 2:106-107. 
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Chickasaws understood that, much like any native confederacy, it was through the 
mechanism of Congress—the United States national council—that the states assured 
their own interests and those of their individual citizens within the greater union. 
The Chickasaws deliberated for seven days after hearing the offer presented by 
Jackson and Meriwether.  According to the final terms of the treaty, the Chickasaws 
ceded all land north of the Tennessee River and most of their claims immediately south 
of the river as well.  In return, the Chickasaws were to receive an annuity of $12,000 per 
year for ten years for the land and another $4,000 for improvements that members had 
made to the ceded lands.11   
Although pressured and most likely bribed into ceding their lands north of and 
immediately surrounding the Tennessee River in the 1816 treaty, the Chickasaws did 
not necessarily walk away from the negotiations with the idea that their requests for the 
president to protect their rights against the demands of American citizens would no 
longer be met.12  Despite Cocke’s assertion about the right to restrict trade by whites 
within the Indian nations, the Chickasaws had already taken the issue to a broader 
audience.  A month before the convention began, William Colbert, through his brother 
James who now acted as the Chickasaws U.S. interpreter on occasion, issued a 
challenge to Americans to keep the Chickasaws’ territory free of “that horde of 
straggling pedlars that have so long infested our nation.”  In a letter submitted to the 
                                                 
11 Jesse Franklin, “Jesse Franklin Indian Treaty Papers, 1816,” pp. 40-58; 
Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 2:135-137. 
12 James Atkinson concludes that payments, unspecified in the actual treaty, 
given to the Colbert brothers—Levi, George, William, and James—and Tishomingo 
shortly after the 1816 treaty offer conclusive proof that these Chickasaw leaders were 
bribed into agreeing to the land cession.  Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, pp. 
207-208. 
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Nashville Whig, Colbert claimed that such activity was “dangerous to the good 
understanding that now exists between our nation and the citizens of the United States.”  
Colbert veiled his threat as a mea culpa on the part of the Chickasaws, who would not 
be able to restrain their own people “whose minds have not as yet undergone so radical 
a change . . . as to feel themselves content with that redress which is drawn from the 
tardy (though certain) process of the law.”  However, Colbert asserted, “the nation will 
not feel themselves responsible for” the violence that would be visited upon those who 
did not heed his warning.13  Further, the Chickasaw leaders managed to get Jackson and 
Meriwether to agree within the terms of the treaty that the agent should grant no future 
trading licenses to whites.  If whites were caught traversing the Chickasaw territory 
with the intent of selling goods to the Chickasaws, their materials would be confiscated, 
with half being surrendered to the Chickasaws and the other half to the U.S. 
government.14  Although the demand to have William Cocke removed as their Indian 
agent was not immediately met, the inclusion of this provision in the final ratified treaty 
probably helped to ameliorate some concerns regarding the president’s ability to uphold 
the requirements placed on his office in the 1801 treaty. 
The Era of Good Feelings ushered in a renewed impulse among Americans to 
expand their empire westward.  In the treaties with native societies conducted after the 
War of 1812, we can see a greater demand for native peoples east of the Mississippi 
River to surrender their lands and remove to the West.  In his journal of the 
negotiations, Franklin confided that securing this connection between the upper and 
                                                 
13 “Chickasaw Notice. From the Nashville Whig,” Niles’ Weekly Register 
(Baltimore), September 21, 1816, p. 56. 
14 Jesse Franklin, “Jesse Franklin Indian Treaty Papers, 1816,”pp. 40-50; 
Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 2:136. 
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lower south was necessary to ensure the continued allegiance of the citizens of those 
states to “the Present administration & [restore] that confidence that formerly existed 
between the Rulers & the People.”15  Franklin indicated that such concerns might have 
been kept from the Chickasaws, so as not to arouse them further than the Cherokee 
treaty had done.16  However, we can reasonably assume that the importance of this 
matter did not escape the Chickasaws’ notice for long.  As had the 1805 cession, the 
1816 treaty promoted fervor among Americans to settle the lands quickly.  On 
September 23, only three days after the chiefs and commissioners affixed their names to 
the treaty, Thomas H. Williams, soon to become a U.S. Senator for Mississippi 
following statehood in 1817, informed Mississippi Territorial Governor David Holmes 
that “the conferences with the Chickasaws terminated [the] day before yesterday, and 
the result is highly interesting to our territory. . . . This will open a most desireable 
country for settlemt.”17   
Holmes was right.  Settlers—who would not remain content with only those 
lands acquired in the post-war atmosphere—quickly began to move into the newly 
acquired territories.  Over the next decade, they clamored to take all of the native lands 
east of the Mississippi, including those of the Chickasaw.   
*************** 
The manner in which these settlers asserted their right to the newly acquired 
lands reveals a difference between the presumed ability of southern states versus those 
                                                 
15 Jesse Franklin, “Jesse Franklin Indian Treaty Papers, 1816,” p. 57. 
16 Ibid., p. 58. 
17 “Tho. H. Williams to Gov: Holmes, September 23, 1816,” Folder ? – 
“Mississippi Territory – Transcripts, 1810-1817,” Mississippi Territory, Governor’s 
Records, Correspondence, 1798-1819, SG3114, Alabama Department of Archives and 
History, Montgomery, AL. 
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in the northwest to exert pressure on the federal government to effect Indian removal.  
The federal government supposedly held to the right to any land beyond the boundaries 
of the recognized member states of the American union.  According to the Northwest 
Ordinance of 1787, the acquisition of Indian land north of the Ohio River was allowed 
only through federal negotiation of treaties with native societies.  As territories in the 
Old Northwest applied for statehood and secured admission into the union, the federal 
government retained ownership over Indian land.  In the American South, Georgia and 
North Carolina initially disregarded any attempt to project the restrictions of the 
Northwest Ordinance into their claimed territories in the Old Southwest.18  As founding 
members of the United States, these states derived their control over Indian land 
through their colonial charters that been granted by England, which were individually 
retained according the terms of the Treaty of Paris in 1783.  By the late 1810s, 
therefore, the southwestern states—and even some of their individual citizens—claimed 
their own right to Indian lands within their territorial boundaries had been obtained 
either through grants made by one of the original thirteen states or through agreements 
made by one of those states and the federal government.  As such, arguments over 
removal in the American South took on a considerable states’ rights tone that secured 
Chickasaw acquiescence to removal and influenced the way they organized themselves 
politically in the decades that followed. 
In 1818, Tennesseans pressed the federal government to acquire the remaining 
Chickasaw lands north of their southern border with the newly formed State of 
                                                 
18 Prucha, The Great Father, 1:47-48. 
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Mississippi.19  Throughout the following summer, Monroe administration officials 
worked to arrange a treaty council with the Chickasaws in order to secure the 
Tennesseans’ demands.  Secretary of War John C. Calhoun appointed former Kentucky 
Governor Isaac Shelby and General Andrew Jackson commissioners for this endeavor.  
Calhoun informed these two men that although their primary mission was to acquire the 
land in Tennessee, an agreement in which the Chickasaws would “remove . . . to the 
west side of the Mississippi . . . would be preferred.”20  Jackson attempted to lay the 
groundwork prior to Shelby’s arrival among the Chickasaws by negotiating through the 
Colbert brothers.   
The Chickasaw council met with Jackson and Shelby at Old Town that fall.  
Although Jackson attended the meetings on behalf of the federal government, Shelby 
intended his participation to benefit his own state.21  The negotiations were delayed 
                                                 
19 Annals of Congress, 15th Cong., 1st Session, p. 1391; “Ratified treaty no. 105, 
documents relating to the negotiation of the treaty of October 19, 1818, with the 
Chickasaw Indians,” pp. [1]-[19], in Documents Relating to Indian Affairs, University 
of Wisconsin Digital Collections, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.IT1818 
no105, accessed on January 7, 2012; and Williams, Beginnings of West Tennessee, p. 
146. 
20 “J.C. Calhoun to General Isaac Shelby and General Andrew Jackson, 
Commissioners, &c., May 2, 1818,” ASP:IA, 2:173. 
21 “Andrew Jackson to Capt. John Gordon, April 3d 1819,” M.F. 678, Reel 4, 
Box 8, J-21, Tennessee Historical Society, Miscellaneous Files, 1688-1951, Tennessee 
State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN.  We can probably assume that Jackson’s 
relations with Tennessee elites meant that he was at least partially engaged in the 1818 
negotiations with a biased perspective toward his home state’s benefit, not necessarily 
for the greater good of the United States.  During the 1828 election campaign, advocates 
of Henry Clay attacked Andrew Jackson’s character publicly in the newspapers.  Two 
men, a C.S. Todd and Thomas Shelby, Isaac Shelby’s son, specifically published 
statements in the Kentucky Advocate on July 25 in which they questioned Jackson’s 
ethics in the 1818 cession negotiations.  The accusations laid down by these men point 
to Jackson as an individual out for his own personal gain and his connection to the elite 
class in Tennessee.  According to Todd, Isaac Shelby had recently commented, “very 
emphatically, that very few men knew General Jackson’s real character; that in his 
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until the Chickasaws’ annual annuity was ready to be dispersed to them.  Dispersal of 
the annuity was late because the United States had tried to pay the Chickasaws in goods 
when the chiefs preferred cash.  The chiefs had already demonstrated their displeasure 
with the idea of another cession.  Jackson and Shelby “determined not to tender the 
goods” and sent for money from Nashville “so as to sustain the good faith and promises 
of the government.”22  However, the commissioners withheld the actual distribution 
until the Chickasaws acquiesced to a cession.  As the commissioners had already met in 
private with some of the chiefs, perhaps this gesture made by Shelby and Jackson was a 
bit theatrical, designed to help promote the cession among the general populace of 
Chickasaws also in attendance at the council and decrease animosity against the chiefs 
who may have been bribed.23  While the two sides awaited arrival of the funds, the 
commissioners presented “books containing copies of the grants by North Carolina to 
individuals lying within the bounds to be treated [to] Levi Colbert, one of the principal 
                                                                                                                                               
opinion, he might make a very good President for the State of Tennessee, as he has not 
the mind or temper to look beyond the wishes of his personal friends to the promotion 
of the great interests of the nation.”  Thomas Shelby, for his part, specifically 
commented about the manner in which his father, representing the Commonwealth of 
Kentucky at the 1818 treaty, believed Jackson had colluded with several of the 
Chickasaw leaders to have him agree to pay twice as much as the Chickasaws originally 
requested.  “[General Jackson; Mr. Clay; Chickasaw; Development; Contained; 
Information],” Alexandria Gazette (Alexandria, Virginia) July 25, 1828, p. 2. 
22 “Extracts to the Editor—Dated, Chickasaw Treaty Ground, 5th Oct. 1818,” 
American Beacon and Norfolk & Portsmouth Daily Advertiser, November 6, 1818, p. 3. 
23 “Andrew Jackson to J.C. Calhoun, July 13, 1816,” “H. Sherburne to J.C. 
Calhoun, July 29, 1818,” “J.C. Calhoun to Andrew Jackson, July 30, 1818,” “J.C. 
Calhoun to Isaac Shelby, July 30, 1818,” and “Andrew Jackson to J.C. Calhoun, August 
18, 1818,” ASP:IA, 2:178-179; Thomas D. Clark, “The Jackson Purchase: A Dramatic 
Chapter in Southern Indian Policy and Relations,” The Filson Club History Quarterly 
50:3 (July 1976): 302-320. 
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chiefs[, who had] asked for a perusal of them.”24  Regardless of the extent to which the 
cession had been predetermined, the manner in which the negotiations were conducted 
and the rhetoric used by those involved most likely influenced the way the Chickasaws 
understood the relationship between the federal government and the individual states 
within the American union.   
When official negotiations commenced on October 12, Shelby informed the 
chiefs,  
Your father, the President always anxious to keep peace and friendship between 
his red and white children, and do justice to all, has charged us again to bring to 
your view that much of land lying in the States of Tennessee and Kentucky, 
which was sold by North Carolina and Virginia about 35 years ago, to pay the 
debt of the revolutionary war. 
 
Brothers:  This piece of land is claimed by your Nation, but our white [brothers] 
paid for it many years ago—and our father the President has kept them away 
from it that his red children might hunt on it, but the game is now gone, and his 
                                                 
24 Quoted passages are from “Ratified treaty no. 105,” p. [4].  The 1818 
negotiations stand out as the moment in which we can first see that Levi Colbert had 
assumed the role of chief diplomat with the United States that his brother George 
formerly performed.  The way in which the individual claims were publicly presented to 
Levi for inspection and the manner in which he represented the Chickasaws both before 
and behind the curtain throughout the council demonstrate his growing importance in 
the Chickasaws’ international affairs.  Levi’s influence during these negotiations cannot 
be denied, nor for that matter can that of his brothers, each of whom is recognized 
through individual stipends or allotments designated in the treaties.  However, his 
prominent position in these negotiations does not mean that he was necessarily in 
charge of Chickasaw policy.  In each of his first two major appointments on behalf of 
the Chickasaws, Colbert was closely observed by one, if not all, of the principal chiefs.  
Further, even though he was appointed to observe the running of the line associated 
with the 1816 cession, one of the principal chiefs, William McGillivray, accompanied 
him.  Despite his disappearance from the public record over the next decade, 
Tishomingo remained the principal advisor and chief in national affairs, a position he 
retained until his death sometime around 1840.  “General John Coffee’s Diary—1816”; 
Atkinson, Splendid Land, Splendid People, pp. 212-235 and 319n32; Amanda L. Paige, 
Fuller L. Bumpers, and Daniel F. Littlefield, Chickasaw Removal (Ada, Oklahoma: 
Chickasaw Press, 2010), pp. 267-289.. 
 178 
white children claim it now from him.25 
 
Further, the commissioners offered to present the documents providing proof that those 
individuals pressing the president to negotiate a cession had bought their claims from 
the states of North Carolina and Virginia, not from the federal government.   
The commissioners offered the Chickasaws two options in exchange for the 
proposed cession.  The first option was that Monroe would give the Chickasaws “as 
much land over the Mississippi for this Country which is granted to your white 
brethren, where there is not claim by any other state or people, and where there is plenty 
of game, and good land.”  Removal was never a valid option for the Chickasaws, 
however, whose leaders had voiced their opposition to in the months leading up to the 
council.  The Chickasaws’ second option, therefore, was to accept “a fair and 
reasonable price in money” for the land.26 
Anticipating that the chiefs might refuse this offer as well, Shelby attempted to 
demonstrate the states’ authority in the matter and the president’s inability to protect his 
native charges.  Shelby reminded the chiefs of a statement Jackson had made to them 
concerning the ability of the states to influence the federal government through their 
congressional representatives.  “General Jackson also told you that if you refuse to sell 
your claim that your white Brothers would move on this land, which is granted to them, 
and then your Nation would have to apply to Congress for compensation, for if you 
refuse the good intention of your father the President, you cannot look to him for 
                                                 
25 “Ratified treaty no. 105,” p. [8]. 
26 “C.S. Todd to Col. Shelby, 17 Aug 1818,” Memorabilia, Mss. A .G857, 
Shelby, Alfred, 1804-1832, Grigsby Collection, Filson Historical Society, Louisville, 
KY; Calvin Jones, “Some Account of the Chickasaw Country Lately Ceded to the 
United States,” Daily National Intelligencer (Washington, DC), November 27, 1818, 
p. 2, col. C. 
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redress.”27  Presumably, Shelby intended to make the point that, as the representatives 
of the states within the federal union, Congress would not decide in favor of the 
Chickasaws and that the president could not reverse the decision.  By telling the chiefs 
that the president could not protect them even within the federal government, Shelby 
once again reaffirmed the power of the individual states within the union.  Further, he 
demonstrated that the states remained united through their cooperation in Congress, not 
by compulsion under a federal authority.   
Such talk probably sounded very alarming to the Chickasaws, as it did to many 
Native Americans over the next forty years.  What, they wondered, would stop the 
expansive Americans from attempting to do the same again in the future as new states 
and citizens settled around them?  Shelby attempted to placate such concerns.   
Despite the overwhelming power Shelby had just attributed to the states, he 
attempted to ameliorate Chickasaw concerns that a similar situation could happen again, 
despite Americans’ commitment to expanding their union of states through westward 
settlement.  He reminded the Chickasaws that the United States were only asking them 
to cede lands that lay within the boundaries of the states of Tennessee and Kentucky. 
Shelby described how North Carolina and Virginia had sold the rights to those lands to 
individual Americans, not the federal government.  They need not have worried about 
their remaining lands in Mississippi and the Alabama territory.  Although that land had 
once belonged to Georgia, whose right to ownership was derived in the same manner 
claimed by North Carolina and Virginia, Georgia did not sell its western lands to 
individual citizens.  Rather, Shelby stated, “that state sold it to your father the President 
                                                 
27 “Ratified treaty no. 105” p. [9]. 
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and Congress, who holds it fast for their red children to live on and be happy.”  
Therefore, the President still could and would intervene on the Chickasaws’ behalf 
against the claims of American citizens and states if future contests between his red and 
white children required him to do so.28 
Shelby’s assertive stance regarding the authority states held within and therefore 
over the federal government did not immediately translate into his desired outcome.  
Even his fellow southwestern citizens understood that factional interests—which were 
just as capable of forming within the United States as they were in Chickasaw politics—
could thwart their desires to gain absolute control over the Indian lands of the American 
South.  In an 1817 petition to the U.S. Congress, the members of the Mississippi 
Constitutional Convention lamented the large amount of land the treaties of 1816 left 
under the control of the Chickasaws and Choctaws.  The delegates expressed their 
concern  
that many years will elapse before the Tribes of the Choctaws and Chickasaws 
who now occupy the Country to its Northern extremity, can be induced to 
dispose of it to the Government.  This circumstance alone will confine the 
growth and population of the State, until it shall be overcome by some exercise 
of executive authority, which will lead to the extinguishment of Indian title over 
this tract of country.29 
 
As indicated in the petition, the Mississippians expected that Congress, as the body 
through which the states formulated national policy, would compel the Executive 
Branch to secure their goal of controlling the Chickasaws’ land.  That is, it would take 
the combined demands of the southern states and the refusal of a president to uphold his 
                                                 
28 “Ratified treaty no. 105,” pp. [9]-[10]; quote on p. [10]. 
29 “Memorial to Congress by the Mississippi Constitutional Convention,” Carter, 
ed., Territorial Papers: Alabama Territory, 18:212. 
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obligations to Native Americans guaranteed through treaties to effect the removal of the 
Chickasaws. 
After hearing the commissioners’ opening statement, the chiefs retired to 
George Colbert’s house to deliberate.  Due to the considerable opposition to either 
option, the commissioners determined to give individual stipends, or bribes, to several 
chiefs.  According to the commissioners’ journal of the negotiations, the bribes were 
kept secret, as “the lives of the Chiefs would be jeopardized by a disclosure.”  Even 
with the bribes, however, the chiefs refused to consider moving west.  In fact, the whole 
council seemed to be in doubt.  On October 17, the commissioners learned through a 
“confidential agent” that “the council was about to break up abruptly, with a 
determination to send a deputation to the President remonstrating against selling or 
exchanging their land. . . . and that there were three chiefs, who were decidedly hostile 
to the measure.”30  Ultimately, the chiefs refused to entertain the option of moving west.  
As to the demand that they sell the lands in question, the chiefs believed they did not 
have much of a choice.  Levi Colbert remarked, “the American Nation was strong; and 
the younger brother must therefore yield to the elder brother.”  Although they still 
believed themselves to be an autonomous and sovereign entity, they clearly recognized 
that their position in this relationship was weaker than that of the United States.31   
The Chickasaws did not enter into this decision uninformed.  Prior to the 
conduct of the negotiations, the chiefs learned how much money the United States 
government received for the sale of public lands and demanded the same compensation 
for their own nation.  After rebuking several offers by Jackson and Shelby, the chiefs 
                                                 
30 Ratified treaty no. 105, p [13]. 
31 Ratified treaty no. 105, pp. [11]-[17]; quote on p. [15]. 
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agreed to sell the proposed land for an annual sum of $20,000 to be paid over fifteen 
years, or 300,000 in total.32  As his political star rose to national prominence over the 
next decade, Shelby’s son and son-in-law accused Jackson of collusion with Levi 
Colbert to ensure that the Chickasaws received the full $300,000 that he and Shelby had 
been authorized to spend on the purchase.  Although the accusations may have been 
nothing more than slander, no one disputed that the Chickasaw leaders knew how high 
they could push the purchase price for this cession.33 
Regardless of the price paid, both Kentuckians and Tennesseans rejoiced at the 
treaty.  As the 1816 treaty had, the 1818 cession opened land for American settlement 
and speculation.  According to James B. Reynolds, a Tennessee lawyer and politician, 
“The late purchase from the Chickasaw nation has Opened a grand field for 
Speculation.  And will be the means of making Tennessee an important State in the 
Union.”34  Kentucky officials incorporated their portion of the cession into the state 
system of government within two years and began marking off towns and counties.   
The Chickasaws, on the other hand, emerged from the conference determined to 
hold onto their remaining territory.  Chickasaw leaders had just ceded over five million 
acres within the state of Tennessee alone, most of which was hunting territory.  This 
most likely angered the warriors among the general population as opportunities for 
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proving oneself through warfare continued to diminish.35  As the general populace 
among the Chickasaws was wary of Americans’ continued demands for their land, the 
chiefs worked hard to deny opportunities for the American governments to run 
roughshod over their peoples’ rights.36  As a result, U.S. officials found their efforts to 
compel removal a decade later would require more than just rhetoric.  It would require 
them to demonstrate that rhetoric in action. 
                                                 
35 ASP:IA, 2:499; Clark, “The Jackson Purchase,” p. 318-319. 
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The negotiations for land during the first twenty years of the nineteenth 
century—in which state and factional priorities directed the path which the central 
government had to take—promoted an understanding among the Chickasaws that the 
United States operated according to separate interests, through which native polities 
could balance state ambitions by appealing to the federal government.  Shelby and 
Jackson’s comments during the 1818 negotiations about the president’s lack of power 
did not seem to have the desired effect.  Jackson later commented that the Chickasaws 
the transaction established an expectation among the nation that “their father the 
President, [would] secure their peace and happiness” from then on.37  Unfortunately, for 
the Chickasaws, this would not hold true. 
*************** 
Early in his first presidential administration, James Monroe indicated that the 
government should consider instituting an official Indian removal policy.  In his first 
annual message to Congress, delivered on December 2, 1817, Monroe commented upon 
the success his administration achieved with the various Native American groups 
following the conclusion of the War of 1812.  Specifically, he referenced the 1816 
treaty with the Cherokees, in which they “exchange[d a portion of their land in Georgia] 
for lands beyond the Mississippi.”  Monroe indicated his belief that such negotiations 
were simply the beginning, and that without the adoption of the American ideal of a 
civilized lifestyle, many Native Americans east of the Mississippi would soon follow 
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suit and emigrate west into “the vast uncultivated desert.”38  Although obviously open 
to removal, Monroe did not pursue the idea with the wanton lust that Jackson did after 
he became president in 1829.  Rather, he promoted programs designed to assimilate 
Indians into American society as well policies to push them to elect to remove without 
the federal government having to use force.39   
In April 1820, Secretary of War John C. Calhoun lent his support to the efforts 
of David Humphreys and Thomas C. Stuart, two men sent by the Missionary Society 
and Synod of South Carolina and Georgia to establish missions among the southeastern 
Native Americans.40  The missionaries’ efforts had probably been encouraged by the 
passage of the Indian Civilization Fund Act of 1819, which authorized the president to 
spend $10,000 annually for the purpose of civilizing the Native Americans.41  The two 
missionaries originally travelled among the Creeks, but received little welcome.  
Discouraged, but not deterred, the two men pressed on to the Chickasaws.  They visited 
Levi Colbert in late May, who informed them of a major gathering of the Chickasaws 
for a stick-ball game that would be held at his brother George’s house.  Having 
followed the chief’s advice, the two missionaries met with some of the Chickasaw 
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chiefs on June 22, 1820, accompanied by William Vans, the acting Chickasaw agent.42  
According to Stuart, the Chickasaws “at once acceded to our proposals and granted us 
everything we desired of them.”  Stuart’s confident remarks should be questioned, 
however.  He also indicated that the chiefs “were not entirely free from suspicions, as 
they required of us an obligation in writing, that we would not seize upon their land and 
make private property of it.”43  Further, according to a later report about the council, 
only “some of the chiefs were disposed to receive instructors and missionaries; but the 
majority of the chiefs were opposed to the instruction of their children in husbandry and 
the mechanic arts.”44 
As the Chickasaws had divided over Americans’ ability to influence their world 
during the late eighteenth century, it seems that the Chickasaws disagreed over how to 
best deal with the Americans as a permanent presence following the first two decades of 
the nineteenth century.  Despite objections by those who did not want to acculturate as a 
method of coping, this did not approach the level of factionalism exhibited in the 1790s 
as it seems that no groups voiced their opposition to the outside world, while claiming 
to be the legitimate leaders of the Chickasaw government.  Humphreys and Stuart 
received enough support to convince the synod to establish a mission among the 
Chickasaws.  Levi Colbert wrote on behalf of the chiefs to the missionaries’ superiors 
requesting that a school for the Chickasaw children be established that following 
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winter.45  Colbert was a proponent of Chickasaw children receiving an American-style 
education.  He sent his adopted son, Winchester Colbert, to Charity Hall—a school 
established by the Cumberland Presbyterian ministry the same year as Humphreys’s and 
Stuart’s visit—in 1826 and 1827, before sending him to Richard Mentor Johnson’s 
Choctaw Academy in 1828.46 
Stuart took responsibility for establishing Monroe Mission, which opened its 
doors in 1822.  Over the next four years, the mission increased in size as more 
Chickasaw families came to see the benefits in having American schools in their 
territory.  For the Chickasaws, educating their children had less to do with the adoption 
of Christianity and more to do with producing a generation of Chickasaws capable of 
maintaining their identity in an ever changing world.47  The school operated on the 
Lancasterian model in which more advanced students took responsibility for educating 
their younger and less competent counterparts.  In such a system, Chickasaw students 
had plenty of opportunity to adapt their studies to fit within their own cultural values.  
In the winter of 1824–1825, the Chickasaws sent a delegation to Washington, D.C., to 
arrange the appropriation of $35,000 from their annuity to be used “toward the 
education and improvement of their children.”48  By January 1827, the synod operated 
four schools among the Chickasaws.  The Chickasaws’ acquiescence to and promotion 
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of schools within their territory instituted a sound basis for the Chickasaws to prepare 
their next generation of leaders, including future Civil War and Reconstruction-era 
governors Cyrus Harris and Winchester Colbert, to negotiate a world in which 
Americans proved ever intrusive.49 
The immersion of bicultural individuals, such as the Colbert brothers, into 
western culture provided an established cadre of bicultural individuals who guided the 
Chickasaws through their early negotiations with the United States.  However, 
Chickasaw leaders knew that to be successful in the nineteenth century, they had to 
provide future generations of leaders with a much more extensive education concerning 
American culture and society.  Even Ugulayacabe recognized the important role 
knowledge of western concepts would play in the Chickasaws’ ability to maintain their 
independence and sovereignty in the face of a strong, imperial power such as the United 
States, which he demonstrated when he asked for Joseph Bullen’s assistance to educate 
his two youngest children in 1799.50  The Chickasaws’ adoption of missionary efforts to 
help them acculturate to western society, therefore, provided future generations with the 
educational means to combat the United States expansionist tendencies on the 
Americans’ own terms.  In addition—in the near term—it provided the current 
Chickasaw leadership ammunition to argue that their people were upholding their part 
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of the bargain struck when the Chickasaws agreed to the protected position of a nation 
within a nation. 
*************** 
As the emphasis on missionary involvement and the establishment of a western-
style education system for their youths indicates, the first half of the 1820s passed by 
rather innocuously for the Chickasaws.  Despite a few calls to revisit the idea of 
removal, the federal government was preoccupied with demands from Georgia to 
remove all Indians from within the state’s boundaries.  According to the 1802 cession of 
their western lands, Georgians believed that the federal government was required to 
remove all Indians from within their state’s bounds.  Monroe resisted, however, and 
refused to recognize any obligation of the federal government to enforce Georgia’s 
demands.51  During Monroe’s first administration, Jackson had latched on to the shift 
towards removal and spoke out in support of the states taking control over those native 
populations within their boundaries.  Spurred on by such rhetoric, Mississippians 
adopted the notion that they had the right to supersede federal authority and impose 
their own laws over the Choctaws and Chickasaws.  Over the next ten years, Mississippi 
politicians worked to extend state laws over the lands owned by the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws.52   
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Towards the end of Monroe’s second term, Jackson’s and the southern states’ 
persistence influenced the president to issue an official call for Indian removal on 
January 27, 1825.  Although Monroe capitulated, he called for “the removal of these 
tribes [west of the Mississippi River] on conditions which shall be satisfactory to [the 
Native Americans] and honorable to the United States.”53  However, even Monroe’s call 
for an honorable removal could not garner enough support to authorize federal action 
within the divided system of United States politics during the Jacksonian Era.  The plan 
failed to pass the House of Representatives, and the issue became even more 
complicated when Monroe relinquished the duties of the president to John Quincy 
Adams that spring.54 
Adams entered office committed to the idea that civilization and assimilation of 
the native population held the only honorable way for the United States to deal with the 
extenuating problems of American expansion.  Adams opposed removal to such an 
extent that he even threatened to use the army to protect Native Americans from the 
aggressive threats issued against them by Georgians.  Such obstinance in the face of 
what was a growing debate among Americans earned Adams enough opponents to 
ensure that he would be a one-term president.  Southerners feared that if the president 
was willing to use force to uphold Native American rights in what many considered a 
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state, not national, issue, he might be willing to do the same concerning the contentious 
existence of slavery within those same states.   
Adams was besieged by the sectional interests of the southern and northwestern 
states throughout his administration.  It was during Adams’ administration, therefore, 
that conditions were right for Mississippian demands for federal support of Indian 
removal to really catch hold and undermine the ability of the president to protect the 
rights of both his red and white children.55  By fall 1826, John Coffee and Thomas 
Hinds stood before the Chickasaw leaders to secure their removal. 
On October 15, 1826, Generals John Coffee and Thomas Hinds arrived at James 
McLish’s house to meet with the Chickasaw Agent Benjamin F. Smith.  These men, 
newly appointed as commissioners on behalf of the United States, were determined to 
secure the cession of all Chickasaw lands east of the Mississippi River.  Smith informed 
the men that their mission would have to wait, however, as “the Chiefs of the Nation 
had changed the place of the meeting from the one [Coffee and Hinds] then occupied, to 
the National Council House Chickasaw, distant about 12 miles.”  The commissioners’ 
attempts to compel the Chickasaws to meet at McLish’s—as had previously been 
arranged—failed.  Given the resolute nature with which the Chickasaws refused to 
consider removal during this conference, the chiefs’ obstinacy was most likely 
attributable to a desire to control as much of the negotiations as possible.  The U.S. 
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commissioners eventually acquiesced and moved to Levi Colbert’s house, which was 
closer to the chiefs’ preferred location for negotiations:  the Council House.56  
The negotiations opened on October 23.  In his opening salvo, Coffee stated, “It 
is the policy and the interest of our Government, to extinguish the Indian title to all the 
lands on this side of the Mississippi River.”  Coffee further presented the reasons why 
the United States wished to acquire the Chickasaw territory, namely that of securing the 
defense of the south and generating revenue for Mississippi.  Over the next few days, 
the two sides exchanged petitions.  The chiefs objected to the idea of removal to the 
west.  Instead, they appealed to the president, whom Coffee claimed to represent, “to 
extend his protection to us here, as he proposes to do, on the west of the Mississippi, as 
we apprehend we would in a few years, experience the same difficulties in any other 
section of country that might be suitable to us West of the Mississippi.”  To this, Coffee 
expressed his disappointment and attempted to convince the Chickasaws that the 
president’s duty was to his white children first, which “makes it his duty to call upon 
you to sell him a part of your land.”57 
The chiefs requested a day to deliberate privately.  They concluded that if they 
accepted removal, they would not find their security in relation to their white brothers 
any more enhanced than it was at the present.  The Chickasaws understood that, from an 
international perspective, they existed within a subservient status under the aegis of the 
American union.  Further, as Coffee’s statement should have indicated, despite 
Chickasaw attempts to hold the Americans to the norms of native diplomacy, they must 
                                                 
56 “A Journal of the proceedings of the United States commissioners appointed 
to treat with the Chickasaw Nation of Indians, 1826.” 
57 Ibid. 
 193 
have known that they could do so only to a certain extent.  Racial ideology had taken 
root in European-Native American diplomacy over the previous century, and the 
president’s preference for his white children over that of his red children should not 
have surprised Chickasaw leaders.  Nineteenth-century southeastern Native Americans 
understood that Americans believed in their own inherent racial superiority.  As theirs 
was the weaker position within the international system in which they and the 
Americans were engaged, the Chickasaws had to play the role of “dutiful children” and 
look to their adoptive father, the president, for protection. 
In an attempt to display how the Chickasaws had heretofore abided by the rules 
required of a nation within a nation, the chiefs reminded the commissioners of the 
efforts their people had made to restructure their society in order to fit within the norms 
of American culture: 
We have abandoned the idea of hunting for a support, finding the game will not 
do for subsistence.  Therefore, we now turn our attention to farming and tilling 
the ground for our support.  Our father the President introduced Missionaries to 
come amongst us, to advance us to a state of civilization.  We accepted them and 
are making all the progress that people can.  We have also been providing means 
for the support of the missionaries to enable them to go on with the education of 
our children and to have them enlightened.  Industry is spreading amongst us, 
population is increasing and we hope soon will arrive at that state of 
improvement, that is so much desired by our father the President.58 
 
The Chickasaws probably did not really want to assimilate into American society as 
fervently as their petition suggests.  More likely, this was an attempt to play on the 
sensibilities of those Americans who might protect them against the wishes of those 
who only desired their land and total subjugation.  Therefore, as they had played by the 
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rules thus far, the chiefs asserted that the President should live up to his responsibility as 
their protector in their relations with the American states. 
After several days more of back and forth between the commissioners and the 
Chickasaws, Coffee was frustrated at what he deemed to be the Chickasaws’ obstinacy.  
His counterpart, General Thomas Hinds of Mississippi, however, remained calm and 
attempted to give the Chickasaws a clear vision of the nature of governmental authority 
within the Americans’ republican system of government.  A veteran of the negotiations 
for the Choctaw cession in the Treaty of Doak’s Stand (1820), Hinds was committed to 
the idea of Indian removal.  Alluding to Mississippi State Senator Thomas Reed’s 
recent attempt to compel the federal government to enforce removal, Hinds addressed 
the chiefs and explained how the President had no power over the people, or his home 
State of Mississippi, whatsoever. 
He told his red brothers that ours [the Americans’] was a government of laws 
and that all the power of the government was in the people[,] that their father the 
President was bound to obey the wishes of the people and . . . that the people 
would not permit the present state of things to continue much longer.  He told 
them that the subject of extending the laws of the State of Mississippi over the 
Indian country within her chartered limits was brought before the Legislature of 
that State at their last session and that the investigation of the subject had been 
deferred partly for the purpose of ascertaining what could be done by the 
General Government by negotiations with the Indians.  If these negotiations [in 
which Hinds was participating] failed[,] the Legislature of Mississippi would 
again take up the subject and that in all probability the laws of the State would 
be extended throughout her chartered limits at the next session.59 
 
According to Hinds statement, the Chickasaws should have come away from these 
negotiations with the understanding that although the citizens of Mississippi were trying 
to play nice, they did not have to in the end.  Most southern Americans identified 
themselves as citizens of their individual states during the nineteenth century.  As such, 
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the states held the true power in the American union, they did not have to work through 
the federal government, which was merely an international compact among the states, if 
its officers proved unable to achieve the individual and collective goals of the 
constituent members. 
Despite Hinds’ threat, the Mississippi legislature did not take the final step for 
several more years.  In the meantime, state officials continued to exert pressure on 
President Adams to remove the Chickasaws and Choctaws from their borders.  In 1827, 
Secretary of War James Barbour directed Superintendent of Indian Affairs Thomas L. 
McKenney “to ascertain the disposition of the tribes within the States, the Chickasaws 
and Choctaws, and, if practicable, the Cherokees, on the subject of emigration to lands 
west of the Mississippi.”60  During his negotiations, McKenney appealed to Chickasaw 
leaders reconsider their opposition to the idea, citing the constant pressure being put 
upon the President “to buy your lands.”61  The chiefs finally agreed to consider removal 
in light of McKenny’s continued pleas.   
The chiefs agreed to examine the lands west of the Mississippi that the 
government had reserved for their people, but they offered several qualifications if they 
could even find acceptable land.  To protect themselves from further state 
encroachment, the chiefs demanded that the United States “drive every body off of [the 
land proposed], and guarantee it to us for ever,” thereby allowing the Chickasaws to 
control who lived among them in the future.  Demonstrating an understanding of the 
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expansive nature of the United States, they further requested “that you establish a 
government over us, in all respects like one of your territories, (Michigan for example,) 
and give the right of suffrage to our people . . . and allow us, after the territory is 
organized, a delegate, like your territories enjoy, in Congress.”62  Although this request 
reiterated a suggestion McKenney made earlier in the negotiations, the addition of 
Michigan as an example appears to have been the Chickasaws’ own doing.63   
In this passage, we can see that the Chickasaws acknowledged the power the 
United States had in their world as they had the previous year.  However, they did not 
see that power as all encompassing and dominating.  By asserting their desire to be 
afforded the same opportunities for future inclusion to the American union as a state, 
the chiefs revealed that they understood that the United States political structure 
contained a mechanism through which the Chickasaws could preserve their political 
independence and sovereignty.  Further, they could keep future encroachments by 
states, or states to be formed by expansive settlers, from wielding the same level of 
pressure and authority concerning the Indians as they exhibited during the 1820s. 
The 1827 negotiations came to naught.  In the fall of 1828, twelve Chickasaw 
representatives under the leadership of Levi Colbert explored the territory west of the 
Mississippi River offered by the federal government.  Upon their return home, the 
delegates presented their observations to the Chickasaw council.  The journey 
convinced Colbert that the Chickasaws could not resist the United States forever, but he 
did not believe that removal held the answer to their dilemma concerning future 
American encroachment.  He and the other members of the delegation returned home 
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unimpressed with the lands they saw in the west.  According to the delegates, the land 
in question did not compare to their current territory in any way.  Consequently, the 
Chickasaws once again rejected American overtures to emigrate west of the Mississippi 
River.64 
*************** 
Despite the desire of the Chickasaws to remain where they had lived for 
centuries, the presidential election of Andrew Jackson effectively signified the end of 
Chickasaw efforts in their tribal homelands.  Indian affairs was a critical issue in the 
1828 presidential election, and one that helped Andrew Jackson secure victory by tying 
the sectional interests of the west and south together.65  By 1828, Mississippi politicians 
were close to their breaking point, no longer willing to defer to the federal government 
to negotiate removal.66  Their lone representative in the House of Representatives, 
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William Haile, attempted “to amend the bill [enumerating appropriations for the Indian 
Department in 1828] by introducing the appropriation to enable the state of Mississippi 
to remove the Chickasaw Indians” from their limits.  His colleagues rebuffed the 
amendment.  They believed the Chickasaws were already included, even if not by name, 
and did not need specific mention in the bill.67 
Mississippians were not alone in their zeal to assert their state’s power over the 
Native Americans within their state boundaries.  Both Georgia and Alabama worked to 
assert their authority over the federal government as well.  Georgia officials protested 
the right of the federal government to conclude treaties that affected the state’s territory 
as an affront to the state’s sovereignty.  Georgia even threatened to nullify treaties made 
between the U.S. government and the Creeks to bring the latter under the state’s 
jurisdiction.68  As a result, these states supported Jackson’s bid for the presidency, 
which helped to unleash the final push for removal of the eastern Native American 
societies. 
During Jackson’s administration, native peoples witnessed the ability for states 
to pursue ambitions that the federal government could not curtail.  However, this was 
not necessarily a result of Jackson’s strong personality alone.  It required collusion 
between the executive and the states to push removal past the sectional and party 
interests within the United States as well as the Native Americans who had no desire to 
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remove in the first place.  In his first annual message to Congress on December 8, 1829, 
Jackson stated that the Indians could not hold their own separate and distinct 
governments on land that was within the confines of a state.  In Jackson’s mind, to 
allow such would have been against the Constitution.69  The Chickasaws were quickly 
affected; Mississippi lawmakers passed laws restricting Native Americans’ rights, and 
threatened to imprison native leaders who engaged in tribal governance.  Using the 
Constitution as protection, Jackson sent commissioners out among the southern tribes to 
secure their removal west of the Mississippi.   
Federal officials quickly secured the removal of the Choctaws under the 
protective rhetoric that the authority of the states within the Constitution meant more 
than the federal government’s obligation to uphold the United States’ promises within 
the international arena.  Jackson’s stance—that the president did not have the 
constitutional authority to stop the individual states from extending their laws over the 
Indians—eroded any faith the Choctaws had in receiving fair treatment from the federal 
government.  According to Choctaw Chief David Folsom, his people could not trust 
“any future promises and guarantees of the United States’ government,” especially 
those guaranteeing the Choctaws’ right to hold the new western lands in perpetuity.  
Drawing upon the power exhibited by the states in this current phase of removal, 
Folsom concluded, it would be a mistake to believe that the same would not happen to 
them again once they emigrated west. 
If not withstanding past treaties, new states have been formed around them on 
this side of the Mississippi, and the general government cannot protect the 
Choctaws from the encroachments of those states, why may not new states be 
                                                 
69 Andrew Jackson, “First Annual Message, December 8, 1829,” Richardson, 
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formed around them on the other side of the Mississippi, and the general 
government, notwithstanding new treaties, find itself unable to protect the 
Indians from the encroachments of those states?70 
 
The Chickasaws soon faced a similar situation. 
On August 23, 1830, U.S. commissioners addressed those Chickasaws 
assembled at Franklin, Tennessee.  President Jackson, himself, attended this conference 
and gave the opening address.  In his speech, Jackson made clear that he would not step 
in to protect the Chickasaws from the demands of the southern states.  Jackson asked if 
the Chickasaws were “prepared and ready to submit [themselves] to the laws of 
Mississippi.”  He further claimed, “To these laws, where you are you must submit.  
There is no preventive—no alternative.  Your Great Father cannot nor can [the] 
Congress prevent it.  The States only can.”  Jackson continued to press the idea:  “The 
only plan by which this can be done and tranquility for your people obtained is that you 
pass across the Mississippi to a country in all respects equal if not superior to the one 
you have.  Your Great Father will give it you forever, that it may belong to you and 
your children while you shall exist as a nation, free from all interruptions.”  To promote 
the idea that removal would secure the Chickasaws’ right to self-government, Jackson 
stated:  
forget the prejudices you feel for the soil of your birth, and go to a land, where 
you can preserve your people as a nation.  Peace invites you there, annoyances 
will be left behind.  Within your limits no state or territorial authority will be 
permitted.  Intruders, traders, and above all else ardent spirits so destructive to  
                                                 
70 “Choctaws; Opinions and feelings of the Choctaws in regard to a removal,” 
The Missionary Herald, Containing the Proceedings of the American Board of 
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health and morals will be kept from among you[,] only as the laws and 
ordinances of your nation may sanction their admission.71 
 
On August 25, 1830, the Chickasaw delegates presented their response to 
Secretary of War John Eaton and General John Coffee.  The delegates expressed 
disappointment that after having shown hospitality to the earliest whites, they were now 
being commanded to give up their homes and move elsewhere.  Further, they 
challenged Jackson’s position about the president’s responsibility as mediator between 
American citizens and the citizens of foreign polities with which the United States had 
formed official agreements through the international norm of treaty making. 
We are informed by our father, the President of the United States, that states 
have been formed around us and now claim the right of extending her [i.e., their] 
laws throughout her territorial limits; consequently subject us to her civil and 
criminal laws.  Should we find it expedient to remain where we are and the 
States of Mississippi & Alabama extend their laws over us we would view it an 
act of usurpation on their parts unwarranted by the Constitution of the U. States 
and the treaties that now exist, unparalleled in history, and in many instances, 
the greatest grievances & hardships would be imposed upon us.72 
 
As this statement indicates, the Chickasaws still held the belief that the states should not 
be able to override the obligations the federal government had made on behalf of the 
entire confederation.  They soon learned, however, that this administration did not hold 
the same understanding. 
In their rebuttal of August 26, 1830, Eaton and Coffee described the nature of 
authority within the United States and that of the federal union of the states.  The 
commissioners pointed to Georgia’s cession of western lands to the federal government 
                                                 
71 “Ratified treaty no. 160, documents relating to the negotiation of the treaty of 
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in 1803 as justification for Mississippi’s and Alabama’s right to enact the laws as they 
had done so.   
Brothers.  It is not the fault of your Great Father that the laws of Mississippi are 
extended over you.  A long time ago, before the U. States government existed, 
Georgia existed as a state, and owned jurisdiction over all the lands which lie in 
your country.  When the king of Great Britain lost all this country by the right of 
conquest, Georgia became entitled to all her priveleges of government.  So it 
was with each State in the Union.  Afterwards, all united and formed our 
government called the Federal Government over which your Great Father now 
presides.  Each state gave up a portion of its rights but not all of them.  Those 
which they did not give up still belong to them.  Georgia did not surrender to the 
General Government any jurisdiction over the soil of her territory.  She retained 
the right to manage her laws and the people no matter whether red or white who 
live on them and to make them answerable for crimes, to punish them for 
wrongs committed, to make them pay taxes, to attend musters, to keep the 
[walks?] in repair and contribute to the support of the government when called 
upon to do so.  All these are rights which Mississippi & Alabama being parts of 
what Georgia was can enforce without the [cause?], consent, or interference of 
the President or Congress.73   
 
This statement reveals a direct betrayal by Jackson, who in 1818 had been part of the 
team of commissioners that promised the Chickasaws that no new states formed around 
them would be able to draw upon the legal claims of the original thirteen states.  As a 
result of these considerations, the delegates expressed their qualified consent to 
negotiate removal.  The final treaty included the Chickasaws right to void the agreement 
if they could not find suitable lands on which to settle west of the Mississippi.74  
Despite the intentions of Jackson’s administration to have the Chickasaws co-
locate with the Choctaws after removal, the Chickasaws did not necessarily agree.  
During an expedition to scout out new lands according to the Franklin treaty, Levi 
Colbert and “four others of the Chickasaw delegation” traveled to Texas to investigate 
the possibility of the Chickasaws acquiring lands among the Caddos.  According to 
                                                 
73 Ibid., passim. 
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Benjamin Reynolds, the chances were slim that the Chickasaws would agree to a 
subservient position to the Choctaws as long as Colbert was involved in the decision-
making process.  Reynolds believed that Colbert’s participation in the 1828 expedition 
had convinced him that the land to the west would never serve the Chickasaws as well 
as their traditional homelands east of the Mississippi River.75  Following the return of 
Colbert’s party in spring 1831, the Chickasaw leaders recommitted themselves to the 
preservation of Chickasaw sovereignty.76 
Chickasaw hopes to avoid removal received a boost following the perceived 
native victory in the Supreme Court decision for Worcester v. Georgia.77  Jackson’s 
commitment to preserving the Union in the face of the emerging Nullification Crisis, 
however, ensured that he would not risk upsetting the southern states on any other 
issue.78  Jackson’s refusal to support the Court’s decision sent Chickasaw aspirations 
crashing to the floor.79  By fall 1832, the Chickasaws and John Coffee found themselves 
back at the negotiating table.  Finally convinced that they could not stop the 
enforcement of Mississippi laws over themselves if they stayed, the Chickasaws 
determined “to seek a home in the west, where they may live and be governed by their 
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own laws.”80  The two sides reached an agreement for the Chickasaws to remove on 
October 20, 1832 in the Treaty of Pontotoc. 
Chickasaw consent to the details for their removal remained questionable, and 
the treaty’s ratification endure several years of debate and renegotiation.  Chickasaw 
leaders continued to push for stipulations that offered the tribe more economic and 
political security.81  When negotiations continued into November, U.S. commissioner 
John H. Eaton questioned whether the Senate would approve the treaty.  According to 
Eaton, the treaty was “based wholly upon new principles [than previous ones with other 
native groups] . . . . the [Government] is a mere trustee for the Indians [and] the whole 
proceeds of sale are to belong to the Chickasaws.”82  Therefore, it is clear that the 
Chickasaws sought to secure their financial security in the face of seeming defeat.  In 
another request, the Chickasaws expressed their wish to obtain land from the Caddos in 
Texas.  If allowed to do so, the Chickasaws requested that “The UStates guarantee 
exemption from State laws if Texas should ever be acquired” by the United States.83  
The request was left out of the official treaty, however, as the United States ultimately 
refused to buy the Chickasaws land in Mexican territory. 
Although Texas was still a Mexican territory, the Chickasaws’ request reveals 
that their leaders were quite attuned to the United States national political scene.  
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Further, it suggests an understanding of the incorporative nature of the expanding 
American empire, and the Chickasaws’ belief that only the president’s adherence to his 
constitutional and diplomatic duties as the mediator between the citizens of the United 
States and their Native American neighbors could protect them from the individual 
ambitions of the states.  Without a voice in Congress, only the president, as the chief 
executive of the federal union, could protect them from the territorial demands of 
Americans as their British father, the king, had tried to protect their ancestors against 
the demands of the colonists following the Seven Years’ War. 
On November 22, the Chickasaw chiefs, under the leadership of Levi Colbert, 
submitted a memorial to Jackson.  Colbert and the chiefs asserted that the states’ 
extension of their laws over the Chickasaws had compelled them to accept removal.   
It is true that my Nation become willing to sell their Country, to put down that 
bitter question of State Sovereignty, to keep peace in the white family, to 
preserve the Union of the United States whose friendship and protection we 
want, and our selves, to get away from the troubles which our white brothers 
fixed upon us.  It is the result of our weakness and we surrender our Country to 
cure the evils we never created.84 
 
In this statement, Colbert and the chiefs revealed their understanding of how much their 
own local situation was connected to the entire American political scene.  Further, the 
Chickasaw leaders acknowledged that they understood that Native Americans must 
serve as Jackson’s sacrificial lambs.  When he upheld the claims of Georgia, Alabama, 
and Mississippi against the authority of the U.S. Supreme Court concerning Indian 
Removal, Jackson betrayed his fatherly duties in order to guarantee his successful 
                                                 
84 “Memorial of the Chickasaw Chiefs to Andrew Jackson, November 22, 
1832,” Letters Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, Chickasaw Agency, National 
Archives Microfilms Publication, microcopy 234, reel 136 (hereinafter referred to as 
M234, R136), frames 276-290; quote on frame 286. 
 206 
opposition to South Carolina’s assertion of sovereignty in the Nullification Crisis 
without provoking the dissolution of the union by the southern states.  By publicly 
accepting that the president did not have the power to stop the southern states from 
asserting their laws over the Indians—both in this memorial and in the preamble to the 
Treaty of Pontotoc—the Chickasaws acknowledged how powerless they had been made 
by the mutually beneficial lies Jackson and southern statesmen told them to secure their 
removal.85 
*************** 
The Chickasaws’ acceptance of Jackson’s lies reveals a desire to secure their 
existence as an independent sovereign entity free from the intrusive power of the 
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individual states.  The rhetoric of removal had revealed an important lesson to 
Chickasaw leaders:  when united behind a shared purpose, the states could exert power 
over Native American groups by compelling the president to ignore his responsibilities 
as mediator between his red and white children.  Nor would they forget how that lesson 
applied to understanding the nature of the American empire, which eventually 
incorporated new territories as equal states imbued with the same power as the original 
thirteen.  Dissatisfied with the terms offered by Coffee during the negotiations at 
Pontotoc and skeptical of the treatment they would receive once in the West, the 
Chickasaws continued to press their concerns.  Although they were willing to accept 
their immediate fate in a somewhat quiet fashion, they certainly were not willing to let 
Jackson believe that he had fooled them.   
In their memorial to the president on November 22, 1832, the chiefs openly 
questioned whether they could trust “this president and the constitution which rules 
him” to uphold his promise—made during the Franklin negotiations in 1830—of 
undisturbed freedom if they chose to remove west.  Therefore, the chiefs included an 
appeal to the president’s Constitutional duties as the United States representative to the 
world.  As a result, the Chickasaws called on Jackson to work with the Senate  
to defend the powerless, and show to the world, that—that spirit of liberty and 
equality, which distinguishes the United States from all the Empires is not as 
many in the world might imagine, a jealously and defense of their own particular 
rights, an unwillingness to be oppressed themselves, but a high respect for the 
rights of Others, an unwillingness, that any man high or low should be 
wronged.86 
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Despite such a high-minded call for Jackson to think of the United States as a beacon 
for change within the world of international relations, the president did not bite, or 
perhaps he was unable to comply.   
After the Senate ratified the Treaty of Pontotoc, President Jackson attempted to 
appoint men to survey the ceded lands.  He initially sought to employ the services of 
Robert J. Chester who was ultimately “rejected” because he was not “a citizen of the 
State of Mississippi.”  According to John Coffee,  
“The President at first determined not to nominate again, but on reflection and 
the advice of his Cabinet he did agree to it, to save the public interest—when 
John Bell of Miss was appointed surveyor and on account of part of the ceded 
lands being in Alabama they did appt. one man from that State all the balance of 
the officers were appointed from Miss.”87   
 
Clearly, this reveals a limit to the amount of culpability that we can place on Jackson 
alone for effecting the eventual removal of the eastern Indians.  Jackson could not 
pursue his own personal agendas with unchecked authority, nor could he run roughshod 
over states which held de facto control over issues on the ground and could compel the 
executive to certain actions through their representatives in the U.S. Congress. 
Jackson’s betrayal of his duties as the Chickasaws’ protector concerning their 
relations with the American states did not dissuade the Chickasaws from attempting to 
hold this and future presidents to that standard.  The chiefs appealed to the president to 
protect them from the oppressive reach of the Mississippians and Alabamians who 
continued to intrude upon the Chickasaws to acquire their lands and profit off their 
misfortune.   
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Despite ratification of the Treaty of Pontotoc the previous year, the Chickasaw 
council elected a delegation to travel to Washington, D.C., to meet with President 
Jackson in spring 1834.  The purpose of this mission was to propose certain 
amendments to the Treaty of Pontotoc, none of which rescinded the Chickasaws’ 
ultimate acceptance of removal.  The delegates were Levi Colbert, George Colbert, 
Isaac Albertson, Henry Love, Benjamin Love, and Martin Colbert.  Although he 
attempted to make the journey, Levi Colbert fell ill enroute.  As his brother was unable 
to complete the journey, George Colbert assumed his old position as speaker to the 
United States for the Chickasaws during these negotiations.88 
The Treaty of Pontotoc was amended on May 24, 1834 to favor the economic 
interests of the Chickasaws over those of the United States.  First, the treaty appointed a 
committee of Chickasaw leaders—Ishtehotopa, Levi Colbert, George Colbert, Martin 
Colbert, Isaac Albertson, Henry Love, and Benjamin Love—to oversee the sale of the 
individual allotments as an attempt to curb the ability of settlers and speculators to 
swindle unsuspecting Chickasaws out of their lands.  In order for a sale to be legitimate, 
two of these seven men had to witness and sign the deed.  As Levi Colbert died on June 
2—only nine days after the treaty was signed—the agreement also allowed the chiefs to 
select a replacement so that the Chickasaws would never be without a leader whose 
duty was to ensure the safety and security of all the members of the nation.  Second, the 
amount of land allotted to each individual Chickasaw would be increased over that of 
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the 1832 treaty, and the proceeds of each sale would go directly to the seller.  Third, and 
finally, the treaty required the United States to provide $3,000 a year for fifteen years 
“for the education and instructions within the United States of such children . . . as the 
seven persons named in the treaty to which this treaty is a supplement, and their 
successors, with the approval of the agent, from time to time may select and 
recommend.”89  This provision allowed the Chickasaws to continue educating their 
future leaders to better understand how to negotiate their peoples' continued 
independence in spite of the power the United States wielded in their world. 
*************** 
Despite their agreement to remove, the Chickasaws did not yet have a territory 
to move to west of the Mississippi River.  For the next few years, Chickasaw leaders 
sent two expeditions west to look for lands and an arrangement that would preserve 
their nation’s sovereignty.  Since the 1820s, federal officials had been pushing the 
Chickasaws to settle in the Choctaw lands of what is present-day southern Oklahoma.  
Neither the Chickasaws nor the Choctaws found this idea overly appealing.  According 
to U.S. Secretary of War C.A. Harris, the Chickasaws “were not satisfied with any part 
of the unappropriated lands, and the Choctaws being unwilling to sell any portion of 
theirs, and the Chickasaws being unwilling to accede to a proposition to unite with the 
Choctaws, no arrangement could be made for their permanent settlement.”90  The two 
groups ultimately resolved their differences when, as a last resort, the Chickasaws 
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ultimately agreed to accept a diminished, semi-sovereign status as a district within the 
Choctaw nation.91 
By fall 1836, the seizure of the Chickasaws’ lands east of the Mississippi was 
well underway, leaving them a “people without a home.”  Both native and western 
notions of political relations recognized the rightful ownership of a territory as a 
requirement for the recognition of and the right to exercise sovereignty.  In September, 
the chiefs submitted a memorial to President Jackson, in which they characterized the 
Chickasaws’ position as being “surrounded by men whose language they can neither 
speak nor understand; subject to laws of which they are wholly ignorant, degraded, 
debased, and ruined by strong drink and vicious habits, and pursuits.”  Further, they 
indicated that their resistance to obtaining land from the Choctaws was waning.92  
Despite past differences, the Chickasaws most likely believed that their common 
cultures and shared experiences over the previous century would allow the Choctaws to 
understand their plight and help them protect their own identity better than any of the 
other western native groups with whom they had contemplated obtaining land. 
Over the next month, the Chickasaws’ awaited the President’s advice 
concerning how much they should offer to the Choctaws in order to obtain an outright 
purchase.  Their request went unanswered, however, as the President refused to weigh 
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in on the subject.93  Despite the fact that Jackson’s administration had been pushing the 
consolidation of the Chickasaws into the Choctaw territory for several years, federal 
officials apparently wanted any subsequent agreement between the two native groups to 
appear as if it was an arrangement made at the behest of both parties, independent of 
American influence. 
On November 12, 1836, the Chickasaw council commissioned James Perry, 
John McLish, Pitman Colbert, James Brown, and Isaac Albertson to travel west to 
negotiate with the Choctaws once again.94  As their previous attempts to purchase land 
outright from the Choctaws had failed, the commissioners aimed to obtain a tract “to be 
held in fee simple for ever,” but they recognized that such might not occur and further 
empowered the commissioners to do their best obtain a permanent home for their 
people regardless.95  The council authorized one million dollars “for the purchase of a 
Tract of Country destined for the residence of the Chickasaw Indians.”  As the 
Chickasaws did not have such a large sum of money readily available, the funds were to 
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be taken from the proceeds accrued once their homelands were sold, “subject to the 
approval of the President of the United States.”96 
With the assistance of U.S. agents, the delegates arranged a council with the 
Choctaw leaders at Doaksville shortly after the New Year.  In their first address to the 
Choctaws on January 11, 1837, the Chickasaw commissioners stated their desire “to 
propose a District of country of the Choctaw by purchase, to be governed by our own 
laws & regulations.”97  Once again, the Choctaws denied this request.  At this point, the 
Chickasaw delegates revealed the truly desperate nature of their situation.   
As [the Choctaws] are opposed to ceding a portion of [their] country to the 
Chickasaws, to be governed by their own laws and regulations . . . We the 
undersigned Commissioners on the part of the Chickasaw tribe of Indians, do 
propose to obtain of the Choctaw Nation the privilege of forming a District 
within the limits of their country, to be called the Chickasaw district of the 
Choctaw Nation; to be placed on an equal footing with the other districts of said 
nation.98   
 
Such a request illustrates that the Chickasaws still relied on colonial-era forms of native 
diplomacy to conduct themselves in the international arena.  By asking if they could 
become an equal unit of the Choctaw Nation, the Chickasaws offered to place 
themselves into the nation-within-a-nation status that had existed among Native 
American polities for centuries.  Although the Choctaws proved amenable to such an 
arrangement, several details had to be ironed out first.   
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Chickasaw-Choctaw Agreement, January 17, 1837,” p. 421. 
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Both sides had to agree upon the area to which the Chickasaws would be entitled 
to settle.  The Choctaws proposed that the Chickasaws accept a portion of their lands in 
the south-central portion of what is present-day Oklahoma.99  The Chickasaw 
commissioners rejected this proposition at first.  They claimed the land’s poor soil and 
lack of timber would perpetuate a reliance on subsistence hunting among the 
Chickasaws.  Without the ability to adopt an agricultural lifestyle, they argued, their 
people would be able to survive the future encroachment of American and western 
society into their world.100  
The Chickasaw rejection of the Choctaws’ proposal threatened to end the 
negotiations once again.  The Choctaw commissioners reminded the Chickasaw 
commissioners that their first duty was to provide for their own people.  As the 
Chickasaws were unwilling to accept their offer, therefore, the Choctaw commissioners 
stated that they could “negotiate no further.”101  Rather than lose the opportunity at 
hand, the Chickasaw commissioners played dumb as a way of begging forgiveness to 
bring the Choctaws back to the negotiating table.  The Chickasaw Commissoners stated, 
“We were misinformed as to the country which you were willing to assign us as a 
District for our people, and regret the haste with which we came to a conclusion 
                                                 
99 “R.M. Jones et al. to the Chickasaw Commissioners, Jany 14th 1837,” Litton, 
ed., “The Negotiations Leading to the Chickasaw-Choctaw Agreement, January 17, 
1837,” p. 422. 
100 “J. McLish, Pitman Colbert &c.&c. to the, Chiefs, Captains, & Warriors of 
the Choctaw Nation, January 14, 1837,” Litton, ed., “The Negotiations Leading to the 
Chickasaw-Choctaw Agreement, January 17, 1837,” pp. 422-423. 
101 “Israel Folsom et al. to the Chickasaw Commissioners, Jany 14th 1837,” 
Litton, ed., “The Negotiations Leading to the Chickasaw-Choctaw Agreement, January 
17, 1837,” p. 423. 
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respecting it, and are now willing to accept the District you are willing to set apart for 
us.”102   
Once both sides agreed to the exact location of the Chickasaw District, 
Chickasaw compensation of the Choctaws for the land in question had to be determined.  
Although they were compelled to accept the Choctaws’ proposition for where their 
district would be located, the Chickasaw Commissioners were able to negotiate a price 
of $530,000 to be paid out of the proceeds from the sale of their land in Alabama and 
Mississippi.  The Chickasaw agreed to pay this amount in specie that they did not 
control.  The Chickasaw paid $30,000 up front; the federal government held the 
remaining sum in trust.  Although many native individuals had become familiar with the 
concept of purchasing goods and services with currency over the previous quarter-
century, neither Chickasaw nor Choctaw society had developed its own reserve to back 
the notes they used to engage in the nineteenth century economy.  The United States 
would include interest accrued from the remaining $500,000 as part of the Choctaw 
annuities as negotiated in the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek—the Choctaw removal 
treaty signed in 1832.  The articles concerning monetary issues in the treaty secured the 
United States’ involvement in both Chickasaw and Choctaw issues for the foreseeable 
future. 
The Chickasaw and Choctaw commissioners formalized their agreement on 
January 17, 1837, in the Treaty of Doaksville.  The treaty established the existence of 
the Chickasaws as one of four districts within the Choctaw Nation.  Despite the absence 
                                                 
102 “J. McLish et al. to the Choctaw Commissioners, Jany 14th 1837,” Litton, ed., 
“The Negotiations Leading to the Chickasaw-Choctaw Agreement, January 17, 1837,” 
p. 423. 
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of an American’s signature from the official treaty, the agreement to pay the Choctaws 
with U.S. currency derived from sales overseen and administered by the federal and 
state governments confirmed that the Chickasaws would remain dependent on the 
United States.  Theoretically, the Chickasaws now existed as a nation within a nation 
within a nation; however, they did not necessarily see it that way.  The Chickasaws did 
not envision a single, vertical relationship of dominant and subordinate nations with the 
United States at the highest rung, the Choctaws in the middle, and themselves at the 
bottom.  Rather, Chickasaw diplomacy following removal reveals that they believed 
they had only created another nation within a nation system by agreeing to settle among 
the Choctaws, one that was parallel to, not subsumed within the already existent system 
that structured their position vis-à-vis the United States. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE ROAD TO CONSOLIDATION 
 
On October 2, 1854, delegates appointed by the Chickasaw Council submitted a 
memorial to the General Council of the Choctaw Nation protesting the Choctaws’ 
treatment of their adopted brothers over the previous seventeen years.  The delegates 
claimed the Choctaws had taken advantage of the Chickasaws when they were in a 
weakened state.  The delegates offered several examples to support their claim.  First, 
the Choctaws had refused the Chickasaws any money from the Choctaw National Fund 
to pay for the political administration of their district.  As they had already paid the 
Choctaws for the land within their district, the delegates argued that, as constituent 
members of the Choctaw Nation, the Chickasaws should have equal access to any 
money set aside for the general operating costs of the central government.  Second, the 
Chickasaws accused the Choctaws of imposing their own legal system, even concerning 
matters of an internal nature.  The delegates claimed, therefore, that the Choctaws had 
denied their people “the rights and privileges” guaranteed by the Treaty of Doaksville. 
The delegates argued that the Chickasaws had not intended to become a 
tributary state to the Choctaws when they accepted the terms of the Treaty of 
Doaksville.  They asserted, “the Chickasaw District were to be placed on an equal 
footing with the other Districts in all respects except a voice in the management and 
consideration paid for those privileges.”  Instead, the Chickasaws had been excluded 
from their rightful access to the Choctaw fund and had their rights infringed upon by an 
unrelated majority.  Consequently, the delegates concluded, “the experience of about 
fifteen years has shown the original design of making two Nations as it were to be 
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moulded into one, by political ties, and amalgamation, was all a mistaken notion.”  If 
the Choctaws would not remedy the situation, the Chickasaw delegates requested the 
right to secede from the Choctaw Nation in order to re-establish their society as an 
independent and fully sovereign polity.1 
This chapter examines the Chickasaws’ efforts to re-establish their autonomy in 
the two decades after removal.  Following their agreement to become a district within 
the Choctaw Nation, the Chickasaws faced three main diplomatic challenges that 
provoked a substantial change in the political organization of their society.  First, 
having accepted territory on the western edge of the American empire, the Chickasaws 
worked to ensure the United States protected their physical and economic security 
against challenges that emerged across their southern and western borders.  Second, the 
prolonged nature of removal left the Chickasaws in an economic state of dependency to 
the American union.  Third, the Chickasaws found their autonomy threatened by their 
incorporated status as a district within the Choctaw Nation, a status that they accepted 
in the Treaty of Doaksville.  Despite their attempts to compel their elder brothers to 
uphold their duties according to the standards of international alliances, the Chickasaws 
emerged from the 1840s convinced of the need to reestablish their society as an 
independent, sovereign power within the international community of actors.  Although 
factions reemerged during the 1840s that competed for control over the Chickasaw 
government and national fund, these factions reconciled their differences behind their 
shared desire to regain their economic independence from the Americans and their 
                                                 
1 “Letter to the Chiefs of the Choctaw Nation from Winchester Colbert, Davis 
James, Sampson Folsom, and Jackson Frazier, Oct. 2, 1852,” Box 7, Folder 2, Peter 
Perkins Pitchlynn Papers, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma 
Libraries, Norman, Oklahoma. 
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political independence from the Choctaws.  As part of this reconciliation process, 
Chickasaw leaders consolidated their society through the adoption of a new political 
structure that blended both native and western concepts and set the stage for the creation 
of the Chickasaw Nation during the 1850s. 
*************** 
Following the negotiations at Doaksville, the Chickasaw commissioners 
returned to their homelands east of the Mississippi River.  They presented the results of 
their mission before the Chickasaw council, who approved of the arrangement and 
immediately set about securing a safe and expedient process for their peoples’ 
emigration to their new lands in the Indian Territory.  Having benefitted from observing 
the removal of the Choctaws and the Creeks, Chickasaw leaders made requests of the 
president designed to make their journey less arduous and destructive to their people.  
On February 17, 1837, the Chickasaw Chiefs submitted a memorial to the president in 
which they laid out their own design for removal.  The chiefs informed Jackson that 
Their delegation who have just returned from the Choctaw Country, have 
apprised them, that in consequence of the great scarcity of provisions, produced 
by the emigration of the Creeks, and other causes, of the badness of the roads, in 
the country through which they would have to pass, great privation and suffering 
and heavy expense would most probably attend the removal of their people, by 
land, and in the mode usually adopted, by contract.  And they much fear, that the 
wants of their people would be unattended to, and their comfort neglected by 
Contractors; whose object it must generally be to make their contract profitable, 
and under circumstances of scarcity and high prices, they might be induced to 
stint the allowance and comforts of those under their charge. 
 
As a result, the Chickasaws requested that the President appoint “one or more discreet 
persons be appointed, to superintend the removal of such of their tribe as shall be in 
readiness to start [west], in the ensuring spring.”  In order to avert potential profiteering 
and corruption by the appointed individual, the Chiefs suggested that the superintendent 
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should be provided a “fixed” salary to “be defrayed out of the Fund of [the Chickasaw] 
Nation.”  Further, the Chickasaw leaders wished their people to travel via river as much 
as possible rather than over land as their predecessors had done.2   
The Chickasaw request for an official U.S. agent to manage their removal 
reveals their continued belief that they should actively participate in forming their 
society’s relationships with American officials.  To fill this role, the Chickasaws 
suggested that the President appoint either Henry R. Carter or Captain Luther Chase of 
Little Rock to act as the superintendent for their removal.3  Previous agents had 
subverted the Chickasaws interests to those of the States.  As a result, it is quite possible 
that the Chickasaws saw the need to reassert their right to have a say in who would be 
their U.S. Agent.  Although he complied with the Chickasaws’ request to appoint an 
official agent to oversee the Chickasaw removal, Jackson did not go so far as to let them 
chose the individual who would fill the role.  Instead, he appointed Arthur Martin 
Montgomery (A.M.M.) Upshaw of Pulaski, Tennessee, as the Superintendent of 
Chickasaw Removal.  On March 30, 1837, Commissioner of Indian Affairs Carey A. 
Harris informed the Chickasaw chiefs that Upshaw would “soon be in the Chickasaw 
country to enter upon the duties of his appointment.”4   
*************** 
                                                 
2 “Memorial of the Chiefs and Headmen of the Chickasaw Nation to the 
President of the United States, 17 Feby 1837,” M234, R137, FF 144-147.  This letter 
can also be found as “Chickasaw Chiefs to the President, February 17, 1837,” in U.S. 
Congress, House of Representatives, 27th Congress, 3rd Session, House Report no. 271, 
pp. 60-61. 
3 Ibid. 
4 “C.A.H to Ish-te-ho-to-pa, Tisho-Mingo, William McGilvery and others, 
Chiefs and head men of the Chickasaw Tribe of Red people, March 30, 1837,” in 
“Letters Sent Concerning Chickasaw Removal, compiled 1832-1861,” 1:139. 
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Even before removal was complete, the Chickasaws knew that securing the 
southern and western borders of their newly purchased territory would be one of their 
primary concerns.  The recent independence of the Republic of Texas had renewed 
unrest among white settlers and the Indians of the southern Plains, such as the 
Comanche, Kickapoos, Kiowas, and Wichitas.  The southern Plains Indians were 
already in a highly agitated state of affairs due to Texans’ commitment to expel them 
from the newly formed Republic’s borders.  The emigration of so-called Civilized 
Tribes into their traditional hunting grounds at the behest of the United States only 
served to exacerbate the problem. 
United States officials planned to use what they considered assimilation into 
western society by removed Indians such as the Chickasaws to promote the same 
among the Indian societies of the southern Plains.  What they failed to recognize, 
however, was that although the Chickasaws were adapting to survive a world in which 
they could not escape the Americans’ influence, this did not mean the same thing as 
assimilation.  Although individual Chickasaws, Cherokees, Choctaws, and Creeks may 
have wished to integrate themselves fully into American society, from a societal 
perspective, the integration of western social and cultural norms into native societies 
was more likely done to preserve and protect their society from extinction, not to hasten 
its demise.  Further, their mistaken faith in the ability of the removed tribes to promote 
“civilization” among the “wild” Plains tribes promoted policies that supported the belief 
among native leaders that their polities’ relationships with the United States were akin 
to the nation-within-a-nation concept that was a part of native diplomacy prior to the 
United State’s creation. 
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First proposed by Chickasaw agent G.P. Kingsbury in 1837, United States 
officials advocated the convening of inter-tribal councils among the removed and Plains 
Indians as a method of coordinating peace on the frontier, with the United States 
guiding from above the fray.  Kingsbury saw the benefits of such a policy in many 
ways.  First, Kingsbury believed that interaction with the recently removed southern 
tribes would promote a western notion of civilization among the Indians of the southern 
Plains.  Second, he advocated the plan as a method of introducing more native leaders 
to the American style of governance and therefore possible incorporation into the 
United States.  Kingsbury proposed, “In short time, if such should be the policy of the 
Government, they might, at this general council, elect delegates to Congress, which 
would open a new field of ambition for them [statehood].”5   
Reception to Kingsbury’s concept within the federal government was mixed.  
Acting Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the Western Territory William Armstrong 
supported inter-tribal councils and promoted the idea among Native American leaders.  
On October 1, 1838, Armstrong informed the Choctaw Council—which now included a 
position for the Chickasaws’ representative—that the Senate had recently passed a bill 
that promoted that “a Council composed of delegates from the several tribes [should] be 
convened once a year” to promote “peace and friendship among the tribes.”  Armstrong 
also commented that membership in the confederation would not be mandatory, and 
that any “regulations [passed by the council] shall not take effect until approved by the 
                                                 
5 “G.P. Kinsbury to Hon. Lewis F. Linn, September 10, 1837,” in U.S. House of 
Representatives, “Western Frontier. Correspondence on the Subject of the protection of 
the Western Frontier, presented to the House of Representatives by Mr. Harrison, of 
Missouri, February 14, 1838,” 25th Cong., 2d Sess., House Document No. 276, pp. 14-
15, quote on p. 15; David LaVere, Contrary Neighbors: Southern Plains and Removed 
Indians in Indian Territory (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2000), p. 92. 
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President of the United States.”6  Others in the executive branch, such as Commissioner 
of Indian Affairs T.H. Crawford, disagreed with Kingsbury and Armstrong.  They did 
not share their positive outlook for the potential that intertribal councils could have in 
Indian Territory.  The proposition of an alliance among multiple tribes provoked 
outright fear among some officials and citizens living in the states bordering Indian 
Territory.7 
Although Kingsbury’s idea did not gain much support within the Van Buren 
administration, executive opposition to intertribal councils did not stop the Indians from 
convening such meetings themselves.  Even before Armstrong submitted his appeal for 
the Choctaw Council to vote in favor of an intertribal council, the Cherokee Old Settlers 
attempted to assemble such a convention on their own.  The Cherokee leaders invited 
“all different tribes who were friendly to the United States” to meet in September 1838 
“for the purpose of renewing the friendship once existing among [their] forefathers.”8  
In all, ten different Indian tribes sent representatives to the council, most notably the 
Cherokee and the Creeks both of which had leaders who assumed prominent roles in the 
subsequent compact that emerged among the attendees.  Such a unilateral action, 
seemingly taken without the direction of United States officials provoked a sense of fear 
                                                 
6 “Wm. Armstrong to the Choctaw Council, Oct. 1st 1838,” Folder 55, Box 1, 
Peter Perkins Pitchlynn Collection, Western History Collections, University of 
Oklahoma Libraries, Norman, OK; LaVere, Contrary Neighbors, pp. 91-126. 
7 “T. Hartley Crawford to Hon. J.R. Poinsett, November 25, 1838,” in United 
States, Office of Indian Affairs, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 
for the years 1826-1839 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, [1826-1839]), 
pp. 455-456; accessed online via Documents Related to Indian Affairs, University of 
Wisconsin Digital Collections, http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History.Ann 
Rep2639, April 22, 2012. 
8 “The Late Indian Council,” Arkansas State Gazette (Little Rock, AR), October 
10, 1838, Issue 43, col. D, 19th Century U.S. Newspapers, web, accessed on April 23, 
2012. 
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among Americans living along the western borders of Arkansas and Missouri.  Reports 
of Mexican intrigues designed to entice the Prairie and Southern Plains tribes into 
warfare against Texas led many settlers to fear that such machinations would threaten 
their own security as well.  In a letter to Tennessee Governor Newton Cannon, dated 
August 8, 1838, General Edmund P. Gaines expressed his concern that the Cherokees 
intended to organize a multinational Indian force to campaign against American 
settlements in Arkansas and Missouri.9  Gaines fear did not come to fruition, however, 
and Arbuckle, Cherokee Agent Montfort Stokes, and Creek Agent James Logan helped 
to alleviate settler anxiety through the local press.10 
In his report investigating accusations of fraud in the removal of the 
southeastern Indians, Hitchcock reported that the Cherokees, Creeks, Choctaws, and 
Chickasaws had maintained “constantly increasing intercourse” among themselves 
                                                 
9 “Threatened Indian Hostilities on the South-western Frontier,” Arkansas State 
Gazette (Little Rock, AR), September 19, 1838, Issue 40, col. D and “The Nashville 
Alarm,” Arkansas State Gazette (Little Rock, AR), September 19, 1838, Issue 40, col. 
E, 19th Century U.S. Newspapers, web, accessed on April 23, 2012; Grant Foreman, 
Pioneer Days in the Early Southwest (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1926), pp. 275-
277. 
10 “The Late Indian Council”; Ethan Allen Hitchcock, “Lieutenant Hitchcock's 
report respecting the affairs of the Cherokees, December 2, 1841,” in U.S. House of 
Representatives, “Frauds Upon Indians—Right of the President to Withhold Papers, 
February 25, 1843,” 27th Cong., 3d Sess., House Report No. 217, pp. 26-27; and Grant 
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since 1838.11  Hitchcock did not express alarm that the nations had convened in what 
seems to have been a militaristic pact as earlier officials had; rather, he remarked that 
such an action coincided with American goals to promote peace and stability in the 
southwestern borderlands. 
I am very far from regarding the prospect of these general councils as a source 
of danger to the peace of the United States, but directly the reverse.  If all the 
Indians in this quarter were in the condition of the Osages or of the Sacs and 
Foxes, such councils might, possibly, prepare the way for spasmodic efforts of a 
threatening character against the white settlements, under the influence of some 
real or imagined wrong; but such a result is not to be anticipated when the 
councils shall fall under the influence of the Cherokees in their present advanced 
intelligence.”12 
 
As Hitchcock’s passage indicates, federal officials on the ground believed that 
communal councils, coordinated and presided over by some of the so-called civilized 
tribes, would provide an arena through which the Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, 
and Creeks could take an active role in securing themselves through diplomatic 
means.13   
The ability to convene in international councils promoted an understanding 
among Native Americans that removal had not condemned them to a semi-sovereign 
status under the permanent hegemony of the United States.  Although the Chickasaws 
seem to have abstained from attending the international councils in the early years of 
their tenure in Indian Territory, they neither disagreed with nor failed to understand the 
significance of such activities.  Their absence from the 1838 convention was most likely 
due to their preoccupation with their emigration and their obligation to act as a member 
                                                 
11 Hitchcock, “Lieutenant Hitchcock's report respecting the affairs of the 
Cherokees, December 2, 1841,” pp. 26-27. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ibid.; Foreman, ed., A Traveler in Indian Territory, p. 70. 
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of the Choctaw Nation, who determined not to send a delegation.  However, they did 
not shy away from working with the other removed Indians in later years when it came 
to providing for their own territorial security in these new lands west of the Mississippi 
River.  They even hosted a council in July 1849 to “make peace and smoke the pipe” 
with members of the Wichitas and Caddoes with whom they had been fighting.14 
When Creek leaders organized another grand council in the spring of 1842, the 
Chickasaw Council sent several delegates at the behest of William Armstrong.  The 
Council empowered these men “to act in all instances in our place to strengthen the 
bonds of Friendship and to [coordinate] with them in forming any plan for the welfare 
and hapiness of all our red brethren.”15  Upon their return from the Creek council, the 
Chickasaw delegates presented tobacco and wampum their “elder brother the Creeks 
sent [the Chickasaws] as a Token of their Friendship.”  The Chickasaws in turn smoked 
the tobacco and described the ceremonial nature of such action in a reply to the Creek 
chiefs:  
Your good Talk we have received and have smoked your Tobacco with our 
King, your Beads our chiefs warriors & woman & children have taken hold of 
the same as if they had have been your hands, we send you a small peace of 
Tobacco and some beads as a Token of our friendship, when you smoke our  
                                                 
14 “Ann H. Upshaw to Mr. Samuel Crockette, July 10th. 1849,” McCutchen 
Collection – Correspondence; Robb, E.C. – Walker, William, IV-G-5 Box 3; Ms. Ac. 
No. 530, Tennessee State Library and Archives, Nashville, TN. 
15 Quoted passage is from “Isaac Albertson and Sloan Love to Genl. Roley 
McIntosh and other members of the grand Council, May 10th 1842,” in “Record Book 
of the Chickasaw Nation, 1837-1855,” p. 15, Federal, Foreign Relations and Court 
Records, Microfilm Roll 030, Chickasaw Nation Records [Microfilm Publication], 
Indian Archives Division, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma City, OK.  
Hereinafter referred to as CKN30.  For more information about the Chickasaws’ 
participation in this conference, see “Wm. Armstrong to Isaac Albertson, April 24, 
1842,” in “Record Book of the Chickasaw Nation, 1837-1855,” CKN30, p. 8 and 
LaVere, Contrary Neighbors, pp. 94-100. 
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Tobacco be assured that you have the good wishes in your undertaking of your 
Brothers the Chickasaws.16 
 
As these ceremonial components of the 1842 council demonstrate, southeastern Native 
American groups continued to practice traditional forms of diplomacy, even as they 
incorporated western political concepts to argue that the United States should uphold its 
obligations to protect their younger, native brothers. 
In his justification of native-led international conventions, Hitchcock alluded to 
the fact that the United States may have even shied away from asserting their supposed 
hegemony over the removed tribes in order to perpetuate the illusion that “justice 
[would] be accorded to them by the United States.”17  This was certainly the case when 
the United States abstained from signing the Treaty of Doaksville as an active 
member—federal officials only signed the treaty as witnesses.  Part of the justice that 
federal officials should have accorded to removed Indians, however, was to take an 
active role in providing for Chickasaw security in this far-flung region of the United 
States.  The belief that United States would accord them justice would soon begin to 
erode among the Chickasaws in part due to a feeling of disingenuousness as American 
officials’ desired to hold the Chickasaws in a subjugated state in some matters while 
pretending to respect the autonomy and sovereignty of the Chickasaws in others. 
*************** 
According to the Chickasaws’ understanding of the removal negotiations, the 
federal government was required to protect the Chickasaws from all outside threats.  
                                                 
16 “Ish taho topa to Our Brothers the Creek Chiefs, July 24, 1842,” in “Record 
Book of the Chickasaw Nation, 1837-1855,” CKN30, p. 22. 
17 Hitchcock, “Lieutenant Hitchcock's report respecting the affairs of the 
Cherokees, December 2, 1841,” pp. 26-27. 
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This included threats created by the action of white people, regardless of any prior 
affiliation they may have had with the United States.  The immediate proximity to 
Texas created situations that prompted Chickasaw leaders to question federal agents’ 
commitment to uphold this duty.  As the sole U.S. Agent to the Chickasaw throughout 
the 1840s, Arthur Upshaw faced what may have been an impossible task:  to protect the 
rights of a people his own society believed were innately inferior and who had been 
conquered through removal.  Upshaw’s relationship with the Chickasaws over the next 
fifteen years, therefore, was tenuous at best. 
Fearful for their people’s safety should they attempt to settle in their district on 
the western end of the Choctaw territory, Chickasaw leaders turned to the federal 
government to help promote security in this land that they had recently purchased 
according to western custom.18  On September 24, 1839, “the King, chiefs &c of the 
Chickasaws [requested] permission to visit Washington . . . . to represent the propriety 
of establishing a military post to protect them from the roving Indians in their 
neighbourhood.”  Commissioner of Indian Affairs Crawford did not believe that a new 
military post was necessary.  According to Crawford, “Fort Towson appears to not be 
very distant from their district, and I should suppose would afford them all the 
protection necessary, but that is a subject which the Secretary of War will dispose of 
properly.”19  Consequently, the Chickasaws’ request went unanswered. 
                                                 
18 “G.P. Kingsbury to Capt. Wm. Armstrong, May 13th 1839,” M234, R137, 
FF500-507. 
19 “T.H.C. to William Armstrong, November 9th 1839,” in “Letters Sent 
Concerning Chickasaw Removal, compiled 1832-1861,” vol. 2, p. 69, PI-163, 252, 
Record Group 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, National Archives and 
Records Administration, Washington, DC.  Fort Towson was located about one mile 
from the Choctaw capitol of Doaksville, site of the 1837 negotiations for which the 
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The need for a closer military presence became even more pressing when 
unsettled Delawares, Shawnees, and Kickapoos started using the Chickasaw district to 
stage raids into Texas in the early 1840s.  In retaliation, Texans sometimes disregarded 
the international boundary between themselves and the United States to pursue the 
raiding Indians into Indian Territory.20  On July 10, 1841, Upshaw informed Armstrong 
that “a force of some fifteen men[,] citizens of the Republic of Texas[,] well armed 
marched into this nation in search of the Co sha too Indians that are settled on the 
Washita.”  According to Upshaw, the Indians retaliated, and he feared continued 
escalation would only drag the Chickasaws into the fray, as “several horses have 
already been stolen” from them.  As a result, he “ask[ed Armstrong] to call on the 
Commanding Genl of the 2nd Department of Western Division in the strongest possible 
manner, to have a force placed some where on the Washita.”21   
Armstrong, for his part, agreed with Upshaw.  On July 15, 1841, Armstrong 
recommended to Crawford that the federal government establish “a military post 
somewhere near the mouth of the Washita” to protect the removed tribes from possible 
mistaken recriminations by Texans against the southern Plains tribes with whom they 
were in conflict.22  This time, higher administration officials heeded the agent’s words.  
Secretary of War John Bell of Tennessee directed Colonel Zachary Taylor to choose a 
                                                                                                                                               
Chickasaw-Choctaw Treaty is named.  W.B. Morrison, “Fort Towson,” Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 8:2 (June 1930): 226-232. 
20 Gibson, The Chickasaws, pp. 188-190; LaVere, Contrary Neighbors, pp. 84-
88, 94-95. 
21 “A.M.M. Upshaw to Maj. Wm. Armstrong, July 10th 1841,” Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, Chickasaw Agency, 1824-1870, National 
Archives Microfilms Publication, Microcopy No. 234, Reel 138 (hereinafter referred to 
as M234, R138), Frames 0153-0154. 
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site for and begin construction of a fort in the Chickasaw District to provide stability in 
the region.  Taylor chose a spot located fifteen miles north of where the Washita drained 
into the Red River.  
Construction of the fort began in 1842.  In his annual report of the agency for 
1842, Upshaw was optimistic about the fort’s ability to secure the peace and happiness 
the Chickasaws.  Upshaw wrote, 
The Military post recently established on the False Washita, has been so far of 
great advantage.  The Chickasaws are now satisfied that the Government is 
determined to give them the protection which it agreed to do.  Before this post 
was established the Chickasaws were more exposed than any other nation of 
Indians, under the protection of the Government, and their losses by the 
depredations of these roving bands, have been very great. 
 
He even attributed the Chickasaws establishment of permanent homes in their own 
district—rather than remaining dispersed among the Choctaws—the fort’s presence.23  
Chickasaw leaders such as Isaac Albertson were less enthusiastic than Upshaw.  These 
men knew all too well that continued unrest between the Plains Indians and Texans 
ensured that the presence of federal troops during the construction would not be enough 
to stave off more violence against Chickasaw citizens.24 
Not only did the Texans’ ongoing war with the southern Plains tribes prompt 
Chickasaw appeals to the federal government for protection of their sovereign rights, so 
too did the actions of individual Texans against the Chickasaws themselves.  On May 9, 
1842, the Chickasaw Council informed Upshaw of the murder of a Chickasaw “by a 
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citizen of Texas, a Mr. Sowile [Sewell].”  The Chickasaws demanded that Upshaw 
pursue the apprehension and extradition of Sewell to stand trial in a U.S. court 
according to the provisions made between the United States and the Chickasaws in the 
Treaty of Hopewell of 1786.   
The 6[th] Article of the Treaty 1786 says if any citizen of the United States or 
person under their protection, shall commit a murder or robbery on any 
Chickasaw, such offenders shall be punished in the same manner as if the 
robbery or murder had been committed on a citizen of the United State.  Had the 
murder been committed on a citizen of the U. States he would have been 
demanded by the Government for trial.  As we are under the protection of the 
United States we believe it will be right and proper for you to demand the said 
murderer from the government of Texas, and have him tried for said crime . . . 
Should the U. States not demand him, it may be the cause of serious dificulties,  
We cannot say but the Friends of the deceased would retaliate the crime but 
should he be given up and receive the punishment due him, the Texans will find 
us as we have been their true friends, we trust and hope you will use all your 
influence to bring the offender to punishment and so doing you will receive the 
thanks of our whole Nation.25 
 
Despite his belief that whites were superior to Indians, Upshaw believed the United 
States should uphold their protective responsibilities laid out in the Chickasaws’ 
message.  In his account of the incident, Upshaw contended that the murder of  
Chee mi cha was completely unprovoked.  Despite the fact that Sewell was set to face 
trial in Texas, Upshaw offered a $100 reward to have Sewell delivered to him “on this 
side of the Red River.”  However, the agent had no takers and worried that “there will 
be no chance for me to get my hands on him” in order to allay the unrest he feared was 
brewing among the Chickasaws and Choctaws against the Texans.26  Despite Upshaw’s 
strong stance on behalf of the Chickasaws, he never brought Sewell to justice in the 
                                                 
25 “Isaac Albertson et al to A.M.M. Upshaw, May 9,1842,” in “Record Book of 
the Chickasaw Nation, 1837-1855,” CKN30, p. 13. 
26 “A.M.M. Upshaw to T.H. Crawford, July 20th 1842,” M234, R138, F1019-
1020. 
 232 
United States court system.  Nor, for that matter, was his demonstration able to stop 
Texan violence against individual Chickasaws.27 
The continued threat of violence from Texans probably helped Upshaw to 
overcome the next major challenge to his authority.  In summer 1842, Major James R. 
O'Neal of the 4th regiment and 4th brigade of the Texas Militia wrote to the chiefs and 
headmen of the Chickasaws and Choctaws inviting their assistance in “a campaign 
about the first of July next” against the southern Plains tribes along the Red River.28  
This invitation was done without coordinating with U.S. officials, who opposed the 
Texans’ and the Chickasaws' right to conduct diplomacy without their approval.  On 
July 5, 1842, Upshaw wrote to Isaac Albertson to let the Chickasaw chief know that he 
had heard of O'Neal's letter.  Upshaw reminded Albertson of the Chickasaws’ obligation 
to be dutiful children to their “Great Father, the President of the United States, who has 
always looked upon you as his favorite Red Children.”  As such, the Chickasaws were 
obligated to refrain from warfare unless the president called them to action.  Should the 
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Chickasaws have harbored any inclination to accept O’Neal’s offer, Upshaw asserted 
that “their is no other nation or Government on earth, that has or ever would have that 
Same feeling for your prosperity and happiness, as the Government of the United States 
will continue to have.”29   
The Chickasaws soon put Upshaw’s concerns to rest.  The agent informed 
Crawford that “A number of the Choctaws and Chickasaws came to see me [on July 5] . 
. .  and they appeared as indignant at the invitation as I was.”30  As the Chickasaws had 
expressed in their letter concerning the death of Chee mi cha, it was unlikely that they 
believed they should seek redress on their own.  They had committed themselves to a 
diplomatic arrangement that they had no inclination, or ability, to break. 
Upshaw’s inability to bring violent perpetrators to justice according to the 
international accords between the Chickasaws and the United States was only one area 
in which Chickasaw leaders deemed him unfit for his position as their agent.  More 
important was his inability to provide for the Chickasaws economic security, which was 
also threatened by their close proximity to Texas.  Early in their western tenure, 
Chickasaw leaders informed Upshaw of their disdain for the economic strain Texan 
intrusion put upon them.  They protested  
the intention of said citizens of Texas to bring in to our country corn and other 
produce, and thereby deprive us of the right and privilege of furnishing our own 
market with corn beef or anything else that we have to sell or dispose of in any 
way whatever, to the great injury of our natives and wholy contrary to the laws 
of nations and regardless of the treaty stipulations. 
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Consequently, they asked Upshaw to “have all intrusion of any kind wh[at]ever put a 
stop to Emediately.”31   
Upshaw lamented the fact that Texans could trade their wares in Indian 
Territory.32  He believed that it was not right for the federal government to deny the 
Chickasaws the opportunity to go into Texas while, at the same time, allowing Texans 
to “to come into their Nation [to] do all the trading they wish and are frequently 
employed to furnish our Military posts with corn beef &c.”33  In response to the 
Chickasaws’ protest, therefore, Upshaw requested a “small command [be dispatched 
from Fort Washita] with an order for those Citizens of Texas to stop their intrusions and 
return to the south side of the Red River.”34  However, Upshaw’s demand stemmed less 
from a desire to protect the Chickasaws’ financial security than it did from the fact that 
the Texans did not have to pay taxes to the United States.  As hard currency was scarce 
in the early 1840s due to a worldwide economic depression, Upshaw lamented that the 
Texans would sell their crops “at any sacrifice in order to obtain possession of current 
funds.”  He further objected to the fact that the federal government seemed to permit the 
Texas merchants “to sell their products on this side of the river free of duty.”  
Consequently, Upshaw recommended, “that some prohibitory regulations may be 
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adopted to protect our own people in this matter, and put an end to the constant drain of 
our money to a foreign Government, who owe us no allegiance, and pay us no duty.” 35   
Upshaw knew that he could not forbid the Texans from trading in the Indian 
Territory altogether.  Like many of his superiors, he believed that the interests of his 
own white society should be placed ahead of those of his native charges.  On the other 
hand, Upshaw did not seem to exhibit any social and cultural affinity for the Texans.  
Regardless, his desire to restrain Texan economic incursion into the United States via 
Indian Territory would not have mattered even if he had the Chickasaws’ support.  It is 
highly unlikely that his recommendations received much support from his superiors.  
Although Andrew Jackson would not annex Texas shortly after the Republic declared 
independence from Mexico in 1837, by the early 1840s, the Tyler administration in 
which Upshaw now toiled was in firm support of U.S. expansion across the North 
American continent, beginning with the immediate incorporation of the fledgling 
republic as the next state in the American union.36 
In an 1843 letter to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Chickasaw 
Commissioner Slone Love accused Upshaw of deliberately keeping the Chickasaws “in 
the dark about many thing of great importance about the manner in which our money 
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have been expended.”37  Despite the long tenure Upshaw enjoyed as an Indian Agent, 
he did not do so with the consent of his Chickasaw charges.  From 1844 until his 
replacement by Gabriel Long in 1851, the Chickasaws submitted several requests to 
Upshaw’s superiors to have him replaced as their agent.  In a memorial submitted to 
President Zachary Taylor on July 13, 1849, the Chickasaw chiefs stated that Upshaw 
had demonstrated that he was “incompetent to protect our people from the most glaring 
and palpable frauds or that he has no disposition to do so,” which they claimed was a 
stipulation of the treaty of 1834.38  The Council’s request indicates a desire among the 
Chickasaws to reassert their right to influence who should be their representative to the 
American government according to southeastern native diplomatic traditions that 
required diplomats to protect the interests of the society to which they were assigned as 
much as they would protect those of their own. 
*************** 
Although the establishment of Fort Arbuckle alleviated some of the Chickasaws’ 
concerns about their physical security, their overriding concern about Texans’ ability to 
undercut their economic prospects speaks to the severe state of economic dependency 
their society had fallen into because of removal.  Government agents and contractors 
had budgeted too tightly in anticipation of a fast and comprehensive emigration by all 
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the Chickasaws at once.  Some Chickasaws chose to travel on their own terms, 
however, which forced Chickasaw leaders to make continual requests to have more 
rations procured as those already purchased had spoiled.  As the cost of removal 
continued to rise, Chickasaw leaders began to question whether they would “derive 
[any] benefit from the national fund for some time to come.”39   
On September 24, 1839, Chickasaw leaders requested permission to travel to 
Washington to discuss the status of the “land sales, . . . especially those of the 
incompetent Indians and orphans.”40  According to Article 4 of the 1834 supplemental 
treaty, those funds paid for the purchase of incompetent and orphaned Chickasaws were 
to remain in the national fund “until such a time as the chiefs in council shall think it 
advisable to pay it” to the individual, or rightful heir, to whom the reservation 
belonged.41  Therefore, a considerable portion of removed Chickasaws did not have the 
individual funds to survive in the harsh, drought-ridden environment of Indian Territory 
upon their arrival.  These individuals often incurred debt from creditors all too willing 
to capitalize on their misfortune.  The leaders wanted the federal government to release 
the entire amount from these land sales to the incompetents and orphans so that they 
could halt the increasing debt their constituents were accruing.  But Crawford did not 
comply with these wishes.  He stated, “if they [the incompetents and orphan 
Chickasaws] were properly declared incompetent before the sale of their property, they 
remained so with few exceptions, and that to pay them the principal would be to give it 
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to waste and destruction, whereas the interest might be to them a source of perpetual 
comfort.”  Crawford’s argument was sound in logic, leaving the Chickasaws without a 
leg to stand on in the debate.  As they were in desperate need of money in an economy 
in which they had nothing to barter, Chickasaw Council members eventually changed 
their demand and asked for only the interest to be paid for the economic relief of the 
incompetents and orphans.42 
The Chickasaws may have been able to hold out on the issue of the incompetent 
and orphan funds if it were not for the fact that they had not received an annuity 
payment from the national fund since removal began.  In fact, they would not receive an 
annuity payment until 1844.  More importantly, Chickasaw leaders did not know how 
much the prolonged removal process had cut into the national fund.  In a letter to 
Secretary of War Spencer, Ethan Allen Hitchcock wrote:   
The principle chiefs of the Chickasaw Indians, while I was with them, expressed 
great anxiety about their national fund, for which the government is trusted 
under the Treaty of 1834.  They think themselves entitled to a detailed statement 
of the condition of the fund every year and they say they have received but one 
such statement. . . . I asked the opinion of an intelligent man in the nation, as to 
the supposed expense of furnishing the Chickasaws for 19 months rations 
delivered to them in their new country—and he answered that he supposed it 
was about $250,000. 
 
According to Hitchcock, this “intelligent” Chickasaw had grossly underestimated the 
costs associated with his people’s journey west.  Hitchcock stated although the estimate 
of $250,000 was appropriate given that that “rations, before their emigration, had 
averaged less than 7 cents.”  However, and this seems to have even stumped Hitchcock, 
the rations alone actually had “cost more than $600,000.”  Although it does not appear 
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that he revealed this discrepancy to the Chickasaw leaders, Hitchcock indicated to 
Spence that there was a growing suspicion among the Chickasaws that federal officials 
had mismanaged their funds, especially in light of the accusations of gross 
overcharging—later confirmed to be true—made against Captain Simeon Buckner, the 
man who had been in charge of the Chickasaw removal via water from Memphis to Fort 
Coffee.43  To alleviate Chickasaw concerns, Hitchcock advocated that “the actual 
disbursements should annually be made known to [the Chickasaw leaders] in detail by a 
statement directed through the Indian Agent, to the 'Commissioners' under the treaty of 
1834.  The sooner they learn the true state of their fund, the sooner they will become 
reconciled to it, while, at present, they are labouring under exciting apprenhensions.”44 
Regardless of Hitchcock’s recommendation, the Chickasaw annuity remained 
unpaid.  On October 26, 1842, the Chickasaw chiefs in council submitted an appeal to 
Secretary of War Spencer for the disbursement of their annuity.  According to the 
chiefs’ statement, the exorbitant prices they were compelled to pay for goods once they 
removed had “exhausted what money we brought with us, our people are now becoming 
naked, they are in great want of the real necessarys of life, they have been looking year 
after year with great anxiety for an annuity untill they have become all but beggars a 
number of their women and children are on the very point of suffering.”  The 
Chickasaws recognized the state of dependency on the United States in which they 
existed following removal.  The chiefs stated that the Chickasaws “only hope is that you 
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will send them an annuity as soon as possible.”45  As such, they initiated efforts to lift 
their society up from the doldrums in which they had fallen since agreeing to remove 
from their homelands. 
Chickasaw leaders knew that they would not be able to free themselves from 
this state of dependency as long as government officials continued to keep them in the 
dark concerning their fiscal affairs.  In a letter to Secretary of War Spencer, dated May 
6, 1843, Isaac Albertson and Slone Love, presumably on behalf the other chiefs, laid the 
groundwork for their peoples’ efforts to free themselves of their dependency upon the 
United States government.  The men made several inquiries about the fiscal operations 
of the U.S. within their society, particularly about whose money paid for certain 
services.  Albertson and Love indicated Chickasaw confusion concerning whose funds 
supplied the salary for the blacksmith who had been hired for their use:  the federal 
government’s or the Chickasaws’.  Further, the two men indicated that the Chickasaws 
did not want to pay for services that they believed were unnecessary, such as a 
commissary.  Finally, they also inquired about establishing their own schools:  “we also 
wish to know of you what the prospect will be to get a fund sufficient to establish a 
district school as we are in great want of one in our own country where our youths may 
be educated under our emediate view.”46  According to Upshaw, the Chickasaws wished 
to establish the schools according to the manual labor system.  They believed this 
method would produce a new generation of skilled Chickasaw laborers through whom 
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the nation could free themselves of their economic dependency to the Americans.47  Not 
only would the establishment of schools in their new territory provide long-term benefit 
to the Chickasaws, Albertson and Love also revealed a short-term economic goal to the 
Secretary: 
It has been a practice heretofore to send our children off to other states, to be 
educated and we now see the evil of such a practice we are now expending large 
sums of money every year for the education of our children to the exclusive 
benefit of other states.  it is the money that makes the school and we want 
expended in our own country so we may get it again.48 
 
As they had in their appeal to Upshaw to stop the Texans from siphoning money out of 
the Chickasaws’ grasp, Chickasaw leaders understood that without the ability to keep 
money circulating within their own internal economy, their society would never achieve 
economic independence from the United States. 
When the Chickasaw Commissioners were not satisfied with the explanations 
put forth by the federal government concerning how money was siphoned out of their 
national fund, they continued to press for more information.  In a letter to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs on June 23, 1843, Slone Love claimed to have 
examined House Document no. 65—which Secretary Spencer had recently submitted 
by to the House of Representatives—outlining all of the expenditures concerning the 
Chickasaw emigration from 1833 to January 1, 1843.  Love thanked the Commissioner 
for sending him the report, “which afforded me more information than any other 
heretofore received ether from our Agent or the department.”  Love questioned some of 
the expenditures in the report and demanded further explanation of some of the 
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payments that he deemed egregious.  Further, he requested the same level of 
information “from the first treaty ever made with the government of the United States 
up to the treaty of 1834.”49  
In this letter, we have an example of a Chickasaw official attempting to catch 
the Americans at their own game.  Federal officials had no qualms about reminding the 
Chickasaws about their obligations to their elder brothers.  By calling the United States’ 
record in upholding the obligations—agreed to in treaties—into question, Love was 
determined to assert his people’s continued sovereignty despite their having accepted a 
weaker position in their diplomatic relationship with the American union.50  As 
Albertson and Love had alluded to in their earlier letter to Spencer, the Chickasaws still 
believed that the states of the American union constituted separate and independent 
entities that were united behind a common purpose.  Further, the fact that they noted 
that had sent their “children off to other states” indicates a belief that by allowing 
themselves to come under the protection of the United States, they existed in a similar 
diplomatic status in which they had adopted the Natchez a century earlier:  incorporated 
on an equal plane but at the same time remaining distinct and separate from their 
ethnically related American state brothers.51   
*************** 
Before the Chickasaws could demand that outsiders respect their sovereignty, 
they had to resolve their own internal differences.  The Chickasaws continued to 
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recognize the legitimacy of distinct factions to conduct diplomatic actions that could 
affect the entire polity.  This had not changed over the previous forty years.  Rather, the 
lack of a viable alternative to the United States allowed those individuals who had 
cultivated early relationships with their American counterparts to remain at the forefront 
of Chickasaw international relations.  However, the death of leaders such as 
Tishomingo and George and Levi Colbert opened a new era of competition among 
Chickasaw politicos that resulted in a new era of factionalism within the nation that 
seems reminiscent of the squabbles between Ugulayacabe’s and Piomingo’s parties in 
the late eighteenth century.  The drive to alleviate the economic stress provoked by 
removal prompted a resurgence of factionalism among Chickasaw leaders.  In the 
1840s, two factions vied for federal recognition and therefore control over the national 
fund.  These two groups would reconcile, however, over their shared desire to rid 
themselves of the ability of the federal government and the Choctaws to influence their 
internal affairs. 
According to the 1834 supplemental treaty, the Chickasaw Commissioners 
comprised the body through which the Chickasaws would negotiate financial matters 
with the United States.  In November 1840, the Chickasaw Council convened at Boggy 
Depot in the Choctaw territory to elect three new members of the council as Henry 
Love, Martin Colbert, and Pitman Colbert—who replaced George Colbert among the 
original five commissioners after his death in November 1839—had decided to 
relinquish their positions.  The Council elected James Wolf, Sloan Love, and Charles 
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Colbert to fill the vacant positions.52  In all other matters concerning the Chickasaws 
political relations with other polities, the Chickasaws were supposed to negotiate 
through their elected members to the Choctaw council as provided for in the Treaty of 
Doaksville:  a District Chief, Speaker, and Secretary.  Due to the prolonged and 
disruptive nature of removal, the Chickasaws did not fill these positions until July 1841, 
when the Chickasaw Council elected two of the Chickasaw Commissioners, Isaac 
Albertson as the District Chief and Sloan Love as the Speaker, and one future 
commissioner, James Gamble, as the District Secretary.53 
Despite the fact that he willingly resigned as a commissioner in 1841, Pitman 
Colbert eventually found himself at odds with the elected leadership of the Chickasaws.  
On June 23, 1843, Sloan Love wrote to Secretary of War Spencer “to inform [Spencer] 
that Pitman Colbert has been getting up little councils in the different parts of the 
Nation to have the 7 commissioners and their successors appointed by a treaty 
stipulation of 1834 dismissed, believing that there is no further use for them in the 
Nation.”  As the Chickasaw Commissioners had to be approved by the Secretary 
according to the removal treaty, Love inquired of Spencer “who has the right to remove 
a commissioner or whether they are appointed for life during good behavior or not.”54   
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Approximately one month later, the Chickasaw Commissioners accused Pitman 
Colbert of further impropriety in an attempt to dissuade Spencer from entertaining 
Colbert’s proposition to disband the commission.  The Commissioners intimated that 
Colbert was out to improve his own economic condition at the expense of the nation.  In 
a missive sent to the Secretary on July 18, 1843, the Commissioners stated that Pitman 
Colbert had been “handsomely paid” for the sale of his land in Mississippi while others, 
even those of his own emigrating party, had never received anything for the sale of their 
lands.55  As these accusations against Pitman Colbert indicate, the Commissioners 
believed that he posed a direct threat to their authority among the Chickasaw people.   
Over the next two years, Colbert garnered his own following among the 
Chickasaws.  Most of his followers were those individuals who had settled near him 
near Doaksville, some “seventy or eighty miles from the [Chickasaw] district.”  
According to William Armstrong, the U.S. Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the 
Western Territory and Choctaw Agent, even the hereditary high chief, Ishtehotopa, 
sided with Colbert.56  As the beloved Tishomingo had acted as the Chickasaws’—and 
therefore Ishtehotopa’s—principal chief over the previous two decades, Ishtehotopa’s 
association with Colbert probably provided legitimacy and support among those 
Chickasaws who wished to retain their traditional form of government.   
The majority of the Chickasaw Commissioners stood in opposition to Colbert 
and Ishtehotopa.  In summer 1845, the Commissioners appealed for federal intervention 
as the two factions argued over the right to determine where Agent Upshaw should 
                                                 
55 “Chickasaw Commissioners to Spencer, July 18th 1843,” M234, R138, 
F1103-1105. 
56 “Wm. Armstrong to T.H. Crawford, June 10, 1845,” M234, R139, F0140-
0143. 
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disburse the anxiously awaited annuity.  Due to the perceived threat of violence in their 
own designated district, the Chickasaw people were still relatively scattered about the 
eastern half of the Choctaw Nation.  Consequently, efficient disbursement of the 
annuity to every eligible Chickasaw citizen required that it be accomplished at one 
location.  The Chickasaw Commissioners contended that as duly elected commissioners 
comprised the proper authorities among the Chickasaw people, and so only they should 
be able to designate the location for disbursement.  The Commissioners insisted that the 
annuity should be paid in the Chickasaw District.  Armstrong blamed the removal 
treaties for creating a situation in which each faction could claim legitimacy.   
Heretofore the Chickasaws have been governed in the old Indian manner by a 
chief and headmen.  The late treaty disposing of their lands gives certain powers 
in relation to lands to the Chickasaw Commissioners, but says nothing about the 
management of their funds.   
 
Armstrong believed that Upshaw should “look to the chief [elected in accordance with 
the Treaty of Doaksville] and captains in paying annuities as the authorities of the tribe 
[rather] than to the commissioners.”57  Therefore, Armstrong sided with the 
commissioners.  Three of the Commissioners—Albertson, Love, and Gamble—
remained the Chickasaws’ elected officials to represent them in the Choctaw council. 
Despite Armstrong’s support, the Commissioners knew that their position at the 
head of the Chickasaw government was tenuous.  They attempted to diffuse Colbert’s 
ability to contest their authority among the Chickasaw people.  Colbert had protested 
that the Commission’s services, as prescribed in the 1834 supplemental treaty, were no 
longer needed.  The Commissioners chose to remove the possibility that they were 
                                                 
57 “Wm. Armstrong to T.H. Crawford, June 10, 1845,” M234, R139, F0140-
0143. 
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acting outside of their lawfully given responsibilities in continuing to pursue control of 
the Chickasaw annuity.  The men resigned their posts on July 18, 1845.  This was no 
mere surrender, however.  The commissioners believed their former responsibilities 
would fall to Isaac Albertson as the elected Chief of the Chickasaw District, and their 
faction would retain control in light of Armstrong’s decision.  The Commissioners’ 
gesture did not work, and the Colbert faction immediately attempted to replace them 
with individuals loyal to Colbert and Ishtehotopa, most notably Edmund Pickens who 
had been appointed the Chickasaw Treasurer.  In response, the Commissioners appealed 
for federal intervention once again.  Writing to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Crawford, the former commissioners requested that United States officials not 
recognize any person “except those persons who were elected in the Chickasaw district, 
under the Choctaw Constitution, agreeable to the treaty concluded between said Nation 
& the Chickasaws in 1837 & ratified by the President & Senate of the United States.”58 
Later that fall, the Chickasaw chiefs and captains—among whom were the 
former commissioners, except Ishtehotopa—submitted a petition to Secretary of War 
William L. Marcy informing him of their objection to any disbursement of the annuity 
to Pickens.  In recognition of the Colbert faction’s right to contest their own authority, 
these men requested that an agent of the U.S. government should disburse the funds 
“because the party feeling and jealousy existing among our people would render it 
impossible for any one Chickasaw to discharge such a duty satisfactorily to all.”  
                                                 
58 “Wm. Armstrong to T.H. Crawford, July 27, 1845,” M234, R139, F0147-
0149; “A.M.M. Upshaw to Wm. Armstrong, July 20th 1845,” M234, R139, F0151; 
“Isaac Albertson et al. to T. Hartley Crawford, July 22d 1845,” M234, R139, F0153-
0154; and “Isaac Albertson et al. to Wm L Marcy, undated [1845],” M234, R139, 
F0235-0241.  Quoted statement is from “Isaac Albertson et al. to T. Hartley Crawford, 
July 22d 1845.” 
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Further, although they recognized that a strong contingent existed among their people 
who wished to retain the Chickasaws’ traditional hereditary form of government, they 
claimed that these individuals had been duped into believing that Pickens’ appointment 
as treasurer was done “under the direction of Ishtehotopa,” who they characterized as “a 
weak, credulous, ignorant but well meaning man” who had fallen under the self-
aggrandizing, acquisitive influence of Pitman Colbert.  Although they obviously 
intended to discredit the Colbert faction, the chiefs and captains did not intend to 
exclude anyone who rightfully deserved a disbursement from receiving one.59   
In determining who did and did not have a right to receive an annuity payment, 
Chickasaw leaders took their first step toward consolidating the Chickasaw polity into a 
nation-state.  In 1843, the chiefs and commissioners had petitioned Commissioner 
Crawford concerning their right “to say whether those Indians that lived in the Old 
Chickasaw Nation who were not Chickasaws but to whom we gave land and emigrated 
them to this country and subsisted them for 19 months after their arrival shall draw 
annuity with us or not.”60  In his response, Crawford replied that the Chickasaws did 
indeed have the right to determine “who shall be participants in the benefits of 
annuities.”  Crawford provided one caveat, however; any individuals who received an 
annuity had to have native ancestry.61  Crawford’s requirement most likely met little 
resistance, as the Chickasaws still practiced their matrilineal customs, a point that they 
                                                 
59 “Isaac Albertson et al. to Wm L Marcy, undated [1845],” M234, R139, 
F0235-0241. 
60 “Chickasaw Chiefs to T. Hartley Crawford, Febry 21st 1843,” M234, R138, 
FF1094-1095. 
61 “T.H.C. to Ish te ho to pa and others Comms. &c. of the Chickasaw Nation, 
April 27, 1843,” in “Letters Sent Concerning Chickasaw Removal, compiled 1832-
1861,” 2:295. 
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had affirmed with President Jackson when it came time to apportion their lands for 
allotment and sale back in Mississippi during the 1830s and one that they would soon 
reaffirm in their first written constitution in 1846.62 
The Chickasaws met for their annual council in October 1846 at Boiling Springs 
in the Chickasaw District.  As the Council’s authority was restricted to the economic 
concerns of the Chickasaw people—as prescribed by the Treaty of Doaksville—the 
primary emphasis of deliberations among council members focused on clearly 
delineating who would be eligible to receive an annuity payment.  On October 31, 1846, 
the Chickasaw Council passed a series of resolutions that defined who and who was not 
eligible to receive annuity payments from the national fund.  According to the first 
resolution,  
all those Chickasaws or any other person that was recognized as Chickasaw and 
have [owned] land with them in the State of Mississippi and have emagrated to 
this country, Shall be entitled to draw annuity with the Chickasaw people, 
Provided he, she, or they are still Citizens of the Nation, Except the heirs of 
Molly & Betsy[,] Creeks who were discarded by the general consent of the 
Chickasaws.  
 
The second resolution excluded “white & Choctaw women with their offspring” who 
had married Chickasaws men after the Treaty of 1834 from receiving a payment.  The 
final resolution excluded all persons who had become connected to the nation through 
marriage since the 1834 treaty from receiving benefits from the General Fund.63 
Not only did these acts reaffirm the Chickasaws’ commitment to their 
matrilineal traditions for defining membership within their society, but they also mark 
                                                 
62 “Ishtahotopa et al. to His Excellency, Andrew Jackson, [undated],” M234, 
R136, FF0610-0613. 
63 “Resolutions for the Chickasaw Council, Oct 31, 1846,” in “Record Book of 
the Chickasaw Nation, 1837-1855,” CKN30, p. 63. 
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the transition of the Chickasaws from a coalescent society into a consolidated society 
that deliberately excluded individuals who would have previously been welcome among 
their ranks.  The coalescent societies of the eighteenth century were, for the most part, 
welcoming of outsiders into their ranks.  Due to an ever-present warfare and the ravages 
of disease during the first three centuries after European contact, the Native American 
societies of the southeast, by necessity, needed to be able to augment their communities 
through the incorporation of new individuals.  But, in the post-Revolutionary, market-
driven world of the nineteenth century, cash was king.  Unable to wrest control of their 
access to their own monetary reserves—obtained through the sale of their lands east of 
the Mississippi—the Chickasaws needed to consolidate their society and to define 
exactly who was and was not a Chickasaw.  Unlike the blood quantums that emerged 
from the United States-directed allotment process of the late nineteenth century, mid-
century Chickasaws embarked on their own process to reclaim political authority within 
their own society.  They began by determining who deserved to receive an annuity and 
for what purpose the reserves would be put to use. 
The Chickasaw Council took a more concerted approach at consolidating their 
society when they drafted a written constitution during the fall 1848 session.  The 
1848 constitution blended components of the Chickasaws longstanding political 
structure with western concepts in which the younger generation of leaders had been 
educated and all had witnessed via their interactions with the United States.  Despite the 
acceptance of factions’ abilities to work toward opposite goals that emerged as part of 
their political culture during the eighteenth century, the Chickasaws’ national council 
had remained the primary body through which to build popular consensus across 
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Chickasaw society.  The primacy of the council had even experienced resurgence 
during the thirty years prior to their removal to the Indian Territory.  In this new 
constitution, Chickasaw leaders reaffirmed their commitment to consensus building 
through the Chickasaw Council at the same time that they modified its operational 
structure to incorporate concepts of republican democracy.  According to the 
constitution, the Chickasaws established “two distinct departments,” comprised by 
members of the Chickasaw Council, which consisted of a chief executive and a 
legislature.  Council members intended the legislature to have more authority than the 
executive did.  A stronger legislature would retain the traditional role of a national 
council to restrict the authority of any one individual who occupied the position of chief 
executive.  However, the Council did not mean for the legislature to dominate 
Chickasaw politics.  They also established a separation of powers between the two 
branches to ensure that “no person or collection of persons being one of these 
departments shall exercise any power properly belonging to the other, Except in 
instances that may be directed by the council hereafter.”64 
The Chickasaws organized under the guiding principle that they must respect the 
agreements their representatives had entered into during the removal negotiations.  But, 
they also created the new government to facilitate their eventual secession from the 
Choctaw Nation.  The descriptions of the executive branch demonstrate that the 
Chickasaws recognized their incorporation into the Choctaw Nation.  The power of the 
                                                 
64 “Copy of the Chickasaw Constitution and Laws [1848], presented by the 
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executive branch was “vested in a Chickasaw District Chief,” in accordance with the 
restrictions imposed on Chickasaw political organization by the Treaty of Doaksville.  
As the first man elected to the position, therefore, Edmund Pickens held the title, Chief 
of the Chickasaw People.  Despite the lip service to the Chickasaws’ incorporation as a 
Choctaw district paid by such designations, the true embodiment of the 1848 
constitution as a separatist document lies in the legislature’s empowerment as the only 
body designated to appoint the Chief.65  This prevented outside polities from gaining 
control of the Chickasaw government through bribery or the installation of a puppet.  
The Chief was only empowered to propose laws for the legislature’s consideration, but 
the legislature did not have to approve those laws.  Consequently, the legislature had the 
authority to refuse recognition of any laws enacted by the Choctaw Council that would 
impose on the Chickasaws’ capacity to control their own internal governance.66 
Beyond the reaffirmation of the resolutions passed in 1846 concerning access to 
the annual annuity, the Council members included several other measures in the new 
Chickasaw constitution designed to distinguish themselves from the Choctaws—and 
                                                 
65 The notion that Chickasaw constitution-making in the late 1840s and early 
1850s exemplified efforts to separate themselves from the Choctaws was established by 
Arrell Gibson.  Gibson noted the “latitude of action given both the chief and council” in 
the 1848 constitution as the documents marker for separation.  In 1992, Duane 
Champagne noted that the 1851 constitution was the true announcement for separation 
by creating the position of Financial Chief, which distinct privileges to manage 
“internal affairs and treaty funds” apart from the District Chief’s oversight.  Although 
he has since given more credit to the 1848 constitution, it seems that he still holds 1851 
as the true marker for Chickasaw separation.  Gibson, The Chickasaws, pp. 216-226, 
quote on p. 217; Champagne, Social Order and Political Change, p. 196; and Duane 
Champagne, Social Change and Cultural Continuity Among Native Nations (New York: 
Altamira Press, 2007), pp. 212-215. 
66 “Copy of the Chickasaw Constitution and Laws [1848], presented by the 
Chief Col Edmund Pickens to Col AMM Upshaw, Chickasaw Agent, By C Harris, 
Clerk C.D. CN, Nov 1849,” M234, R140, FF0170-0184; Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: 
Laws and Treaties, 2:486-488. 
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therefore consolidate their society—that signified the adoption of nineteenth-century, 
western conceptions of republican governance.  Council members declared that “no 
person shall be a member of the Chickasaw Council or be eligible to any office under 
these regulations unless he be a Chickasaw or a recognized member of the Tribe.”  In 
doing so, they signified their intent not only to restrict access to the national fund, but 
also to consolidate the democratic ethos into the hands of a specific, ethnically 
identified constituency.  Only males aged sixteen or older held the right to vote for 
representatives in the new republican government.  As further evidence that the 
Chickasaws were willingly surrendering aspects of their traditional hereditary modes in 
favor of a republican form of government, the constitution also stipulated that all 
members of the Council had to be “a citizen of the District in which he may reside.”  
Finally, the Chickasaws also established their own police force and court system.67 
*************** 
As the election of Edmund Pickens to the position of Chief indicates, during the 
previous two years, the two factions began to reconcile their differences, primarily by 
focusing their efforts toward the twin goals of ridding their society of its economic 
dependency on the United States and securing political independence from the 
Choctaws.68  During the summer of 1848, just months before the transformative 
                                                 
67 “Copy of the Chickasaw Constitution and Laws [1848], presented by the 
Chief Col Edmund Pickens to Col AMM Upshaw, Chickasaw Agent, By C Harris, 
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constitution, both Pickens and Pitman Colbert served as members of a delegation, 
appointed by the Chickasaw Council on March 19, to travel to Washington, D.C.  The 
delegation was tasked to direct how the national funds should be appropriated for 
certain projects such as the building of schools within the Chickasaw District.69  
According to Upshaw, Pitman Colbert remained on the outskirts of Chickasaw political 
society—and he did indeed pursue his own economic agenda while in Washington—but 
we should not take this to mean that the factions had not begun working toward 
reconciliation.70   
The 1848 delegation took steps to ensure that they acted in a unified manner and 
that they worked to protect the rights of the Chickasaws without allowing exterior 
influences to influence or interfere with their work.  The delegation met at least once a 
day, during which time all conversations were to be “carried on in the Chickasaw 
language.”  Delegates were not allowed to receive visitors during these meetings, nor 
could any member leave the session without the acknowledgement and approval of the 
other members.  Even though members could form small committees to draft letters and 
memorials, the entire delegation had to approve, by majority vote, of the contents before 
they could be sent to the intended recipient.  If a majority could not be obtained, the 
matter was dropped.  As a final step to ensure that outside influence could not infiltrate 
                                                                                                                                               
experience of removal had no influence on the structural changes the Chickasaws made 
to their political system in the 1840s and 1850s.  As I suggest in this dissertation, 
however, the rhetoric of removal directly influenced the way Chickasaw leaders argued 
to regain their autonomy from the Choctaws and to reassert their independence 
immediately in the 1850s; Champagne, Social Order and Political Change, pp. 164-
165. 
69 “Pitman Colbert et al to Wm. Medill, July 7, 1848,” M234, R139, F0440-
0442. 
70 “A.M.M. Upshaw to Wm Medill, April 25th 1848,” M234, R139, F0522-
0523. 
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the delegation’s mission, all members swore an oath of silence concerning “all business 
that may be transacted by the Delegation in Session.”71 
Over the next few years, the Chickasaw factions united behind the dual purpose 
of securing their economic independence from the United States and their political 
independence from the Choctaws.   At the conclusion of the 1848 session, the 
Chickasaw Council appointed another delegation to travel to Washington that winter.72  
Moreover, while this delegation was in Washington, the council established a 
permanent Committee of Vigilance early the next year.  The committee’s members 
were required to travel to Washington at least once a year, for the purposes of attending 
to the Chickasaws’ affairs with the United States.  Specifically, the Council tasked the 
committee to secure those guarantees U.S. officials made to the Chickasaws through 
various land cession treaties dating back to 1818.  Although the original act called for 
the committee to have three members, the Council amended the provisions in July 1849 
so that only two representatives, Pitman Colbert and Edmund Pickens, were required for 
the committee’s inaugural journey to the federal city.73  The selection of and the 
confidence placed in Colbert and Pickens by the Chickasaw Council signifies the end of 
the factionalism of the 1840s. 
On July 17, 1849, Pickens and Colbert retained the services of B.H. Eperson, a 
lawyer from Clarksville, Texas, for a period of two years.  According to the articles of 
agreement between the two parties, “the Chickasaws have much unsettled business with 
                                                 
71 “Rules for the Government of the Chickasaw Delegation, June 4th 1848” 
CKN30, pp. 150-151. 
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the United States in relation to their national funds and being desirous of closing their 
matters with that government as soon as possible.”  The principal goal in securing 
economic independence from the Americans, therefore, required the settlement of land 
sales relating to the Chickasaws removal in the 1830s.  Despite the availability of 
Chickasaw land for most of the 1840s “at the reduced price of twelve and a half cents 
per acre,” much of the Chickasaw lands east of the Mississippi River remained unsold.74  
According to the agreement,  
The said Eperson upon his part agrees and binds himself to render whatever 
services he can to the delegation in the transaction of their national business to 
cooperate with Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, who has been employed to 
defend the interest of the Chickasaws in that State in cases whaere it is supposed 
the principle upon which they will be decided.”75   
 
The point in relinquishing their ownership of any lands remaining east of the 
Mississippi River seems to be mainly to remove the United States' ability to continue to 
drain the Chickasaw General Fund by claiming administrative fees for maintaining the 
lands on their behalf.76 
The Chickasaws tried to convince the United States Government to sell off their 
remaining Mississippi lands for almost four years before federal officials agreed to 
negotiate a new treaty.  In early 1852, the Chickasaw Council appointed Benjamin 
Sloan Love, Edmund Pickens, and Sampson Folsom as a special delegation empowered 
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to negotiate a new treaty to settle the Chickasaws’ financial affairs with the United 
States concerning all land ceded east of the Mississippi River.77  According to the treaty 
that these men concluded with the United States representative, Kenton Harper, that 
June, the Chickasaw delegates retained the military protection of the United States in 
their new western home, and they successfully secured a commitment by the United 
States to finalize the sale of the lands still available in Mississippi.  However, they did 
not accomplish all of their objectives.  The incompetent and orphan funds would remain 
an issue until well after the United States Civil War, and the national fund would remain 
under the control of the United States Government, leaving the Chickasaws 
economically dependent upon the Americans for the foreseeable future.78 
Although the Chickasaws were unable to free themselves of the semi-sovereign 
status under the hegemony of the United States, the delegates did take a step forward in 
their people’s stated goal to dissolve the political union between themselves and the 
Choctaws.  Despite federal retention of the national fund, the Chickasaws secured 
enough access to the principle that would allow them to purchase outright a territory for 
themselves and their posterity forever.79 
*************** 
During his investigative sojourn in 1842, Ethan Allen Hitchcock commented, 
“the Chickasaws find themselves destitute of every comfort they have formerly 
enjoyed; and, by a misunderstanding on the part of most of the tribe, they have become 
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subordinate to the Choctaw government, a government utterly foreign to their habits 
and offensive to their national pride.  They feel as if they had purchased themselves into 
degradation.”80  Despite Pitman Colbert’s participation in the negotiations for the Treaty 
of Doaksville, his faction came to represent that portion of the Chickasaw citizenry who 
objected to continued acceptance of Choctaw hegemony in their world.  Although the 
opposing faction did not necessarily see any reason to protest against their situation at 
first, they eventually agreed to press for a political separation in an attempt to unite their 
people behind their vision for a republican form of government.  By fall 1846, the 
Chickasaws had requested that Upshaw arrange for a delegation to travel to Washington 
to meet with the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to procure a new “Country to 
themselves.”81 
Although they would eventually have to take the matter on themselves, for the 
next four years, the Chickasaws sought the assistance of the United States government 
to resolve their differences with the Choctaw, as the treaties of 1832 and 1834 and the 
Treaty of Doaksville required of them.  On January 19, 1849, the Chickasaw delegates 
in Washington appealed to President James K. Polk to resolve an issue of financial 
disagreement between the Chickasaws and Choctaws concerning the purchase of the 
Chickasaw District.  The Choctaws thought that the Chickasaws still owed them $5,000 
for the use of the Chickasaw District.  According to the terms of the Treaty of 
Doaksville, the Chickasaws were to pay $530,000 to the Choctaws for the land:  
$30,000 paid in cash up front and $500,000 through the acquisition of stock worth that 
amount.  The interest from the stock purchase was intended to help sustain the 
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Choctaws for at least the next twenty years.  According to the Chickasaws’ account, 
U.S. officials negotiated a deal for stock from Alabama worth $500,000, but for which 
the Chickasaws only paid $495,000.  The Choctaws argued that the Chickasaws should 
have purchased stock with the full amount.  Further, the Choctaws now argued that the 
Chickasaws should pay the outstanding interest that would have accrued from the 
additional $5,000 worth of stock.  The Chickasaws argued that if the stock had cost 
them $510,000, the Choctaws would certainly not have refunded them the difference.  
In accordance with the terms of the treaty, therefore, the Chickasaws wished the 
President to settle the issue.82   
Shortly after petitioning for the President’s intervention, the Chickasaw 
delegation in Washington learned that the Senate had voted in favor of the Choctaws 
regarding the $5,000.  The Chickasaw delegates protested to the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs.  In their letter, the delegates laid out their understanding of the situation, 
intimating that by ruling in favor of the Choctaws, not only had the Senate negated the 
United States Government's obligation to act as a trustee for both the Chickasaws and 
the Choctaws, but that body had also kept their deliberation of the subject secret from 
the Chickasaws and ignored the legal obligation requiring the assent of both the Senate 
and the President to decide the issue.83  On February 20, 1849, Polk weighed in on the 
$5,000 issue.  Polk allowed that the Chickasaws should pay the $5,000 difference, as 
they were to have used that much money to procure the stock in the first place.  
However, he rejected the idea that the Chickasaws ought to have paid the outstanding 
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interest that would have accrued on the $5,000 dollars as the Choctaws demanded and 
the U.S. Senate had approved.84  In this case, federal officials decided the Chickasaws 
owed the Choctaws more money for their land according to the Treaty of Doaksville 
and played down their own involvement in creating the problem in the first place.  
Efforts such as this to compel federal intervention would have instilled a sense of 
uncertainty regarding Americans’ willingness to treat the Chickasaws as equal political 
actors.   
On the other hand, government officials were more than willing to pretend they 
supported Chickasaw sovereignty by encouraging the Chickasaws to negotiate directly 
with the Choctaws concerning their desired independence.  Chickasaw leaders most 
likely welcomed such freedom.  On October 16, 1851, the Chickasaw Council 
determined to appoint  
‘Commissioners…invested with the full powers to treat in behalf of the 
Chickasaws with the Choctaw Nation, upon the subject of a separation from it; 
and that these Commissioners be instructed to attend the next Choctaw Council 
with a view of effecting a separation, if possible, and to exert their efforts to 
bring it about.’  
 
Unlike the authority granted to the commissioners back in 1837, however, the 
Chickasaw Council now reserved the right to ratify or reject any settlement the 
delegates negotiated.85  The Choctaws refused to consider the matter and requested the 
Chickasaws submit a complaint to the Choctaw Agent as required by treaty.  The 
Choctaw Agent declined to weigh in on the matter, which forced the Chickasaws to take 
the issue to higher authority. 
                                                 
84 “W. Medill to Davis James & others, Feb 23rd 1849” and “Copy of In 
Executive Session of the Senate of the United States, January 26th 1849,” CKN30. 
85 “Kenton Harper to Luke Lea, Oct. 18, 1851,” M234, R140, FF0296-0299. 
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According to the Chickasaws’ understanding of the Treaty of Doaksville, they 
were required to present any grievances they held against the Choctaws to the Choctaw 
agent.  Although they had complied with this requirement, “the Chickasaw 
commissioners submitted not that [i.e., because] they were satisfied the referee was a 
just or proper one, but only because it was in conformity to the language of the Treaty, 
and they were indisposed to throw any hindrance in the way of an amicable 
adjustment.”  The Chickasaws did not believe they would ever receive fair treatment by 
applying to the Choctaw agent as the sole “umpire” to resolve grievances between the 
two groups.  Therefore, on June 6, 1852, the Chickasaw delegation to Washington 
appealed to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Luke Lea, to submit the case to “the 
President of the United States” who they believed was “duly constituted the final arbiter 
in all matters of controversy between us.”86  Lea, however, demurred.  On August 16, 
1852, he informed the Chickasaw delegates in Washington that although he agreed  
that the existing political connection existing between the these tribes 
[Chickasaws and Choctaws] is unfavorable to the interests of both . . . the 
Department is unwilling to interpose for the purpose of dissolving that 
connection, until better satisfied that the tribes themselves cannot by mutual 
consent effect a satisfactory adjustment of their differences and relations.87 
 
The Chickasaws returned their attention to persuading the Choctaws to release 
them from their obligations established in the Treaty of Doaksville.  Almost three years 
passed before the Chickasaws finally achieved their goal of separation.  When pleas to 
the Choctaws’ conscience failed—such as those embodied in the memorial presented to 
the General Council Choctaw on October 2, 1854—Chickasaw delegates changed 
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tactics.  They appealed to the Choctaws for the right “to form a separate and distinct 
political organization with such metes & bounds and under such rules and regulations 
and upon such terms as may be agreed upon by the Choctaw & Chickasaw board of 
Commissioners present; subject to the ratification of the Government of the United 
States.”88  Again, the Choctaws refused to entertain dissolution of the political compact.  
However, it appears that their resolve had waned.  After several days of back and forth, 
the Choctaws denied “on any terms consent for your people to form a political 
organization within the limits of our country.”  In order to diffuse the Chickasaws' 
accusations that the Choctaws had attempted to capitalize on the Chickasaws misfortune 
by entering into the Treaty of Doaksville, the Choctaw commissioners stated:  “We are 
willing to refund Your money and you may go your way; Provided you can obtain a 
home beyond the limits of our country.”89 
By spring 1855, the Chickasaws had had enough.  In his account of recent 
conversations held with delegates from both tribes, Choctaw Agent Douglas Cooper 
recounted that the Chickasaws had “but one proposition to make to the Choctaws—viz:  
that an arrangement be entered into, whereby the jurisdiction of the Chickasaw Tribe 
over their District may be acknowledged, and, their independence as a Nation be 
secured.”  According to Cooper, the Chickasaws still desired the intervention of the 
federal government to affect this outcome.90  However, Chickasaw representatives may 
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have slightly misled Cooper.  On the same day that Cooper submitted his report, 
Edmund Pickens and Sampson Folsom wrote a letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
George W. Manypenny in which the two Chickasaw delegates chastised Manypenny for 
the United States Government’s willingness to side with the Choctaws over the past 
decade.  Pickens and Folsom even went so far as to challenge the federal government’s 
right to weigh in on the issue at all.   
Certainly, there is nothing in the convention of 1837 that binds the United States 
to assume any such false and incumbent position.  That convention is a compact 
primarily between the Choctaws and Chickasaws. 
It was not signed by any commissioner on the part of the United States, 
and if they are to be considered a party to it, as a treaty within the meaning of 
the Constitution, it can only be to a limited extent. . . .The Convention itself 
shows on its face that no such duty or obligations exists.  If either party should 
assume the responsibility of abrogating the Convention and declaring its 
independence of the other, the only proper question for the United States to 
consider would be, not whether the natural and inalienable right of revolution 
exists, but whether the party had good and sufficient cause for the exercise of 
the right?  Should the judgement be that it had, then, the duty and obligation of 
the Government in the premises be clear and unquestionable. 
 
The delegates reminded the Commissioner of the United States’ obligation to protect 
the physical security of the Chickasaws, even against the Choctaws whom they 
intimated might “use force for the purpose of coercing the Chickasaws to submission.”  
Finally Pickens and Folsom indicated that the Chickasaws would be willing to purchase 
land in the Cherokee Neutral ground, provided the Choctaws refund the $530,000 plus 
accrued interest that the Chickasaws had paid in 1837.91 
                                                                                                                                               
Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Choctaw Agency, National Archives Microfilms 
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Two months later, all three parties came to an amicable accord.  The Choctaws 
had sent a delegation to Washington to settle some of their own financial concerns with 
the federal government.  Cooper believed that they could be persuaded to negotiate a 
settlement with the Chickasaws if the United States made it a condition of resolving 
their 'unsettled business' with the government.92  He was right.  On June 22, 1855, 
Edmund Pickens and Sampson Folsom concluded a treaty with Manypenny, as the 
United States representative, and Peter Pitchlynn, Israel Folsom, Samuel Garland, and 
Dikson W. Lewis on behalf of the Choctaws.  The treaty dissolved the political union 
between the two native nations.  Rather than having to follow through on their proposal 
to emigrate once again, the Chickasaws paid the Choctaws an additional $150,000 “out 
of the national fund of the Chickasaws [to be] held in trust by the United States” in 
order to secure Choctaw recognition of their outright ownership of the Chickasaw 
District.  Both the Chickasaws and Choctaws agreed that the citizens of the other nation 
could settle in their respective territories, wherein they would be accorded the full rights 
of any citizen, except for access to the national fund.  Further, both groups agreed to 
share the Choctaw district lands west of the 98th meridian and to lease those lands to the 
federal government for the relocation of the southern Plains tribes.93   
Pickens and Folsom returned to the Chickasaw District and presented the treaty 
to the General Council.  The council members generally approved of the provisions 
secured by the two delegates and ratified the treaty on December 13, 1855.  Now, free 
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of Choctaw authority within their own government affairs, the Chickasaws were fully 
free to erect the republican form of government that they had begun in 1848. 
*************** 
In a letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs Crawford on September 4, 1843, 
Arthur Upshaw intimated that a wholesale change in the way the Chickasaws organized 
themselves politically, something the Americans had hoped for, was possibly in the 
works.  Upshaw wrote,  
The Chickasaws as yet have the same kind of government that they had when 
they lived East of the Mississippi, some are disposed to change it and have it 
agreeably to the government of the Choctaws, as they agreed to do when they 
treatyed with the Choctaws for this country, but some of the older Chickasaws 
say they are unwilling to give up their ancient rule and customs; their rule pretty 
much is, when a chief gets old or sick, he says that some man naming him is to 
have his place when he dies, and the Chickasaws must look on him then as a 
young chief, but a good number of the younger men are getting tired of such a 
government, and want a more republican one, which would be decidedly the 
best, for it would create a spirit of emulation among the young men and of 
course would have a great tendancy to improve the Chickasaws as a nation.94 
 
Upshaw clearly supported any adoption of a republican form of government that would 
emulate that of the United States.  Upshaw was right that a segment among the 
Chickasaw leadership advocated the adoption of a professional system of government to 
replace their traditional hereditary one.  Upshaw’s immediate superior, William 
Armstrong, claimed that the removal treaties had created the environment in which this 
could happen.  In a way, Armstrong was right, but to accept this explanation at face 
value would make light of the significant transformation that was about to take place 
within the socio-political organization of the Chickasaws. 
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The creation of the 1848 constitution promoted a misguided sense of 
accomplishment and pride among U.S. officials who viewed the changes to Chickasaw 
political culture espoused therein as an emulation of their own federal system of 
government.  On December 24, 1849, Upshaw commented that the elected members of 
the 1849 Chickasaw Council “men of more tallent, than any Council I have ever seen 
among the Chickasaws, and they should be encouraged, it is a very decided step 
towards improvement.”95  On February 11, 1850, Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Orlando Brown echoed Upshaw’s sentiment in a letter to the latter’s long-awaited 
replacement as Chickasaw Agent, Gabriel Long.  Brown commented that Upshaw had 
furnished him with “a copy of the constitution and laws adopted and passed by the 
Chickasaws for the purpose of properly controlling and managing their money affairs 
and business.”  Brown was pleased with the document, “nothing is found in them 
conflicting with the constitution and laws of the United States, or with treaty 
stipulations between them and the government, or the Chickasaws.”  Further, he 
complimented the Chickasaws for having adopted a document that so imitated 
components of the American system of government:  “The adoption by the Chickasaws 
cannot but be considered as a very commendable act and as affording satisfactory 
evidence of rapid advancement in civilization and intelligence.”96 
Brown’s interpretation that the formation of the Chickasaws’ constitutional 
government was modeled after that of the United States Constitution in order to be 
accepted into American society is misguided.  As evidenced by a new constitution, 
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adopted during the annual Council session in 1851, the Chickasaws restricted the 
definition of membership within their political society in two ways.  First, the right to 
serve as a member of the Chickasaw Council was changed to exclude white men, 
thereby serving as a method of preventing outside influence.  Second, in defining who 
should have access to the benefits of the Chickasaw National Fund, the new constitution 
restricted annuities to only those individuals who received allotments according to the 
treaties of 1832 and 1834 “and their descendents by Chickasaw women, provided they 
are citizens of the Choctaw Nation.”  Contrary to their earlier statements when 
affirming their right to control the disbursement of annuities, the Chickasaws now also 
refused to accept as fully entitled citizens those Chickasaws who did not emigrate west 
to their new lands in Indian Territory.  As these amendments to the provisions of the 
1848 constitution indicate, the Chickasaws were trying to consolidate control over their 
nation. 
These changes were made based on a thoughtful interpretation of their own 
experiences in dealing with the United States, determined to emulate the constitutional 
governments of some of the states in which they had come into direct contact.97  The 
previous sixty years of diplomacy with the United States had demonstrated to them the 
strength of the states when it came to preserving local autonomy and sovereignty.  This 
would be proven even further on the south side of the Red River as Texans negotiated 
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their republic’s place as an equal member of the American union, all within full view of 
an emerging generation of Chickasaw statesmen who had been schooled in American 
ways of governance.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE CHICKASAW NATION ASSERTS ITS RIGHT 
 
Some of the leaders who signed the revised 1851 constitution were young men 
who represented the next generation of Chickasaw leaders.  These individuals, such as 
Benjamin Sloan Love, had been educated in American schools as a result of the 
Chickasaws’ desire to use funds—obtained from the sale of their land during removal—
to educate Chickasaw youths to better understand and engage with the United States 
political system that had heretofore sought to exclude them.1  Love arrived at Choctaw 
Academy, Richard Mentor Johnson’s Kentucky school for Indian education, in March 
1835, where advanced students engaged with concepts similar to those taught elsewhere 
to the children of elite white Americans.2  Further, school officials even encouraged 
students to form their own government wherein they could practice the political ideas 
they studied.3   
Among the texts studied by the higher-level students at Choctaw Academy was 
Jesse Olney’s A Practical System of Modern Geography, which was in widespread use 
throughout the United States at the time.  Reading this volume would have further 
confirmed the states’ authority—over that of the federal government—to determine the 
outcome of local affairs, which had just been demonstrated to the Chickasaws to compel 
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their removal.  According to Olney’s section explaining the governmental system of the 
United States, 
The government of the United States is a federal republic’ formed by the union 
of the several states, for the purpose of mutual safety and defence . . . [Each state 
is independent, with distinct laws for itself, and has the exclusive control of all 
local concerns:  but the defence of the country, the regulation of commerce, and 
all the general interests of the confederacy, are committed by the constitution of 
the United States to a general government.]4 
 
Despite contemporary accounts of fraud and abuse that contributed to an uneducated 
student body at Choctaw Academy, there is evidence that the more apt students rose to 
the occasion and even took control of their own learning, revealing an understanding of 
the material presented to them to a far greater extent than their American benefactors 
had ever intended.5  By fall 1838, at least eight students were currently studying 
Olney’s Geography, and eighteen more had already passed on to higher subjects within 
the Choctaw Academy curriculum such as book-keeping, history, and surveying.6 
Love became a major player in Chickasaw politics by the early 1850s as the 
Chickasaws worked to separate themselves from their semi-sovereign status to the 
Choctaws.  As part of his efforts to influence the political views of his fellow 
Chickasaws, he helped set up the Chickasaw Intelligencer, a newspaper written for 
Native American consumption in Indian Territory.  By the mid-1850s, American 
expansion had reached the Indian Territory and speculation was rampant about the 
extension of a territorial government over the Indians’ land.  Although the 
                                                 
4 J. Olney, A Practical System of Modern Geography, or, A View of the Present 
State of the World Simplified and Adapted to the Capacity of Youth ... Accompanied by 
a New and Improved Atlas. Fifteenth ed. (Hartford: D.F. Robinson & Co, 1834), pp. 52-
53.  The brackets are part of the original text, not my own addition. 
5 Ronald L. Pitcock, “‘Let the Youths Beware!’: The Sponsorship of Early 19th-
Century Native American Literacy,” Written Communication 17 (2000): 390-426. 
6 Joe R. Goss, ed., “The Choctaw Academy,” p. 127. 
 271 
Intelligencer’s proprietors seemed to favor incorporation of the Chickasaws, and all 
Indians for that matter, into the body politic of the United States as citizens, they 
objected to the manner in which United States officials proposed to accomplish this.  
American politicians thought that the Indians should buy citizenship through the 
dissolution of their tribal governments and complete subjugation to federal authority.  
Using rhetoric that hearkened back to the debates over removal, the editors of the 
Intelligencer wrote, “We do not object to the obligation it is proposed that our probable 
Chief shall take [to answer to the President], for that was incurred as long ago as the 
treaty of 1786 when we placed ourselves under the protection of the United States.”  
The editors did object, however, to the proposition that Congress would be able to 
impose on internal matters “which are, and always have been, within the exclusive 
control and power of the local legislature.”  In further demonstration of their belief that 
the American union was still a confederation of sovereign states, joined together by 
their own free will, they called upon the public to examine the manner in which white 
territories recently entered the union.  “Let us look at the bill annexing Texas, and see if 
its legislature was compelled to make reservations for such purposes as Congress 
thought fit to encourage, and let us see if Utah was denied a territorial government until 
Mormonism should be abolished.”7   
Not only did these men demonstrate an understanding of the balance the U.S. 
Constitution accorded between state and federal authority, they also offered a Native 
American interpretation about the nature of the United States government and how 
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those men who were responsible for its conduct had forsaken the intentions of the 
founding fathers in their relations with Native Americans.   
The American Revolution was not the result of only a desire to establish a 
government on earth, where the internal regulations should allow justice and the 
widest possible freedom to its citizens, but it was intended by those who 
achieved that result, that a new era should mark the diploma[c]y and intercourse 
of nations.  Justice and fraternal frankness were to mark its dealings and its 
mode of communications with other nations, the organized impostures of the 
world.8 
 
As this article continued, the editors connected the previous statement to Removal and 
implied that the federal government should have protected the Indians against the 
expansive ambitions of the states and individual citizens of the United States in 
recognition of the treaties formed between two independent nations.  “With the part of 
such a people [Indians], possessed of rich and widely spread lands, surrounded by the 
most cupidous land getters the world ever saw, whose deep hatred and recollection of a 
recent hostile relation stifled their conscientious scruples, the Government of 
Washington saw fit to take sides.”9  The statement indicates a betrayal of the diplomatic 
relationship established between the United States and the various Indian groups who 
submitted themselves to American guardianship.  The editors of the Intelligencer 
believed that their incorporation into the United States should not come at the cost of 
their independent and sovereign status, thereby according themselves the same status 
enjoyed by the states when they chose to join the American union.  Whereas traditional 
native notions of diplomacy recognized such relationships, this lament indicates how 
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removal reinforced the need to adjust to the political realities of the Americans’ federal 
union and the racialized world of the nineteenth century.   
In the face of continued American expansion, the editors clearly believed that 
the federal government had betrayed its promise to the southeastern tribes of perpetual 
control over the land to which they had been removed.  The only way forward, 
according to the editors of the Intelligencer, was to accept citizenship within the United 
States.  However, they asserted that they should enter into the American polity on an 
equal basis to that of the individual states, which removal had revealed to them to be the 
truly sovereign powers within the United States.  By 1856, the Chickasaws had 
negotiated their independence from Choctaw control and had organized their own 
constitutional form of government, one that was modeled on that of the states, not the 
federal government.10   
This chapter examines the ten-year period from 1856 to 1865.  During this time, 
the Chickasaws established a constitutional government that blended traditional native 
cultural and social concepts with western ideas of governance and state interaction.  
Through this combination of old and new, the Chickasaw Nation set out to demonstrate 
its sovereignty to both their American and native neighbors.  As the events leading to 
the American Civil War threatened their security, the Chickasaws worked to protect 
their security and right to self-government.  Their decision to align with the 
Confederacy suggests that the opportunities for Native Americans to balance Euro-
American imperial powers against each other on the North American continent had not 
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ended in 1820, as many historians have suggested.  The secession of the southern states 
and the subsequent creation of the Confederate States of America introduced a new 
power with which Native Americans could hold the United States back from realizing 
their expansionist ambitions. 
*************** 
As the Chickasaws demonstrated by their decision to enter into a semi-sovereign 
position under the Choctaws in the Treaty of Doaksville and subsequent separation by 
the 1855 treaty, acquiescence to a semi-sovereign status was not necessarily permanent.  
Even within the western system of international relations established by the Peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, one state could not subjugate another without the latter’s consent.11  
However, theory does not always translate into reality, especially in the racialized 
context of nineteenth-century American-native interaction.  Euro-Americans proved 
reluctant to extend Vattel’s theories to those whom they regarded as racially inferior.12  
By the early 1800s, Americans began to accept that natives and Euro-Americans would 
never be able to cohabitate without one destroying the other’s culture.  After the War of 
1812, Americans became committed to a policy of removal.  Despite missionaries’ 
efforts to Christianize and improve the Indians, the majority of citizens felt that the 
Indians would eventually become extinct succumbing to the insurmountable tide of 
Manifest Destiny.13  In order for Euro-Americans to see the Chickasaws as a legitimate 
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and equal actor within the international state system, therefore, the Chickasaws had to 
create a governmental system that adhered to western notions of political philosophy.  
The successful conclusion of the 1855 treaty imbued the Nation with a renewed 
sense of independence.14  The social and political consolidation that occurred over the 
previous decade helped to translate the Chickasaws’ ethnic nationalism into political 
nationalism.  However, there was one barrier to remove before their newly consolidated 
national identity became legitimate.  The 1848 and 1851 constitutions were constructed 
to reflect the Chickasaws status as district within the Choctaw Nation.  Consequently, 
the 1855 treaty stated that Choctaw laws remained in force within the Chickasaw 
Nation until the Chickasaws established their own constitution with a government to 
administer the provisions and laws therein.15  Having sought separate independence 
from the Choctaws since the early 1840s, the Chickasaws wasted little time in 
addressing this issue.16 
The Chickasaws adopted their new constitution in August 1856.  The 
government established in the constitution reflected the union of native and western 
concepts in an effort to preserve autonomous sovereignty in a world increasingly 
dominated by Euro-Americans.  The Chickasaw political leaders of the 1850s had been 
trained in a similar philosophical tradition as the Revolutionary generation’s Founding 
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Fathers.  However, they entered the practice of forming a constitutional government 
relatively late.  Therefore, they used their education and experience to construct a 
government that blended native cultural tradition with modern concepts developed by 
Scottish Enlightenment philosophers and put into practice by both Americans and their 
“removed” neighbors.   
The Chickasaws modeled their own constitution on those of their state 
neighbors—Alabama and Texas—whose own experience of government formation they 
had been close enough to witness and experience.  Not only did they adopt the format of 
a state constitution, the Chickasaws also chose the term governor as the title for their 
chief executive.17  In the context of the twenty-first century, this would seem to imply 
that the Chickasaws accepted the semi-sovereign status defined for Native Americans in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.  This should not ring true, however.  The construction of 
their constitution to mirror those of the states implies that Chickasaw leaders at least 
sought equal status with any entity of the United States.  It does not mean that they 
acquiesced to the nominal position as wards to a legally recognized caretaker, in which 
Americans defined Native Americans. 
Pre-Civil War Americans understood the United States constituted a federal 
union, or a confederation of independent sovereign republics.  To many Americans in 
the United States’ first century of existence, therefore, the republican experiment was 
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“an international system in embryo.”18  The Chickasaws’ choice to develop their 
constitutional government in a manner akin to that of the states reflects a similar 
understanding.  As the Chickasaws had traditionally dealt with the federal government 
in matters relating to any portion of the United States, the Chickasaws recognized that 
entity as the Americans’ representative for foreign relations.  This did not mean, 
however, that the federal government held supreme authority with the union.  The 
inability of that government to protect the Chickasaws from southern demands in the 
1830s revealed that the individual states held an equal, if not more powerful, position in 
relation to the federal government.   
The Chickasaws also constructed their new constitution in a manner to keep 
legal control over the nation’s lands.  The previous eighty years of interaction with the 
United States had demonstrated the importance retaining ownership of their lands as a 
prerequisite for demanding recognition of their sovereignty by the western world.  In 
order to prevent white men who married into the nation from making land claims 
according to western customs, the framers retained their matrilineal custom that ensured 
the property of women remained theirs even if acquired after they married.  As the 
United States had never attempted to secure land through individual cession without 
having negotiated a treaty with the nation first, this provision kept control over the 
nations’ territory within the hands of the Chickasaws’ elected leaders. 
As they did with landownership, the framers continued to restrict the ability of 
outsiders to gain access to the strictures of government as they had first done in 1846.  
Voting rights were open rights to “all free-male persons of the age of nineteen years and 
                                                 
18 Hendrickson, Union, Nation, or Empire, pp. 3-221; quote is on p. 221 
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upwards,” but only if they were Chickasaw citizens by birth or had been adopted as 
such and lived within the Chickasaw Nation for the previous six months.  Further, white 
men who married Chickasaw women were “not eligible to any office of trust or profit in 
this Nation.” Not only did they restrict the influence of outsiders by denying them 
access to public office, the Chickasaws also determined that any politician convicted of 
“having given or offered any bribe to procure his appointment.”  Finally, the three 
branches of government—the judiciary was given its own branch under the 1856 
treaty—held separate powers as an attempt to reduce the ability for kinship groups to 
consolidate too much power despite the persistence of traditional notions of kinship 
responsibility.  In this respect, the Chickasaws demonstrated an understanding that if 
they were to retain autonomy in a world increasingly dominated by the United States, 
they had to fashion a government designed to protect themselves from internal avarice 
as well as external intrusion.19 
The Chickasaws’ creation of a new constitution and their subsequent alliance 
with the Confederate States of America established their society as a Native American 
example within the cadre of nation-states throughout the world.  First, the Chickasaws 
created their nation from a conglomeration of ethnically related kinship groups.  
Second, they explicitly recognized the presence of other groups with whom they had no 
intention to merge.  Finally, their continual emphasis of their right to self-government 
before and after the American Civil War reveals that they sought to present their case in 
                                                 
19 Chickasaw Nation, Constitution, laws, and treaties of the Chickasaws, by 
authority (Tishomingo City: E.J. Foster, 1860), pp. 4-21; quoted passages are on pp. 6, 
19 , and 18 respectively.  See also Champagne, Social Order and Political Change, p. 
198. 
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terms established by Enlightenment philosophers and easily understood by their Euro-
American adversaries.20   
With the creation of a new constitution in 1856, the Chickasaws clearly intended 
to establish themselves as equal players within an international system that included 
both western and Native American actors.  The establishment of a constitutional 
government alone could not secure such recognition, however.  They had to put their 
plan into action.  The first step in doing so was to implement the roles and 
responsibilities of specific officers within the new governmental structure.  At the first 
session of the legislature in October 1856, both houses elected Cyrus Harris as the first 
governor of the Chickasaw Nation.  Overton Love, Speaker of the House of 
Representatives, “administered” Harris’ “oath of office” the following day.21  The 
delegates spent the rest of the 1856 session establishing rules and procedures for the 
government’s operations.  As Chickasaw politics became routine over the next four 
years, lawmakers worked to define their nation as distinct from other native groups and 
states.  Despite a good amount of intermarriage among Chickasaws and Choctaws 
following removal, the Legislature enacted laws to exclude Choctaws from interfering 
in Chickasaw national politics.  However, the years of cohabitation resulted in political 
and financial arrangements through which Americans continued to conduct joint 
negotiations with the two groups until the twentieth century. 
                                                 
20 Although the Chickasaw Nation in 1856 does not fit exactly within the model 
proposed by Benedict Anderson in Imagined Communities, it certainly meets his 
definition of a nation.  Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, revised ed. (New 
York: Verso, 1991), pp. 5-7; Stern, The Structure of International Society, pp. 93-95. 
21 “Official Acts of Governor Cyrus Harris, 1856,” Volume 32, House Records, 
Executive Records and National Officers, Roll 9, Chickasaw Nation Records, Indian 
Archives Division, Microfilm Publications, Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma 
City, OK. 
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*************** 
To compound this dual identity within the framework of diplomacy, one Indian 
Agent represented the Chickasaws and Choctaws to the federal government for the next 
five years.  For the previous three years, members of the Chickasaw Nation 
presented accusations that their assigned agent, Andrew J. Smith, abused his 
responsibility managing the disbursement of annuities.22  Douglas H. Cooper 
officially replaced Smith on March 11, 1856.23  Having served as the Choctaw Agent 
since 1853, Cooper was acquainted with the Chickasaw leaders.  Nevertheless, this did 
not guarantee Cooper the Chickasaws’ support; the days of accepting a foreign emissary 
into the fold were over.  Having fought to regain their independence for almost twenty 
years, the Chickasaws were not yet ready to accept the semi-sovereign status proscribed 
for them by the United States.  Rather, Cooper’s efforts on behalf of the Choctaw’s 
financial objectives and attention to Chickasaw security during this critical period 
would eventually help him earn their trust. 
One of the most pressing issues during the period from 1856 to 1861 became the 
management of the Leased District.  This tract of land lay west of the newly created 
Chickasaw Nation, bounded on the north by the Canadian River and the south by the 
Red River.  For the fee of $800,000, the Choctaws and Chickasaws allowed the federal 
government to use the Leased District for the settlement of other removed tribes.24  
Federal officials thought that this territory would provide a suitable place to resettle the 
                                                 
22 M234, R141. 
23 Gail Eugene Balman, “Douglas Hancock Cooper: Southerner,” (Ph.D. 
dissertation: Oklahoma State University, 1976), p. 125. 
24 Kappler, comp. and ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 2:708. 
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Southern Plains tribes.25  On March 3, 1857, the federal government officially 
determined to establish reservations within the Leased District for “the Southern 
Comanches, Wichitas, and certain other bands of Indians.”26  Violence and tension had 
dominated relations between the Plains tribes and the Five Tribes dating back to the first 
instances of removal in the 1830s.27 
Despite federal designs to appoint a separate Indian Agent for this territory, the 
Chickasaws, along with Cooper and the Choctaws, sought to maintain control over the 
Leased District.28  Writing to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs on May 20, 1857, 
Cooper expressed his aversion to the transfer of the Leased District to the Texas 
Superintendency.  In his letter, Cooper argued that the transfer of the district would 
betray the trust the Choctaws and Chickasaws—many of whom lived in the Leased 
District—had granted to the federal government.29  To show their support for Cooper’s 
efforts, the Choctaw General Council convened on November 4, 1857, to announce 
their desire that Cooper’s duties should expand to include “supervisory and directory 
                                                 
25 ARCIA, 1856, p. 15. 
26 ARCIA, 1858, p. 12. 
27 LaVere, Contrary Neighbors, pp. 70-71. 
28 Kappler, comp. and ed., Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, 2:708; “A.B. 
Greenwood to Jacob Thompson, May 4, 1857,” Letters Received by the Office of 
Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Southern Superintendency, 1851-1871, 1857-1862, National 
Archives Microfilms Publication, Microcopy No. 234, Reel 834 (hereinafter referred to 
as M234, R834). 
29 “Douglas H. Cooper to James W. Denver, May 20, 1857,” Letters Received 
by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-1881, Choctaw Agency, 1856-1859, National 
Archives Microfilms Publication, Microcopy No. 234, Reel 175 (hereinafter referred to 
as M234, R175); Douglas H. Cooper, “Notes on the question of jurisdiction in the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw territory between 98˚ and 100˚ West Longitude for certain 
purposes of the U. States, 1857” in M234, R175. 
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control over” any agency established in relation to the Leased District.30  In turn, the 
Chickasaw Legislature passed a resolution demanding that the Plains tribes leave the 
Leased District.31 
For the next two years, the Leased District remained a high priority for the 
Chickasaws.  During the second half of 1857, the Mormon War engulfed the Utah 
Territory.  This left the Leased District without a force to maintain peace and order.  For 
years, Texans had slowly pushed the Native Americans out of every part of Texas.  
Robert S. Neighbors, the Indian Agent for Texas, worked in a precarious situation.  
Indian Agents usually dealt with tribes in federal territory; however, Texas was 
unique.  The amount of open land in Texas required the presence of an Indian Agent 
to negotiate between the tribes, Texans, and the federal government.  Texans refused 
to acknowledge that any political entity, other than their own state government, held 
sovereign power over the land.  The ability of Texans to impose their will on to the 
federal government most likely reminded the Chickasaws of the power dynamic that 
resulted in their removal to Indian Territory, demonstrating that the United States 
continued to exist as a conglomeration of autonomous sovereign entities joined 
together for mutual benefit.  By the mid-1850s, therefore, the federal government 
resolved that the only way to avert violence between Texans and the tribes was to 
implement a policy of removal, which only added to the Plains tribes’ frustration.32   
                                                 
30 “Resolutions requesting the Gov. of Choctaw Nation to do certain things. 
Passed,” Choctaw Nation Papers, Box 48, Folder 2, Western History Collection, 
University of Oklahoma Libraries, Norman, Oklahoma. 
31 Grant Foreman, A History of Oklahoma (Norman, OK: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1942), p. 89. 
32 Gary Clayton Anderson, The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the 
Promised Land, 1820-1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2005), pp. 172-
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By 1858, the Comanches appeared to be in a highly agitated state.33  Reports 
attributing hostile activities to the Comanches and other Plains tribes abounded.  A large 
group congregated near the Canadian River in the Chickasaw Nation, possibly intending 
to raid Fort Arbuckle.34  In one report, Cooper learned of a conference of Comanches, 
Kiowas, and Wichitas, among other Plains tribes, in which the Indians contemplated an 
offer from the Mormons to join them in their fight against the United States.  Whether 
these reports accurately depicted the actions—and more importantly, the intentions—of 
these Plains tribes is unclear; however, Douglas Cooper believed that their presence in 
Indian Territory posed a threat to the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations.35 
Both Cooper and the Chickasaws agreed to establish a strong presence to deter 
any violent activity by the Comanches.36  In the absence of federal troops to protect the 
fort, Cooper resolved to raise a small force calling “upon the Chickasaws and Choctaws 
for volunteers to defend the frontiers.”  According to Cooper, “a considerable number 
of Chickasaws” volunteered and “were finally organized into two bands under Captains 
Holktiche and Capt George James.”  After establishing this force, however, Cooper 
remained cautious.  He moved his force away from the fort only after troops from the 
                                                                                                                                               
301; Robert A. Trennert, Jr., Alternative to Extinction: Federal Indian Policy and the 
Beginnings of the Reservation System, 1846-1851 (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1975), pp. 61-93. 
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p. 91. 
34 Muriel H. Wright, “General Douglas H. Cooper, C.S.A.,” Chronicles of 
Oklahoma 32:2 (Summer 1954): 151. 
35 “Douglas H. Cooper to Charles E. Mix, April 5, 1858,” M234, R834. 
36 Grant Foreman, “Introduction” to Douglas H. Cooper, “A Journal Kept by 
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found in M234, R834. 
 284 
First Infantry arrived under the command of Lieutenant J.E. Powell on June 30.37  To 
the Chickasaws, this most likely demonstrated that Cooper would not sacrifice the 
defense of their homeland in favor of taking an aggressive course of action elsewhere. 
Cooper’s main goal was to ascertain the presence of “any considerable bodies of 
Comanches within the Chickasaw and Choctaw country.”  Other than a few distant 
plumes of smoke, the Chickasaw volunteers did not encounter any Comanches.  The 
expedition concluded on July 16, and Cooper’s Chickasaw volunteers returned to their 
homes.  Cooper believed the mission was successful.38  He submitted a report of the 
expedition on July 21, 1858.  In this report, Cooper claimed that he acted in accordance 
with “verbal instructions” from Secretary of the Interior Jacob Thompson.  However, 
Thompson refuted Cooper’s justification.  The secretary claimed that the agent was 
“entirely mistaken” and that Cooper’s lack of funding to pay for such a force should 
have precluded him from ever doing so.39  Despite Thompson’s reaction, Cooper 
believed the continued presence of the Comanches posed a threat to the security of the 
Choctaw and Chickasaw Agency.  He requested that Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
Elias Rector authorize him “to raise a regiment or two of Choctaws and Chickasaws.”40  
Although it appears that Cooper never received instructions to move forward with his 
plans, he did not stop promoting this idea.41 
                                                 
37 Cooper, “A Journal Kept by Douglas Cooper,” pp. 382-383; LaVere, 
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Even though officials in Washington admonished Cooper, praise followed from 
within Indian Territory.  Both the Chickasaws and Choctaws commended Cooper for 
his efforts.  On October 26, 1858, the Choctaw General Council issued a resolution 
complimenting “the very able, highly efficient, purely disinterested and successful 
manner” that Cooper exhibited in the conduct of his duties as agent.  The resolution 
specifically cited Cooper’s “prompt, energetic and judicious recent course” of action to 
ease fears “upon the border of” the Leased District.  When the military presence was 
restored in Indian Territory, the Choctaws requested that Cooper return to Washington 
“to assist the Choctaw delegation…in all matters of business pending between the 
government of the United States and the [Choctaw] nation.”42 
Cooper’s efforts to secure the Choctaws’ financial objectives, which related to 
money owed the nation dating back to removal, earned the same confidence from the 
Chickasaws.  In October 1859, the Chickasaws requested that Cooper “to take all legal 
steps which may become necessary to recover possession of any and all lands or just 
and fair compensation” on behalf of the tribe.  In a situation similar to that of the 
Choctaws, the Chickasaws objected to the continual abuse of their funds—earned from 
the sale of their lands in Mississippi—by the federal government.43  Therefore, the 
Chickasaws insisted that Cooper “institute a careful and thorough investigation into 
                                                 
42 “A resolution complimentary to General Douglas H. Cooper, 1858,” Choctaw 
Nation Papers, Box 50, Folder 20, Western History Collection, University of Oklahoma 
Libraries, Norman, Oklahoma. 
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everything connected with the location, sale, and transfer” of land under the Treaties of 
1832 and 1834.44   
It seems that through his defense of the Leased District and competence in 
representing Choctaw financial interests, Cooper earned the Chickasaws trust in matters 
relating to many national affairs.  The Chickasaws further demonstrated their desire to 
have Cooper act on their behalf on November 12, 1860.  The Legislature requested that 
Cooper travel to Washington to assist the Chickasaw delegates’ negotiations on behalf 
of the tribe.  In addition, the election of Abraham Lincoln posed a threat to Cooper’s 
status as the Choctaw and Chickasaw Agent.  Contrary to Lincoln’s avowed stance to 
keep the Union intact, Cooper was an ardent supporter of states’ rights and slavery.  
Cooper’s beliefs were not likely to be viewed favorably within the new president’s 
administration.  The Chickasaw Legislature wished to avoid Cooper’s removal, stating 
that replacing him would prove a step backward for the Chickasaw interests.  Therefore, 
the Legislature voted to have the Governor Cyrus Harris inform Lincoln of the 
Chickasaws’ desire to have Cooper re-appointed as their agent.45 
*************** 
With a consolidated polity and renewed independent spirit, the Chickasaws 
stood poised to take advantage of the schism between the North and South that erupted 
on April 11, 1861.  As events in Kansas threatened to sever the ties of union during the 
mid- to late-1850s, the conjoined themes of territorial expansion and racial subjugation 
that played out in the political development of the territory raised concern among the 
                                                 
44 “Copy of an ald [sic] certified copy of Chickasaw National Legislature’s 
Resolutions of 1860 pertaining to D.H. Cooper, Agent,” Box 1, Folder 12, Douglas H. 
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45 Ibid.  
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Chickasaws and Choctaws about their continued ownership of their lands.  The Kansas-
Nebraska Act reduced the amount of territory reserved for removed Indians in order to 
stave off sectional confrontation over western expansion.  Although neither nation was 
directly affected, this act—combined with the events of Bleeding Kansas and the 
decline of the Democratic Party in the wake of the Lecompton Constitution—provided 
multiple opportunities for the Chickasaws to become intricately aware of the growing 
sectional divide among Americans.46 As the sectional crisis loomed, the Chickasaws 
found their nation in a precarious position. 
Having established an independent identity over the past few years, the 
Chickasaws wanted to protect their full right to self-government.  As such, Chickasaw 
leaders had been working with the other native polities of Indian Territory to preserve 
each other’s territorial integrity.  In November 1859, representatives from the 
Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles entered into a compact, formally 
declaring, “the lands we now possess shall be the undisturbed home of ourselves and 
our posterity forever.”  They further determined that if their territorial status became 
threatened, any one of the nations could request that all convene to discuss their 
concerns and how they should react to the perceived danger.47  Such a threat appeared 
in the fall of 1860.  On October 3, William H. Seward, soon to become Lincoln’s 
Secretary of State, indicated his desire to remove the Indians from the territory as a 
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means of reconciling Northern and Southern interests.  Lincoln’s commitment to keep 
the southern states in the union peacefully and the connection of an ardent expansionist 
such as Seward with the incoming federal administration most likely caused alarm 
among Chickasaw leaders.48  Without control over a defined territory, Chickasaw 
claims of autonomous sovereignty would have become moot.  They would revert to the 
semi-sovereign status to which they committed themselves under the Treaty of 
Doaksville.49   
Fear of losing their lands in Indian Territory led the Chickasaw Legislature to 
pass its resolutions of January 5, 1861.  Removal would further set them back in their 
efforts to regain independent self-government.  To discuss these fears, the Chickasaws’ 
invoked the 1859 compact, calling for the Five Tribes to meet in council.50  Although 
some of the other tribes’ leaders met this request with trepidation, we can assume that 
most Chickasaws supported their legislators’ action.  Despite the dominance of a mixed 
blood, slave-owning elite in Chickasaw tribal politics, if political leaders were to ensure 
their own longevity, they had to enjoy support from the general populace.  It seems 
unlikely that the Chickasaw Legislature would initiate a course of action that others 
perceived to be inherently dangerous without popular support.  Popular support for the 
Chickasaw legislature’s proactive stance seems even more plausible given that only an 
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estimated forty families disagreed with tribal policies enough to leave Indian Territory 
for refuge in Union-governed territory after the Chickasaws actively entered the war.51   
A convention of tribes was held on February 17, 1861, but neither the 
Chickasaws nor the Choctaws sent representatives to attend on their behalf.  Instead, 
these two tribes met on March 10, 1861.  The Choctaws, who already declared their 
intent to join the Confederacy, favored immediate action.  The Chickasaws remained 
uncommitted.  During the winter session, the Legislature agreed to send representatives 
to Washington with the mission of obtaining all outstanding funds for the incompetent 
and orphan Chickasaws.  Having continuously sought this funding since the removal 
negotiations in the 1830s, the Chickasaws most likely knew their demands would be 
ignored once again.  Rather, it seems as if the Chickasaws used that issue to make a 
case for separation based on the United States’ inability to secure the economic needs of 
the nation.52   
On May 25, 1861, the Chickasaw Legislature announced their nation’s 
“independence” from the United States.  The members claimed they could not 
“maintain neutrality” in the anticipated war between the states due to the fact that they 
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were “deprived of their money and destitute of all means of separate self-protection.”  
Despite such ominous tone, however, this was not necessarily a desperate act.  In 
declaring their intent to align with the Confederacy, the Chickasaws made sure to assert 
their sovereignty in the matter.  They asserted, 
The dissolution of the Federal Union, under which the Government of the 
United States existed, has absolved the Chickasaws from the allegiance to any 
foreign government whatever; . . . the people thereof free to form such alliances, 
and take such steps to secure their own safety, happiness, and future welfare as 
may to them seem best. 
 
With this statement, Chickasaw leaders proclaimed that their action was made of their 
own free will, not one that had been forced upon them.  Consequently, they openly 
invited a treaty with the Confederate States and called for all tribes in Indian Territory 
to do the same.  53 
That same day, the legislature adopted Cooper as a member of the tribe, “with 
all of the rights, privileges, and immunities of a citizen” of the nation.54  Despite his 
continued service on behalf of the Chickasaws and Choctaws toward the federal 
government, Cooper had eventually joined the Confederate government.55  Confederate 
President Jefferson Davis, Cooper’s former commander during the Mexican-American 
War, provided a place for Cooper within his administration.  On May 13, 1861, the 
Confederate Secretary of War, L.P. Walker, authorized Cooper to recruit Choctaw and 
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Chickasaw soldiers to support the Confederate cause.  By adopting Cooper as a member 
of the nation, the Legislature most likely drew on traditional notions of native 
diplomacy, and, at the same time, demonstrated another adaptation within their socio-
political organization that incorporated western concepts of diplomacy. 
The adoption established a relationship reminiscent of the appointment of a 
fanemingo, a traditional form of kinship diplomacy used by the Chickasaw and other 
southeastern Indian groups when initiating diplomatic relations with another sovereign 
entity.56  The Chickasaws formal adoption of Cooper into the nation marks a distinct 
difference in the way they approached their relationship with the Confederacy to the 
one they had with the United States.57  They would not simply follow Confederate 
officials’ plans for the war effort.  Although Cooper had already been appointed as the 
Confederacy’s direct emissary to the Chickasaws, his adoption allowed the Chickasaws 
to put their own stamp on Cooper’s selection as their Confederate agent.  Not only did 
the act indicate their approval of early Confederate plans, it also provided a method 
through which Chickasaw leaders could allay fears about an outsider making decisions 
that influenced the nation’s future.  The act symbolized, therefore, the Chickasaws’ 
determination to engage in the Civil War in terms that asserted their status as an 
autonomous, sovereign nation, equal to that of the Confederate States of America.58 
*************** 
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At this point, it seems that all sides had made it clear that the Indian Territory 
was to become greatly involved in the Civil War.  Albert Pike arrived at North Fork 
Town on June 25, 1861.  Despite the statements Chickasaw legislators made the 
previous month to announce their independence, Pike was still uncertain about the 
Indians’ desire to join forces with the Confederacy.  Pike stated, “It was very clear that 
if the Indian tribes were not conciliated and treaties made, they would be confederated 
against us in ninety days.”59  Having dealt with these tribes previously, Pike 
demonstrated an awareness of the pragmatic nature with which they had debated the 
dangers of opposing the federal government.  In justifying the agreements and 
concessions he ultimately gave to the various tribes, Pike claimed, “among the five 
principal tribes there is no lack of shrewd, capable and well informed men.”  In Pike’s 
mind, the tribes knew that the North held an advantage in capabilities to conduct a war.  
Despite the persistent treaty transgressions committed by the United States, “the contest 
seemed, at best, a very doubtful one [to the tribes], to engage in which on their part was 
most dangerous.”60  It may be implied that securing treaties with the Chickasaws and 
Choctaws were lesser concerns for Pike, as both nations had declared their national 
independence from the United States and stated their intent to form alliances with the 
Confederacy in May.  In his report, however, Pike alluded to difficulties faced in 
finalizing the treaties: “an Indian has no idea that time is of any value; and therefore, 
patience is a peculiarly necessary virtue in dealing with them.”61  Pike’s frustration 
                                                 
59 “Report of Albert Pike,” p. 22. 
60 Ibid., p. 20. 
61 Ibid., p. 26. 
 293 
indicates that the Indians did not really feel a pressing need to choose a side; they 
needed to weigh options with their own interests in mind.   
Regarding the specifics of the treaties, Pike assured the tribes that the 
Confederacy would assume the role previously played by the federal government.  But 
the Chickasaws did not necessarily want this; they felt that it was better to back those 
attempting to throw off the yoke of federal power.  According to Pike, each tribe’s 
delegates “met me in a spirit of the most perfect frankness, never asked for anything 
wrong, illiberal or extravagant, and only desired to have just claims and rights of their 
people recognized and secured, and to make such advances toward political 
independence as they might well ask and we concede.”62  Pike sensed this desire to 
retain whatever independence the tribes could and acted accordingly.  He even went so 
far as to assure the Chickasaws and the Choctaws of the right to apply for statehood 
should they desire.  “It was useless to tell these Indians that they had nothing to fear 
from the love of land of the people of the Southern States, but that the States of the 
North would inevitably rob them of these lands.”  The Chickasaws most likely 
remembered that Confederates wanted to expand into the western territories as much as 
did their Union counterparts.63  While Pike’s gesture was not entirely genuine—
Douglas Cooper had been pushing a similar concept since the conclusion of the 1855 
treaty—it is important to note that the Chickasaws did not object when the Confederate 
Congress later removed this provision from the treaty.  They may not have been aware 
of the provision’s removal; however, their resistance to Cooper’s efforts to push them 
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toward statehood in the late 1850s implies that it was never really one of their internal 
goals.  They wanted to be free of American political influence, not a part of it. 64 
The Chickasaws envisioned themselves participating in the United States Civil 
War as equal, albeit weaker, states within an international context, and their leaders 
were determined to keep it this way.  Neither the Union nor the Confederacy could 
demand the Chickasaws’ allegiance.  Not only were the United States weakened by 
secession, but the creation of the Confederate States of America offered a new, albeit 
disjointed, power with which to balance federal ambitions.  Confederate legislators may 
have wished to assume the role of the Indians legal guardian, executive branch officials 
soon realized the limits of their power.  Despite a desire among Chickasaws and 
Choctaws to side with the Confederacy, the latter could not dictate the terms under 
which Native Americans supported their cause.65 
*************** 
Not all Chickasaws agreed with their government’s course of action.  Early on, 
about forty families—comprised of about 225 individuals—left for Union-controlled 
Kansas, where they maintained a neutral stance throughout the war.66  In a letter dated 
November 16, 1861, William P. Dole, U.S. Commissioner of Indian Affairs, informed 
Major General David H. Hunter, Commander of the Western District of the U.S. Army, 
“that ‘a talk’ has already been had with some of the chiefs who represent the Seminoles, 
Chickasaws, and Creeks.”  Dole wrote that these chiefs claimed the Confederates 
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“deceived” them into believing the United States no longer existed, and “that the 
Indians will readily continue their dependence upon the United States when persuaded 
that the government is still maintained, and that it will not only give them all necessary 
protection, but faithfully perform all its treaties with them.”  Dole also requested that 
Hunter assure the chiefs, whom he was to meet, that the federal government would 
resume the payment of the tribes’ annuities “so soon as its agents can be established in 
their midst.”67  There is no record that the legitimate leaders of the Chickasaw Nation 
met with Federal officials during this time as most of the Five Tribes refused to 
communicate with the Union.  By all accounts, these families were only a small portion 
of the Chickasaw constituency.   
Unlike the Creeks and Cherokees, therefore, the Chickasaws remained relatively 
united in their effort to support the Confederate cause.  In all likelihood, this was 
because the Chickasaw delegates who negotiated the treaty with the Confederacy 
worked to ensure that the nation’s contributions to the war effort would only be used to 
defend their homelands.  Pike recognized a desire to ensure their troops fought only to 
protect their own national territory; therefore, the treaties often included language to 
guarantee this demand.  And yet, the Indian forces had to fit into the overarching 
Confederate plans since their troops would be fighting as part of the Confederate Army.  
Jefferson Davis, as president of the Confederate States, held the authority to appoint 
commanding officers.  He had already indicated his first choice for commander of the 
combined Choctaw and Chickasaw forces when he had L.P. Walker authorize Cooper to 
recruit soldiers from the two nations in May. 
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Cooper’s efforts over the past five years as the Chickasaws’ Indian Agent earned 
him the full support of the nation, symbolized through their adoption of Cooper.68  
Traditionally, fanemingos were recognized as “some growing man of Esteem in the 
Warrs,” a status that Cooper earned through his defense of the Leased District in 1858.69  
Although the Choctaws declared independence on June 14 and had already indicated 
they would support the Confederate cause, they did not necessarily want Cooper to lead 
their troops.70  According to Sampson Folsom, the politically active nephew of Choctaw 
leader Peter Pitchlynn, Chickasaw unity in the late 1850s had the potential to push other 
Native American groups in Indian Territory to follow along in pursuit of Chickasaw 
objectives.71  Statements by Choctaw leaders issued during and after the war reveal 
suspicions that Cooper had embezzled money due the nation just prior to his 
resignation.72  Given the accusations, it is possible that he did not enjoy the full support 
of the Choctaw leadership in terms of commanding their troops.  A letter from Sampson 
Folsom to Albert Pike in early August 1861 further supports this idea.  After the First 
Regiment of Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles ranks filled, the Choctaws had 
enough volunteers to organize “7 or 8 [more] Companies…to serve the Confederate 
States.”  Although officials originally thought to send the offer to provide another 
regiment to Jefferson Davis, himself, they reconsidered, preferring that Albert Pike 
“attend to the matter for us” instead.  As Pike had been working to remove Cooper from 
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his command—arguing that an Indian Agent should not act as a military commander at 
the same time—it is possible that the Choctaws believed Cooper held too much 
influence in their internal affairs and therefore sought a different commander for this 
new regiment.73 
Regardless, the First Regiment of Choctaw and Chickasaw Mounted Rifles rode 
into battle in November 1861 under the command of Col. Douglas H. Cooper.  It is 
likely that Cooper allayed Choctaw concerns about his growing influence over their 
nation and citizens, to some extent, by appointing Tandy Walker, Principle Chief of the 
Choctaw Nation, as his second in command with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel.  The 
regiment’s mission was to assist in efforts to thwart the loyalist Creeks, under the 
leadership of Opothleyahola, who were moving north to Kansas.  On December 27, 
1861, the Confederate Indian forces defeated the Unionist Creeks in the Battle of 
Chustenahlah.74   Despite riding a hide tide into 1862, the Confederacy suffered a major 
defeat at the Battle of Pea Ridge (Arkansas) the following March.  The battle, which 
lasted several days, was a major turning point in the war.  According to Laurence 
Hauptman, the loss marked the official beginning of the Cherokees’ internal civil war, 
reigniting an internal schism that dated back to removal. 75   
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The Chickasaw soldiers did not participate in the Battle of Pea Ridge, and 
therefore did not suffer the same loss of morale.  In fact, their determination to be an 
equal member of the Confederate war effort remained strong.  In fall 1862, Confederate 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs S.S. Scott asked the Chickasaws to provide refuge to 
approximately 140 Toncawa men, women, and children.  Governor Colbert sought the 
advice of “Colonel Pickens, Captain Gamble and Captain Sheco” to determine the 
Chickasaws’ response.  Although they acquiesced to Scott’s request, they qualified their 
consent to ensure that both Scott and the Toncawas recognized Chickasaw sovereignty 
over their territory.  Colbert replied, “You are duly authorized to make this temporary 
removal of these Indians, provided they are subject to the laws of the Chickasaw nation, 
and will furnish guides to the Home Guards and the Chickasaw Battalion, when called 
upon to do so.”76 
Despite this resolute stance, the retributions enacted by pro-Union and pro-
Confederate Cherokees against each other over the next three years affected the 
Chickasaw greatly.  Union forces controlled the northern half of Indian Territory by 
mid-1863, after which many Confederate Indians sought refuge in the Chickasaw 
Nation.  To complicate matters further, the close proximity of union forces forced 
Chickasaw government to cease functioning in their own territory, as Governor 
Winchester Colbert fled to Texas in 1864.77 
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As the Confederate effort spiraled downward after 1863, the Confederate 
Indians sought to take matters into their own hands.  Stand Watie, the Confederate 
Cherokee who rose to the rank of Brigadier General during the war, proposed that the 
Five Tribes break away from the Confederacy in August 1863.  He did not intend to 
give up the cause, however; rather, he proposed that the nations continue fighting the 
Union as an entirely new and separate entity.78  Although this idea never materialized, 
the Confederate Indians continued fighting after General Robert E. Lee surrendered to 
Ulysses S. Grant at Appomattox Courthouse on April 9, 1865.  Perhaps sensing the end 
was near, on May 26, the nations of Indian Territory convened at Camp Napoleon, near 
the Chickasaw Nation-Leased District border.  The representatives determined to 
negotiate their own terms of surrender and entered into a compact of peace wherein all 
agreed that to fight amongst themselves was futile:  they had to work together to against 
the Americans in the future.79 
The tribes’ leaders elected to meet at Armstrong Academy in the Choctaw 
Nation on September 1, 1865; however, the federal government had other plans.80  The 
United States government sent a delegation to Fort Smith in September 1865, for the 
purpose of reconstructing the relationships between the Indian tribes and the United 
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States.  Council proceedings began on September 8, 1865.  U.S. Commissioner D.N. 
Cooley opened his remarks by reminding the tribes that by forming alliances with the 
Confederate States, they had abrogated their rights under their pre-war treaties with the 
federal government.  The purpose of the council, therefore, was to negotiate new 
treaties with all of the tribes.  Over the course of the next ten days, both pro-Union and 
pro-Confederate delegates appeared before the commissioners multiple times.  The 
tribal representatives voiced justifications for wartime actions and concerns regarding 
the government’s stipulations for reconciliation.  The commissioners outlined seven 
requirements for reconstruction of the tribes, including the abolition of slavery and 
incorporation of freedmen as citizens, the cession of lands for future settlement of more 
Native Americans in the territory, and recognition of the government’s desire to create a 
single government for the territory.81  These conditions would result in considerable 
consternation among Native Americans for many years following the war.  
Representatives of several tribes that supported the Confederacy, including the 
Chickasaws, missed the opening proceedings as they previously agreed to meet at 
Armstrong Academy in the Choctaw Nation on September 1.  Consequently, they did 
not arrive until September 10 or 11.  From this point on, the Chickasaw Nation acted in 
a unified manner.  In fact, the Unionist Chickasaws present at the 1865 Fort Smith 
council prior to the arrival of the official representatives admitted that they were a 
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minority with no right to speak on behalf of the Chickasaw Nation.82  On September 18, 
the Chickasaws proclaimed before a commission of United States delegates, that they  
were not induced by the machinations of the emissaries of the Confederate 
States to sever out treaty stipulations with the government of the United States, 
but that we made treaties with the Confederate States, from what appeared to us 
as our interest seemed to dictate, and as the means of preserving our 
independence and national identity, considering ourselves a separate political 
organization, and our country composing an integral part of the territory of the 
United States.  [Further, they stated,] As nations, we are ready and willing to 
resume such relations [with the United States], and sign this treaty of peace and 
amity, in all sincerity, claiming no rights but those properly belonging to us. 
 
The Chickasaw delegates made several more statements to the United States’ 
commissioners during the Fort Smith peace council.  In all of these statements, the 
Chickasaws’ delegates refused to place the blame solely on southern transgressions.  
While the delegates stated that the close proximity of Confederate entities factored into 
tribal deliberations, they also boldly proclaimed that the achievement of self-
government was the Nation’s underlying intent from the beginning:  “to establish what 
we believed to be the great cardinal principle of republican liberty—the right of self-
government.”83 
Despite analyses that proclaim that southerners coerced the Indians to ally with 
the Confederacy against the federal government, the Chickasaws statements at Fort 
Smith following the war should be respected, not brushed aside.  Although their 
reasoning changed slightly during the war, the rhetoric did not.  The Chickasaws always 
presented their decision to join the Confederate war effort as one allowed to any 
sovereign state within the realm of international diplomacy, unlike their Confederate 
allies who shifted away from a racially based defense of slavery to one emphasizing 
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state’s rights.84  In a response to one of the Unionist Chickasaws on July 2, 1865, 
Chickasaw Governor Winchester Colbert asserted:   
We are not rebels against you or the United States Government or any other 
Government.  But you seem to have forgotten that you rebelled against your 
own Government.  You left your country and home in the hour of trial and 
danger and went to the enemy.  The Chickasaws….have never violated a single 
treaty stipulation.  The United States deserted us four years ago by [removing] 
her troops and left us without protection under a protest, then refused us arms 
and ammunition with which to defend and protect our country.  Consequently 
we allied ourselves to the Confederated States Government.85   
 
Colbert wrote this statement before official treaties were concluded to determine how 
the United States would treat the tribes following the war.  Clearly, the Chickasaws felt 
that it was within their right to protect their sovereignty by aligning with an alternative 
power if it suited their interests better.  
Not only did their actions signify a repudiation of federal authority, akin to 
southern secession, but also the Chickasaws saw this opportunity as a chance to reassert 
their independence that had long been denied them by the United States.  In the 
Chickasaws’ quest to maintain autonomous sovereignty, they held a vested interest in 
seeing the Union dissolve in the early stages of 1861.  An alliance with the South 
signified a reasonable and pragmatic step towards such as the importance of Indian 
Territory became a clear factor in the impending United States Civil War.  Therefore, 
when Albert Pike negotiated treaties of alliance between the Confederate States of 
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America and various tribes in Indian Territory during the summer of 1861, he did so in 
the manner of one sovereign diplomat to another.   
*************** 
It is impossible to deny the presence of cultural and economic influences 
regarding the Chickasaws activities of 1861.  However, the creation of a consolidated 
nation-state under an independent constitutional government in 1856 poised the nation 
to take advantage of the war between the United States.  In choosing to ally with the 
Confederacy, however, the Chickasaws demonstrated that internal tribal desires took 
precedence over external influences.  Not only did their actions signify a repudiation of 
federal authority, as did southern secession, but the Chickasaws saw this opportunity as 
a chance to regain their independence which had long been denied them by the United 
States.  An alliance with the South signified a reasonable and pragmatic step to regain 
the Chickasaws’ independent sovereignty from Americans as the importance of Indian 
Territory became a clear factor in the impending United States Civil War. 
Just as European powers were curious to see whether the republican experiment 
undertaken by the former British colonies in North America would succeed, so too were 
the Native American communities with whom the United States shared territory.  
Chickasaw diplomacy and political development during the Early American Republic 
reveals a group that had not yet accepted a permanent semi-sovereign status in relation 
to the United States.  Further, the federal-state relationship offered opportunities for the 
Chickasaws to negotiate for recognition of autonomous sovereignty through the end of 
the Civil War.  Such opportunities may have disappeared immediately following 
removal, but this is most likely attributable to succession of several presidential 
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administrations whose political ambitions coincided with key sectional interests among 
the states.  Americans’ ideological differences over the federal government’s role in the 
United States political structure continued to persist.  When the sectional crisis of the 
1850s erupted in civil war, therefore, an opportunity emerged for native communities to 
re-establish the “play-off system” by supporting the introduction of an entirely new 
Euro-American imperial power (the Confederate States of America) into the 
international political order. 
The Chickasaws’ decision to align with the Confederacy demonstrates that 
native polities’ ability to balance the ambitions of western powers had not yet ended.  
Both the Chickasaws and Confederates held deep cultural commitments to the right to 
self-determination.  Although neither was overly committed to preserving that right for 
the other during the Early Republic, by the 1860s, the desire for be free of federal 
intrusion became a shared goal.  And yet, simple incorporation into the Confederate 
polity threatened a similar subjugated position as they suffered under the United States.  
The only way for the Chickasaws to retain sovereignty, therefore, was to make Indian 
Territory a Native American center and a Euro-American periphery.  The establishment 
of the Confederacy offered such an opportunity.  The creation of the Confederate States 
of America introduced a new political entity through which Native American peoples 
could balance imperial-minded nations against each other in the effort to preserve their 
own autonomous sovereignty. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
If the minds of our people here could once be disabused of the fallacious 
idea that this Indian Territory is a separate and distinct government from 
the United States then there would be little trouble in shaping a policy 
that would lead us out of all our difficulties; but just so long as they hold 
to the absurd notion that these little Indian governments stand in the 
same relation to the United States that England, France, and Germany 
do, just that long will they find themselves floundering about in deep 
water, unable to swim and liable to be drowned at any moment.    
 — Star Vindicator, December 29, 1877 
 
Despite American desires to place Indian peoples into the subjugated condition 
of wards to the federal government, Native Americans continued to fight for recognition 
of their autonomous sovereignty throughout the nineteenth century.  Americans placed 
Indians within the legal definition of domestic, dependent nations through Chief Justice 
John Marshall’s 1831 decision in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.  As this decision helped 
set the stage for the forced migrations of Native Americans in the 1830s, we often 
assume that the process of removal helped secure native acceptance of the permanent 
semi-sovereign status Marshall defined for them.  As the editor of the Star-Vindicator 
indicated in 1877, however, many Native Americans in Indian Territory, including 
Chickasaws, viewed themselves as members of independent, sovereign nations after 
their removal west of the Mississippi.1   
It is my contention that defeat in the Civil War and the experience of 
Reconstruction forced the Chickasaws to accept that they were a domestic, dependent 
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nation within the United States.  Reconstruction for the Confederate-allied Indians had 
two important goals.  First, the federal government needed to re-establish the 
relationships with Native American groups that the Civil War disrupted.  Second, 
Americans desired to open Indian Territory for the cultural, commercial, and 
geographic expansion of their own society.  Although the Chickasaws placed 
themselves in a semi-sovereign status according to the reconstruction treaty of 1866, the 
permanency of this status was still debatable.  As the Chickasaws fought to preserve 
autonomy and recognition of their separate nationhood, the pursuit of the federal 
government in achieving these goals resulted in the loss of autonomy all Indian nations 
experienced at the turn of the twentieth century. 
The reconstruction treaty negotiations began in September 1865 at Fort Smith.  
Each tribe left the council having signed a preliminary treaty renewing their allegiance 
to the United States; however, most tribes required popular consent to approve the 
specific measures of the treaty.  The Chickasaw negotiations proved even more 
complicated.  According to pre-war treaties, the Chickasaws shared land with the 
Choctaws; therefore, the United States determined to treat with both nations 
simultaneously.  The three sides reached an agreement on April 28, 1866.  Although the 
United States ratified the treaty by July 10, the Chickasaws ratification process took 
much longer.  On July 12, Winchester Colbert and Peter Pitchlynn, the Chickasaw and 
Choctaw leaders, published an address to their respective nations in favor of ratification.  
The two leaders identified two areas they considered to be critical to the retention of 
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sovereignty—citizenship and landownership—both of which are related to home rule, 
the same concept that was central to reconstruction in the American South.2 
Concerning citizenship, Chickasaw activities over the next thirty years illustrate 
a desire to maintain autonomy within their own territory and polity.  Chickasaw 
Governor Winchester Colbert joined with Choctaw Chief Peter Pitchlynn to argue in 
favor of adopting their peoples’ former slaves based on racial and economic reasons; 
however, their constituencies did not agree.3  Although they agreed to emancipate their 
slaves, the Chickasaws refused to incorporate them into the citizenry.  Even the offer of 
$300,000—proposed as compensation for the federal government’s seizure of the 
Leased District—to ease the financial burden of additional members to the nation could 
not induce the Chickasaws to adopt the freedmen.4  Rather, the Chickasaws demanded 
that the federal government use the money to remove the freedmen from their territory 
once and for all.  The racialized nature of this decision cannot be denied.  Over the next 
thirty years, the Chickasaws went to great lengths to deny citizenship to their former 
slaves, many of whom even had a Chickasaw parent.  Yet, it is important to understand 
that, as with their reason for joining the Confederacy, they justified this exclusion 
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within the context of sovereignty.  The Chickasaws refused to submit to this demand 
because they feared that granting full citizenship rights to those who they believed held 
no particular allegiance to the nation would lead to the dissolution of tribal authority.5  
Eventually, even the rights of intermarried or adopted whites—who had initially been 
granted citizenship according to the treaty—became an issue as the Chickasaw 
government revoked specific rights of intermarried citizens, whom they felt were 
undermining tribal authority through access to voting and land ownership.6   
As the Chickasaws remained firm in their opposition to expanding access to 
citizenship, control over the land became the primary issue that would ultimately lead to 
their loss of autonomy and sovereignty to the United States.  Native American 
communities recognized that land was a fundamental source of sovereignty.  Even 
though the Chickasaws had come to believe that any land that they could call their own 
would do, the loss of land in the post-Civil War era posed a direct threat to Native 
American sovereignty because removal was no longer an option.7  Therefore, 
Chickasaw politicians fought to secure Chickasaw governance over the land against 
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what they deemed to be collusion between the federal government, railroad companies, 
and land speculators.8 
The key concern involving landownership stemmed from the reconstruction 
treaty’s provision for division of the nation’s land in severalty.  Colbert and Pitchlynn 
voiced their opinion in favor of allotment.  The two leaders remarked upon how 
national ownership of land resulted in the loss of the Leased District as a spoil of war:  
“Had we held our lands in this manner before the war, we would have been now under 
no necessity to have parted with an acre of them.”  As the issue concerning the adoption 
of freedmen versus forfeiture of payment for the Leased District illustrated, public lands 
became the spoils of war.  Further, the treaty required the Chickasaws to allow 
construction of railways through their nation eventually, which eventually undermined 
their control over the land.9   
Following Colbert’s logic, early Reconstruction-era administrations promoted 
allotment as a means to thwart American designs to gain control over the land in Indian 
Territory.  On August 3, 1870, the Chickasaw “formally requested [for] their lands [to] 
be surveyed into townships, and sections, in accordance with” the treaty of 1866.10  
Revealing the dynamic nature of Native American polities in the fight against 
subjugation, some Chickasaws were willing to part with cultural traditions in order to 
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“The Chickasaw View of the Railroad: Accommodation, Resistance, and the Demise of 
Sovereignty,” The Journal of Chickasaw History and Culture 11:3 (Fall 2008): 8-31. 
10 “J.D. Cox to the Commissioner of the General Land Office, August 29, 1870,” 
M234, R142, FF0628-0635. 
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preserve sovereignty.11  However, the Chickasaw could not act alone.  The 1866 treaty 
restored the co-dependent status of political decision-making that the Chickasaw fought 
to free themselves of in the 1850s, especially concerning land ownership.  In order for 
the Chickasaw lands to be divided in severalty, therefore, the Choctaw had to agree to 
the same for their lands.  Despite Pitchlynn’s agreement with Colbert, the majority of 
Choctaw did not share his sentiments.12 
Under siege by American interests and at odds with their territorial co-owners, 
two political divisions—the National Party and the Progressive Party—emerged by the 
late 1870s, each with its own ideas about the proper way to maintain sovereignty.  The 
battles between these two groups for popular support between 1874 and 1884 indicate a 
shift in the Chickasaws understanding of the nature of their relationship with the federal 
government.  In his 1876 annual address to the national legislature, Governor Benjamin 
Overton, a National Party member, commented on the tenuous nature of Chickasaw 
sovereignty.  Overton observed that while the United States recognized the Chickasaws 
“as being an independent political community,” the tenure of that status was possibly at 
an end.  According to Overton, “men and the implements of war [are] the only means 
by which we can enforce our legal and just demands upon foreign powers and make 
them strictly adhere to all international provisions governing such independent 
communities.”  The Chickasaws had neither of these on their own:  “Time and the 
ravages of the most cruel wars have swept our race from the stage of action, and we, the 
once few survivors of a once powerful race, will no more be numbered with 
                                                 
11 Message of Cyrus Harris, The Vindicator (September 14, 1872), Folder 3, 
Cyrus H. Harris Collection, Western History Collections; Gibson, The Chickasaws, 
p. 265.  
12 Gibson, The Chickasaws, p. 265. 
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communities of national strength and greatness.”  To illustrate his point about the 
futility of warfare against a unified United States, Overton referenced the current Sioux 
battles to protect the Black Hills and the earlier Red Stick Uprising among the Creeks.  
Thus, Overton suggested that the Chickasaws take the lead—along with the Cherokees, 
Choctaws, Creeks, and Seminoles—in establishing a confederation among Indian 
peoples.13 
Despite Overton’s recognition of the Chickasaws as a dependent nation under 
the hegemony of the United States, he was determined to demonstrate Chickasaw 
autonomy within the confines of their own territory.  The Chickasaws had not yet 
officially ratified the 1866 treaty, and the primary sticking point involved the status of 
the Chickasaw Freedmen.  Federal officials had delayed removing the freedmen from 
the nation, hoping that the Chickasaws would reconsider their firm stance incorporating 
their former slaves as citizens.14  Overton cautioned the Chickasaws against such a 
course of action.  Overton compared the adoption of the freedmen to “sign[ing] the 
death-warrant of your Nationality with your own hands; for the negroes will be the 
wedge with which our country will be rent asunder and opened up to the whites; and 
then the grand scheme so artfully devised by the treaty of 1866, will have been effected, 
and the ends of the conspirators attained.”15  When the legislature ratified the 
reconstruction treaty on October 17, 1876, they once again stated their preference to 
have the United States remove the freedman rather than adopt them as full members of 
                                                 
13 “Message of B. F. Overton,” The Vindicator (September 20, 1876), Folder 6, 
Box O-22, Benjamin F. Overton Collection, Western History Collections, University of 
Oklahoma Libraries, Norman, OK. 
14 Gibson, The Chickasaws, pp. 259-261. 
15 “Message of B. F. Overton.” 
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the nation.16  These demonstrations of local authority illustrate the Chickasaws’ belief 
that although they might be dependent, they would not simply bow to federal officials’ 
desires. 
In a further demonstration of autonomy, Governor Overton approved several 
acts restricting the ability of United States citizens to conduct business in and even 
intermarry into the nation.  The most important of these was the Permit Law, which 
required non-citizens to purchase a permit authorizing their presence and right to work 
in the nation.  Overton’s zealous enforcement of the law earned him many enemies, 
including the Secretary of the Interior.  On June 4, 1878, the Secretary forced Overton 
to compromise regarding the permit law.  The Secretary refused to pay interest due the 
nation unless Overton suspended that law.  Although Overton complied, he reserved the 
right to re-instate the law if he so chose.  More importantly, many prominent Chickasaw 
politicians objected to what the editor of the Star-Vindicator termed Overton’s 
“tyrannical rule.”  These men joined the Chickasaw agent, Lemuel Reynolds, in a 
petition to the United States Government.17  Further, they supported Cyrus Harris in his 
bid to return as governor as the Progressive candidate in the 1878 election.  Overton, 
barred from re-election by a constitutional rule limiting the number of consecutive 
terms selected his treasurer, B. C. Burney, to succeed him until he could run again in 
1880.   
The 1878 election became a battleground for the future of Chickasaw autonomy.  
The Burney faction portrayed Harris as being in favor of a territorial government 
                                                 
16 “An Act Confirming the Treaty of 1866,” Constitution and Laws of the 
Chickasaw Nation, p. 120-121, quote on p. 121. 
17 Letter to Dear Mac, Star-Vindicator (April 27, 1878), Folder 50, Box O-22, 
Benjamin F. Overton Collection. 
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controlled by the federal government.  Harris won the popular vote by a close margin; 
however, through a deft political maneuver, Overton had the legislature throw out some 
of the votes as fraudulent and declared Burney the winner.18  Although the Star-
Vindicator reported that Harris would contest the result to the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs, the former governor quietly stepped aside.19  If Harris had appealed to federal 
authority to uphold his election, his action would have indicated a clear acceptance that 
the Chickasaws were both a dependent and domestic nation under the hegemony of the 
United States.  Combined with the return of Overton as chief executive in 1880, 
Harris’s acquiescence indicates that the majority of Chickasaws respected the 
constitutional government they had established prior to the Civil War, and refused to let 
the factional disagreements rise to the levels they reached in the 1790s and 1840s. 
Over the next twenty years, the Chickasaws worked to preserve autonomy and 
recognition of their separate national status.  They recommitted themselves to retaining 
communal landownership, defining who could be citizens and to what rights those 
individuals were entitled, and opposing to any form of territorial government organized 
under the leadership of American authorities.  Further, Chickasaw leaders continued to 
operate as representatives of an independent political entity and engaged in international 
conventions with the other tribes in Indian Territory to oppose federal intrusion on their 
local affairs.  In 1886, the Chickasaws sent delegates to a conference of Indian tribes 
held at Eufaula in the Creek Nation.  At the conference, each nation agreed that no 
                                                 
18 John Bartlett Meserve, Governor Benjamin Franklin Overton and Governor 
Benjamin Crooks Burney, Chronicles of Oklahoma 16, no. 2 (June 1938):  227; John 
Bartlett Meserve, Governor Cyrus Harris, Chronicles of Oklahoma 15, no. 4 (December 
1937):  385. 
19 Editorial on B. C. Burney and Cyrus Harris, Star-Vindicator (Sept. 28, 1878), 
Folder 4, Box B-35, B. C. Burney Collection, Western History Collections. 
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member would cede any territory to the United States without having first obtained 
approval from the other members.20 
Again, the importance of retaining ownership over the land is important to 
understanding the Chickasaws’ submission to the loss of autonomy the United States 
demanded from them by the end of the nineteenth century.  In 1890, Governor William 
L. Byrd appealed to President Benjamin Harrison regarding increased intrusion by 
white people into Chickasaw lands, which was against the provisions of the 1866 treaty.  
Byrd indicated that Chickasaw autonomy rested solely on their retention of the lands 
guaranteed to them by treaty and therefore on the United States Government’s 
willingness to uphold its obligations under that treaty.  Further, Byrd indicated a 
difference that separated this era of intrusion from that of Removal:  in the late-
nineteenth century, emigration to new land was no longer an option to escape the grasp 
of American authority.21  Therefore, when the federal government authorized the Dawes 
Commission to secure allotment for the Five Civilized Tribes, the Chickasaws 
redoubled their efforts to preserve tribal autonomy. 
Although the Dawes Severalty Act (1887) exempted the Five Tribes from 
allotment of their lands without tribal consent, this did not imply that they would be 
immune from federal pressure to do so.  Governor Robert M. Harris recognized that the 
commission would not respect any assertions of native sovereignty even when 
guaranteed by existing treaties.  He also realized that the Chickasaws must negotiate 
any new treaty from a position of strength.  Therefore, he recommended that the 
                                                 
20 “Compact Between the Several Tribes of the Indian Territory,” Constitution 
and Laws of the Chickasaw Nation, pp. 181-185. 
21 Wm. L. Byrd, Governor to the President of the United States of America, July 
2, 1890,” Constitution and Laws of the Chickasaw Nation, pp. 273-274.   
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Chickasaws appoint a delegation to meet in conference with the other Indian nations to 
ascertain all of the available options.22   
The Choctaws soon undermined the Chickasaws position.  The Dawes 
Commission secured an agreement with the Choctaws and determined “to extend the 
treaty over to [the Chickasaws] whether they favor[ed] it or not.”  When the Chickasaw 
delegates protested, the commissioners refused to listen.23  For Harris, the report of his 
delegates’ treatment by the Dawes Commissioners only made the Chickasaws’ situation 
all the more grave.  He called the legislature together for a special session in January 
1897.  Harris urged the legislators to take action, but he cautioned against a show of 
defiance.  He indicated his belief that if the Chickasaws showed deference to the United 
States, they might be able to retain a degree of autonomy.24 
The Chickasaws successfully protested the Dawes Commission-Choctaw 
agreement to the Senate; however, the success was not long-lived.  As they celebrated 
their successful petition, the Chickasaws learned of an amendment to the Indian 
Appropriation Bill that threatened to destroy tribal authority altogether.  This compelled 
the Chickasaws to negotiate the Atoka Agreement with the Choctaws and the Dawes 
Commissioners later that spring.  The agreement prescribed a formula for the allotment 
of the Chickasaw and Choctaw lands and set a timeline for the dissolution of their 
national governments.25  As Harris predicted, contrition on the part of the Chickasaws 
                                                 
22 Portion of Message of R. M. Harris, The Indian Citizen (Sept. 24, 1896), 
Folder 1, Box H-49, Robert M. Harris Collection, Western History Collections. 
23 Interview with R. L. McLish, South McAlester Capital (December 3, 1896), 
Folder 5, Box H-49, Robert M. Harris Collection. 
24 Copy of “Special Message of R. M. Harris,” Folder 6, Box H-49, Robert M. 
Harris Collection.  Original on file at Oklahoma Historical Society, Doc. # 12942. 
25 Deloria and DeMallie, Documents of American Indian Diplomacy, 1:391-398 
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secured some vestiges of autonomy from the Dawes Commissioners.  According to the 
agreement, the Chickasaws retained mineral rights and finally settled the Freedmen 
question by denying them rights to land ownership.26   
Despite acquiescing to the Atoka Agreement, ratification required national 
consent through a popular vote.  Harris campaigned for ratification, indicating his belief 
that Chickasaw consent would save their nation from the dissolution threatened in the 
Indian Appropriation Act.27  Despite Harris’s pleas, however, the Chickasaws voted 
against the Atoka Agreement on December 1, 1897.  Similar events played out in the 
other Indian nations.  In response, an impatient Congress approved the Curtis Act on 
June 28, 1898.  The act abolished tribal governments and allowed for the allotment of 
land without native consent.28  In response, the Chickasaws ratified the Atoka 
Agreement that August.  According to the editor of the Wapanucka Press, “Before the 
expiration of the terms of the governors of the various Indian ‘Nations,’ the United 
States will have assumed control of the government of the Territory, and the course of 
imperialism will have ended there.”29 
                                                 
26 Ratification Favored by R. M. Harris, The Claremore Progress (May 22, 
1897), Folder 12, Box H-49, Robert M. Harris Collection. 
27 Message of R. M. Harris, The Indian Citizen (Sept. 16, 1897), Folder 16, Box 
H-49, Robert M. Harris Collection. 
28 Laws Relating to the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma, 1890-1914 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1915); Prucha, The Great Father, 1:195, 
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(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1940; reprint, 1991), p. 33; Leonard A. Carlson, 
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Folder 7, Palmer S. Mosely Collection, Western History Collections. 
 317 
The recognition among Chickasaws that they existed in a permanent semi-
sovereign status came not through the process of removal but following their failed 
effort to support the creation of the Confederate States of America and re-incorporation 
into the United States political system.  Not only did Union victory demonstrate the 
power of the federal government to hold the United States together, the United States 
embarked on a unified effort of rapid expansion westward following the war, this time 
unhindered by the issue of slavery.  Americans stood poised to fulfill their self-
proclaimed manifest destiny.  As it did for their former Confederate allies, 
Reconstruction for the Chickasaw Nation became a battle over home rule and the extent 
to which local authority would reign.  Unlike their southern counterparts, however, 
notions of racial difference precluded a victory, or even a stalemate, for the Chickasaws.  
Although southern Democrats accepted the power of the federal government to keep the 
United States together, they regained control of local and state government by the end 
of official Reconstruction in 1877.  Chickasaws’ continued assertions about their 
sovereign rights, however, clashed with the commitment both Northerners and 
Southerners exhibited toward industrial development and western expansion in the 
Gilded Age.  This meant that Reconstruction would not end until their political 
authority was almost completely dissolved.   
*************** 
By ending on such a sour note, I am not suggesting that Americans’ assertions 
of dominance over their continental domain at the end of the nineteenth century marked 
the end of the road for Native American sovereignty.  In the twentieth century, 
Chickasaws, along with many other Native American peoples, fought to retain and 
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reassert as much of their sovereign rights as possible.30  In our own time, the 
Chickasaws have become a strong political and economic entity within state and federal 
politics.  Such a turnaround has allowed modern Native American advocates to argue 
for recognition of a status higher than that of the individual states—often with success.   
Benjamin Overton’s acceptance of the reality of United States hegemony, and 
therefore that the Chickasaws existed in a semi-sovereign status—the termination of 
which could not be achieved solely by their own demand—during the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, demonstrates less about the Native American struggle for 
recognition of sovereignty than it does about the history of the Americans’ republican 
experiment and the Civil War’s place in its development.  It demonstrates a very real 
reason why Americans should not separate stories of Native American agency away 
from their national narrative. It speaks to the differences and frailties inherent in 
Americans’ construction of a democratic federal republic committed to national 
expansion.  Regardless of Americans’ assertions of dominance and superiority prior to 
the Civil War, they had to resolve their own internal debates over the role of the federal 
government within their own lives, which restricted their ability to use that body 
effectively to enforce compliance from the indigenous populations they sought to 
control.  Therefore, Chickasaw participation in the U.S. Civil War should be situated as 
part what Elliott West calls the “Greater Reconstruction” of mid-nineteenth century.31 
                                                 
30 For examples of how Chickasaws fought to retain their sovereignty through 
the first half of the twentieth century, which many historians consider to be a nadir in 
American Indian-United States relations, see Michael S. Lovegrove, A Nation in 
Transition: Douglas Henry Johnston and the Chickasaw Nation, 1898-1939 (Ada, 
Oklahoma: Chickasaw Press, 2009). 
31 Elliott West calls the period of 1845–1877 the “Greater Reconstruction” era. 
West emphasizes that while the rapid westward expansion of the United States in the 
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mid-nineteenth century not only contributed to the coming of the Civil War, it also had 
a profound effect on the nature of authority in those western territories where no state 
government was in place to contest the ability of the federal government to shape the 
lives of those actually living on the ground.  Elliott West, The Last Indian War: The Nez 
Perce Story (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
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